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This thesis explores disabled activist’s perceptions of the challenges to British disabled people 
thrown up by changes in policy and cuts to services made by the coalition government of 
2010-2015. These themes are explored through a qualitative analysis of interviews conducted 
with 20 disabled activists.  
The thesis begins with a presentation of the history of the British Disabled People’s 
Movement, drawing on writers such as Hunt (1966, 1981), Campbell and Oliver (1996) and 
Barnes and Mercer (2006). This is followed by an overview of available evidence concerning 
current challenges to the standard of living of disabled people. The next chapter involves a 
discussion of methods in the form of a narrative account of the development of the thesis. This 
is followed by an interrogation of prominent methodologies in disability research, pointing to 
the strengths and drawbacks of the emancipatory disability research approach (Oliver, 1992; 
Barnes 2008) by drawing on critical realist perspectives (Sayer, 1992; Lawson, 1999). Moving 
on to an analysis of interview data, the combination of challenges currently facing disabled 
people are explicated. To make sense of challenges revealed at individual, collective and 
ideological levels, the notion of ‘enforced individualism’ (Roulstone and Morgan, 2009) is 
drawn upon. It is argued that, taken together, these challenges comprise novel forms of 
disablism that coexist with older and more familiar forms of disablism associated with 
paternalism and oppression within institutions. Following examination of these challenges, 
attention turns to the political positions and responses that disabled people have adopted in 
reaction. To theorise such responses, Fraser’s (1995: 2003) analysis of injustice and resistance 
is applied to the political positions taken by participants. Later chapters reflect further on 
injustice and resistance, drawing again on Fraser, as well as the extension of the social model 
of disability presented by Thomas (1999; 2007; 2010; 2012), the political theory of Holloway 
(1991; 1993a; 1993b; 2005) and the political economy of Polanyi (1944). These theories serve 
to highlight the nature of contemporary anti-disablist resistance, and also provide a novel 
means of conceptualising the relationship of disability studies and disability activism. 
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Chapter 1: The History of the British Disabled 
People’s Movement 
This thesis explores disabled activist’s perceptions of the challenges to British disabled 
people thrown up by changes in policy and cuts to services made by the coalition 
government of 2010-2015. It also examines the political positions and responses that 
disabled people have adopted in reaction to these challenges. It is structured around a 
qualitative analysis of interviews conducted with 20 disabled activists. It was necessary 
to restrict the sample group to the narrower constituency of those with physical 
impairments (see chapter three), but some of the questions and conclusions thrown 
up by the research could prove relevant to other people who self-define as a disabled 
person. Research for the thesis began in January 2011 and writing up was completed in 
November 2014. Central to the concerns of the thesis are the policies implemented by 
the government upon its election in 2010, as it embarked on a strategy of deficit 
reduction, in main characterised by reducing public sector expenditure. At the time of 
interviews from March 2012 to January 2013, some cuts to services and benefits were 
still in the planning stage, and thus some interviewees were more concerned with 
establishing their concerns about anticipated challenges, rather than addressing prior 
impacts of cuts and reforms. 
In this first chapter I will summarise one of the two main elements that form 
the background to my thesis, giving a brief overview of the British Disabled People’s 
Movement (DPM). This serves the purpose of positioning participants within a wider 
social movement, and contextualises their contributions, showing why their 
contributions to this thesis are valued.  
The British Disabled People’s Movement 
Current activism and opposition to government policy follows a notable history of 
disability activism in the UK. In the past this activism has done much to challenge the 
situation of disabled people in British society, and it is likely to have a major role in any 
opposition to the policies I describe in the next chapter. Together with the impact of 
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austerity on disabled people, the nature of disability activism in the UK provides the 
primary background consideration to this thesis. 
Within this chapter I could not hope to do justice to the diversity at work 
currently and historically within the British DPM. Omission from the following 
discussion should not be taken to mean that I consider omitted topics and 
organisations insignificant. I proceed with the modest goal of sketching some key 
developments and key ideas within the movement, to contextualise the rest of the 
thesis.  
The history of the DPM reflects the development of the movement through its 
various strands and factions, and therefore any account of its history is inevitably 
partial, contentious and open to question. In writing this history I have primarily drawn 
upon Campbell and Oliver’s interviews with key actors in British disability politics in 
their presentation of ‘a series of perspectives on the process of self-organisation of 
disabled people’ (1996: 17) over the preceding thirty years. Campbell and Oliver’s text 
is of particular significance as an example of research carried out with disabled 
activists. To the best of my knowledge it is one of very few examples of research of this 
sort. Another important example of relevant research comes from Barnes and Mercer 
(2006). Though they do not refer to their research participants as ‘activists’, it is 
reasonable to infer that many of them could be described as such. This is because their 
research involved interviews with a range of staff and users of services in Disabled 
People’s Organisations (DPOs) across the country, both in well-established and newer 
DPOs. Many of their participants would appear to fit the profile of an activist. The aim 
of their work was to ‘assess the development of Centres for 
Independent/Integrated/Inclusive Living (CILs) and similar user-directed service 
organisations’ (Barnes and Mercer, 2006: 63). In complement to these more recent 
texts, I also draw upon some notably influential texts from the earlier period of the 
modern movement (Hunt, 1966; UPIAS, 1976). Overviews of the more recent history of 
the movement are scarcer, perhaps reflecting a decline in the vigour of the 
movement’s activity (Oliver and Barnes, 2006). Alternatively, it may be that movement 
actors have been more concerned in recent times with action and less with systematic 
reflection in written form. When I turn to very recent activist history at the end of this 
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chapter, the account given is primarily re-constructed from grey literature, such as 
blogs written by disabled activists and representatives of DPOs. 
The detailed literature concerning the British DPM typically begins with 
reference to the efforts by those within residential institutions to increase the level of 
autonomy they experienced in everyday life (Campbell and Oliver 1996; Barnes and 
Mercer, 2006). Barnes and Mercer observe of this early activism that it ‘stressed self-
determination, choice (where and how to live) and control over support services (who 
assists, how and when), and the removal of disabling barriers in mainstream society’ 
(2006: 33). The growth in consciousness this involved was based on disabled people 
forming groups and, through cooperation, learning more about what they shared in 
common (Campbell and Oliver, 1996). It is clear that these scholars believe something 
distinctive began in the nineteen sixties. This can be understood against a context in 
which the formation of the welfare state created new formal rights for disabled 
people, but by the 1960s ‘many disabled people were faced with the choice of 
managing with little or no service input or being shut away in a geriatric ward, a 
Cheshire home, or the like’ (Campbell and Oliver, 1996: 29). In this sense, the promise 
of greater equality and autonomy offered by the formation of the welfare state was 
not experienced by large numbers of disabled people. As the affluence of society as a 
whole grew, and standards of living improved for many previously impoverished 
sections of society, disabled people were in a stronger position to become more 
assertive in demanding similar levels of prosperity. 
Both Campbell (1997) and Shakespeare (1993) link the growth of the DPM in 
this period to the emergence of other new social movements. This is to say that they 
link the development of the DPM in the nineteen sixties to other movements that 
emerged at a similar time. Such movements eschewed traditional forms of political 
mobilisation, seeking to address political objectives ignored by mainstream political 
organisations. To build on the tentative statements of Campbell (1997) and 
Shakespeare (1993), one might link the growth of the DPM to the post-materialist 
thesis of Inglehart (1971). Inglehart’s basic contention is that the satisfaction of the 
basic material needs of much of society opened up its members to consideration of 
other non or ‘post’ material political demands. Relatedly, one could argue that changes 
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towards a post-industrial society (Touraine, 1974) meant that disabled people could be 
more included in the workforce leading to greater potential rewards for employers. 
Such a background may have meant the demands of disabled people were easier to 
bring about than in the industrial past. Arguments about the shift to post-industrial or 
post-materialist societies are frequently linked to the emergence of new social 
movements in general and may have a degree of relevance to the DPM. However, 
more than many other social movements, the DPM arguably has a strong class based 
dimension (Priestley, 1999), demanding a redistribution of resources to bring about 
participation on the basis of equality (Morris, 2011). Thus although the DPM grew at a 
similar time to many other social movements, the post-materialist thesis of Inglehart 
(1971) tends to overlook an economic based argument of this sort. This is not to 
suggest that other new social movements are exclusively post-materialist. Indeed it 
could be argued that the DPM shares with anti-racism, feminism and other movements 
a ‘bivalent’ (Fraser, 2003) struggle against both cultural and economic oppression (See 
chapter eight). 
Given the significance of economic questions to the DPM, it is relevant to refer 
to Roulstone’s (2002) exploration of the relationship of the DPM to older social 
movements such as trade unions. One of Roulstone’s concerns is with the way trade 
unions have largely been unable to defend aspects of the welfare model that are of 
value to disabled people. This, he argues, is because they have been ill-suited to 
resisting the ‘spatial, technological, trade, political and discursive’ (2002: 634) 
elements of globalisation. These elements operate at a level beyond the reach of 
national trade unions and pose problems for the UK welfare model. Other than 
challenges to the welfare model, disabled people face further problems in the labour 
market that unions have thus far been unable to overcome (ibid). For example, 
Roulstone highlights the results of applying ideals of ‘flexibility’ and labour discipline to 
both public and private sector employment. As parts of the public sector have been 
contracted out, work in cleaning, catering and laundering has required employees take 
less pay for more labour (ibid). Roulstone argues that this and the process to 
competitive tendering has meant people with impairments have lost work due to the 
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way in which the relevant contractors have selected against those they perceive to be 
‘less fit’ to work, removing many disabled people from the work force.  
Roulstone was perhaps more hopeful regarding the role that new social 
movements could take in defending and extending disability rights, noting their 
capacity to use information technology to span national borders and tackle 
international challenges (ibid). Fifteen years after Roulstone wrote, it may be argued 
that new social movements have been no more able than trade unions to resist 
challenges to disabled people in the UK either in the labour market or welfare and 
social care.  
To conclude this brief discussion of social movements and the DPM, it is 
notable that the challenges the DPM faces combine elements characteristic of those 
faced by both old and new social movements, incorporating economic elements that 
are arguably of a more recognisably traditional form than those typically associated 
with new social movements. Arguably, the most obvious recent challenges to the DPM 
have been driven by an economic commitment to shrink public spending as a 
proportion of GDP and to remodel the state on more streamlined neoliberal ideals 
(Blyth, 2013). This perhaps suggests the continued relevance of trade unions to 
disabled people because they represent the largest and most obvious means by which 
these trends may be challenged. On the other hand, greater collaboration between 
trade unions and the DPM would not be straightforward, particularly given a history of 
trade unions defending workers and jobs in cases in which professional practices are 
perceived to be oppressive or paternalistic by many disabled people. 
To continue discussion of the history of the DPM, it is instructive to examine 
the essay A Critical Condition by Paul Hunt (1966). It is part of his book Stigma: The 
Experience of Disability, which has been described as the ‘first important book written 
by disabled people about disability issues’ (Campbell and Oliver, 1996). This text is not 
only of interest in its own right, but can also be read in light of the pivotal leadership 
role that Hunt played in the emergence of the DPM (ibid). 
Hunt drew on the concept of ‘the other’, arguing that disabled people’s 
position challenges and causes discomfort to the values of the rest of society because 
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they are seen as ‘unfortunate, useless, different, oppressed and sick’ (Hunt, 1966: 2). 
He summarises the role of disabled people as ‘the other’ in the following analysis: 
Contact with us throws up in people's faces the fact of sickness and 
death in the world. No one likes to think of such which in themselves 
are an affront to all things, our aspirations and hopes. A deformed 
and paralysed body attacks everyone's sense of well-being and 
invincibility. People do not want to acknowledge what disability 
affirms - that life is tragic and we shall all soon be dead (1966: 8). 
The way in which disabled people are constituted as ‘the other’ underpins what Hunt 
saw as their oppression. Hunt records that he has ‘seen disabled people hurt, treated 
as less than people, told what to do and how to behave by those whose only claim to 
do this came from prejudice and their power over them’ (ibid: 6). In reference to 
institutional settings, Hunt makes the following observation of his experience of the 
oppression of disabled people: 
There are administrators and matrons who have had people removed 
on slight pretexts, who try to break up ordinary friendships if they 
don't approve of them. There are the staff who bully those who 
cannot complain, who dictate what clothes people should wear, who 
switch the television off in the middle of a programme, and will take 
away 'privileges' (like getting up for the day) when they choose. Then 
there are the visitors who automatically assume an authority over us 
and interfere without regard for our wishes (1966: 7). 
Hunt’s work appears to have been a novel development in that it is written by a 
disabled person and characterises disabled people’s political position in terms of 
resistance to oppression. His analysis offers a potent example of the power of taking 
this analytical step, and the way in which it leads to generalising from one’s own 
experience to that of a broader group. This can be seen as Hunt goes beyond his 
experience of institutions to observe: 
Employers turn away qualified and competent workers simply 
because they are disabled. Restaurants and pubs give transparent 
excuses for refusing our custom. Landladies reject disabled lodgers. 
Parents and relations fight the marriage of a cripple into their family 
(1966: 7). 
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Following from this analysis of shared oppression, Hunt articulates the challenge 
offered by disabled people to society as a whole, demanding of it that disabled people 
are included and integrated. This demand reflected a growing refusal of disabled 
people to be ignored and oppressed (ibid). Anticipating the later social model of 
disability, Hunt argues that the focus should be on the change required in society and 
not on the failings of disabled people. He frames this within the need to overcome the 
othering of disabled people and the principle that ‘society is itself sick if it can't face 
our sickness’ (ibid: 9). Disabled people are a challenge ‘to values that put attributes or 
possessions before the person’ (ibid: 10), experiencing life from a position that is 
‘uncomfortable’ and ‘subversive’ to those who insist on the dominance of these 
values. 
At the time at which Hunt wrote, an important trend in disability activism was 
the emergence of the Disability Income Group (DIG), dedicated to gaining disabled 
people a fairer share in the growing wealth of British society (Campbell and Oliver, 
1996; Barnes and Mercer, 2006). Although this group was centred on the campaign for 
greater income, it also had a broader significance, as a forum through which people 
with different impairments could come together and share ideas (Campbell and Oliver, 
1996). It was formed by two disabled women but, for Campbell and Oliver, it 
ultimately represented a ‘false start […] on the road to liberation’ (1996: 63). This is 
because ‘it promised more than it delivered’ (ibid), failing to achieve its goals in part 
because it became subject of a schism ‘between those who wanted to become a single 
issue lobbying group and those who wanted to become a mass movement’ (ibid). 
Increasingly there was a divide between the grass roots of the group and a relatively 
small group of lobbyists who were often able-bodied. According to Campbell and 
Oliver, these factors ultimately meant that the income-centred approach of DIG 
became discredited (ibid). 
Although Campbell and Oliver describe DIG as a ‘false start’, it may have been 
an instructive experience for disabled people seeking to drive forward political change. 
This is because the formation of the Union of the Physically Impaired Against 
Segregation (UPIAS) was, in the words of one of its key activists, Vic Finkelstein, based 
on a ‘direct criticism of DIG’ and the failure of DIG ‘to see disability broadly’ 
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(Finkelstein, interviewed in Campbell and Oliver, 1996: 64). UPIAS was, in contrast to 
DIG, dedicated to looking at disability as a totality and not as a single issue, addressing 
the full range of barriers and discriminations disabled people encounter (ibid). 
Finkelstein argued that this holistic approach to disability followed from Paul Hunt’s 
clarification of the principles that disabled people should have ‘control over their own 
lives’ and also that ‘disability is not a single issue’ (ibid: 64). 
The formation of UPIAS was strongly influenced by Paul Hunt (Campbell and 
Oliver, 1996) who instigated the emergence of UPIAS through writing a letter to the 
Guardian newspaper inviting others to write to him and join him in political 
mobilisation: 
Severely physically handicapped people find themselves in isolated, 
unsuitable institutions, where their views are ignored and they are 
subject to authoritarian and often cruel regimes. I am proposing the 
formulation of a consumer group to put forward the views of the 
actual and potential residents of these successors to the workhouse 
(Guardian, 1972 cited in Campbell and Oliver, 1996: 65). 
Hunt’s letter attracted responses from like-minded individuals. What ultimately 
became UPIAS began as an internal circular exchanged confidentially between 
members of the emerging network instigated by Hunt’s letter. Communications were 
made confidentially so as to protect the identity of institutionalised correspondents 
who were vulnerable to the power of institutional staff and management (Campbell 
and Oliver, 1996). UPIAS appears to have been a dedicated and determined 
organisation. In the words of Ken and Maggie Davis (quoted by Campbell and Oliver), 
the union was ‘very committed to the political requirement facing disabled people, 
which was to produce a rigorous, dependable explanation of disability in social terms 
that enabled society itself to be seen as the focal point of disabled people’s attention’ 
(1996: 66). 
This requirement led to the writing of a manifesto The Fundamental Principles 
of Disability (1976) which contained a now famous passage which firmly asserted 
society’s responsibility for the creation of disability: 
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In our view, it is society which disables physically impaired people. 
Disability is something imposed on top of our impairments by the 
way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full 
participation in society. Disabled people are therefore an oppressed 
group in society (UPIAS, 1976: 14). 
This analysis inverted common sense ideas about disability and rejected the 
individualisation and medicalization of disabled people’s situation. It separated 
biological impairment from the social oppression of disability. From an essentially 
social analysis of disability flowed a stance on political action that arguably continues 
to characterise much of disability activism in the UK: 
The correct direction for the Union's main energies follows from our 
view of the cause of our oppression. We see the essential task, at this 
point in time, as that of helping disabled people to organise together 
to take a more active part in struggling for the changes in society 
which will ensure that we are brought into the mainstream of life, 
rather than being excluded (UPIAS, 1976: 14). 
The social interpretation of disability that informed this strategic analysis does not 
deny the medical definition of impairment, or deny that impairments can cause 
difficulty, but seeks to separate the individual experience of impairment from the 
social process of oppression that those with impairments experience in a disabling 
society. This way of interpreting disability was subsequently popularised, firstly by 
Oliver (1983), as the social model of disability. By this Oliver referred to: 
Nothing more or less fundamental than a switch away from focusing 
on the physical limitations of particular individuals to the way the 
physical and social environments impose limitations upon certain 
groups or categories of people (Oliver, 1983: 23). 
This view continues to influence debate on disability, especially but not only in the UK, 
both within activist groups and within disability studies. Disability studies (an academic 
discipline concerned with research into disability related-issues) itself grew as it 
pursued research informed by the social model, building on earlier work by activists 
based on a ‘disability as oppression’ perspective such as that of Finkelstein (1980). The 
social model continues to exert a strong influence within disability studies, and has 
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played an immensely influential role within disability activism in the UK (Hasler, 1993). 
It has also become the object of increasing criticism from some academics (e.g. 
Shakespeare, 2006). I refer to it throughout this thesis and explore it further in chapter 
nine. 
UPIAS established important ideas of this sort and stated them with cogency 
but they did not attract mass support (Campbell and Oliver, 1996). In the view of some 
of those interviewed by Campbell and Oliver, this may have been because of the 
perception that it was exclusionary, male dominated or aggressively argumentative 
(ibid). Later in the early nineteen eighties, as DPOs grew in different parts of the 
country, the British Council of Disabled People (BCODP) was formed to strengthen 
local movements by bringing them together through a national forum. Varying 
accounts of the genesis of BCODP are given by interviewees in Campbell and Oliver 
(1996), including references to the need identified by members of UPIAS to build an 
alternative organisation with a wider constituency. 
Campbell and Oliver and their contributors generally agree that the BCODP 
played a crucial role in the history of the DPM in the UK. Judy Hunt, quoted by 
Campbell and Oliver, argues that the emergence of BCODP marked ‘the point at which 
the movement became very visible and took on board the social interpretation of 
disability’ (1996: 80). It built on the work of those like Hunt and UPIAS in earlier 
decades and, through its greater scale and national constituency, pushed important 
issues toward a higher profile in general political debate. These issues included 
‘critiques of state-based and voluntary-sector based welfare, struggles for IL 
[independent living], campaigns against discrimination in all its forms, self-help, and 
challenges to the negative imagery and stereotypes with which disabled people 
constantly have to live’ (ibid). 
The existence of the council itself was also important to its members, 
demonstrating the strength that could be drawn from representative members of 
DPOs, and offering a powerful contrast with organisations ‘for’ disabled people which 
exercised power on behalf of disabled people without their democratic input 
(Campbell and Oliver, 1996). In the view of Campbell and Oliver it also had definite 
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practical benefits, offering a powerful reminder to those in control of disability policy 
that they were under the watch of a nationally organised disability organisation 
dedicated to change (ibid).The authors also argue that it gave legitimacy to local 
organisations of disabled people, making it easier for them to attract resources and 
members, in turn allowing members of local organisations to feed their experiences of 
success back into the BCODP. 
BCODP was not without its problems and it was criticised by some of Campbell 
and Oliver’s (1996) activist interviewees for appearing to be too radical in its demands; 
too influenced by left-wing politics; dominated by wheelchair users; and wrong to act 
as if it represented disabled people in general. It also suffered problems due to having 
to compete with the ‘disability establishment’ of charities and private sector care 
providers, meaning it was often perceived to be poorly resourced and organised (ibid). 
Despite these problems, it is hard to dispute that the BCODP had a valuable impact on 
many disabled people’s lives. One prominent example of this is its role in the campaign 
to establish anti-discrimination legislation for disabled people (ibid). Others include its 
role in ‘creating and funding the National Centre for Independent Living (NCIL) in 1997, 
which became the leading organisation giving information and support to local centres 
for independent living’ (UKDPC, ND)
1
. It also influenced the development of the 
Community Care (Direct Payments) Act (1996) and established a Research Unit at the 
University of Leeds (ibid). It continues to exist today as the UK Disabled People's 
Council and still functions as a membership organisation for various regional DPOs. Of 
similar prominence today is Disability Rights UK, formed from a unification of Disability 
Alliance, Radar and the National Centre for Independent Living on 1 January 2012. 
There are few sources available which discuss the history of the DPM in the first 
decade of this century. This may be a reflection of a period in which comparative 
economic stability brought gains to disabled people as the ideas of the movement 
gradually gained a foothold within parts of policy making communities. Another 
explanation may be the increasing professionalization of parts of the movement and 
its integration with the state and service providers (Oliver and Barnes, 2006). This 




might mean activists had less time to dedicate to writing histories or engaging in self-
conscious theoretical reflection on the practice of the movement. This could be read as 
a sign of success in that the decline in visibility of the movement may have signalled its 
achievement in gaining a platform for movement actors and the objectives of the 
movement. Dejong (1983, cited by Barnes and Mercer, 2006: 138) writes of the 
American Independent Living Movement that it increasingly sought change by working 
within government and through cooperation, as its grievances and policy 
recommendations began to be accepted. This could arguably be applied to the DPM in 
the UK through the late nineteen nineties and the ‘noughties’ as it seemed to lose 
some of its campaigning visibility. A process of absorption of movements into existing 
social structures is in keeping with social movement theory exploring the stages 
through which movements evolve. For example, Blumer (1951) describes a four-stage 
‘life-cycle’ of social movements, ending with institutionalisation of a movement as it 
becomes an embedded and absorbed part of society and takes on professional form.  
 From this view, the decline of writing about and engaging in political protest 
may be reflective of the success of the movement had in persuading politicians of their 
cause. Alternatively, in a view closer to that of Oliver and Barnes (2006), this process 
could be seen as the co-option and professionalization of the movement. Given the 
apparent decline in writing about the movement until very recently, when I return to 
my overview of the DPM, I will be discussing the recent history of the movement and 
its response to contemporary challenges. 
By giving this background to the emergence of the DPM, I hope to have 
established the field of contention with which the movement is concerned. The 
academic field with which this thesis can broadly be identified, disability studies, 
shared a similar set of ideas to the DPM at first, but has undergone significant 
diversification in the last two decades, expanding to embrace areas of concern such as 
embodiment (Loja et al, 2013); disability in the global south (Soldatic, 2013); disability 
and the life course (Priestley, 2003); and internalised oppression and psycho-
emotional disablism (Reeve, 2002). Theoretical and methodological changes have also 
developed in disability studies, with an increased interest in post-structuralist ideas 
(Shildrick, 2012; Goodley, 2013) and critical realist approaches (Bhaskar & Danermark, 
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2005; Shakespeare, 2006). Despite this diversification, it is fair to say much of disability 
activism (my primary area of concern) remains informed by the principles established 
in the earlier part of the movement’s history. Before I turn to the recent history of the 
DPM, I will clarify the relation of the DPM to the Independent Living Movement (ILM). 
In doing so I will more fully describe the field of contention concerning British disabled 
activists. 
The British Independent Living Movement 
The Independent Living Movement (ILM) has emerged and grown over a similar period 
to the DPM, sharing many of its objectives and participants. At times the terms ILM 
and DPM can be referred to interchangeably, reflecting the difficulty one would have 
separating them in practice. The terms ‘DPM’ and ‘ILM’ can be usefully employed to 
denote differing emphases and tactics among disabled activists. To give an impression 
of the differences at work, I now give a brief overview of the history of the ILM in 
Britain. 
Describing the origins of the ILM in the nineteen seventies, Evans (2002) notes 
how its emergence resulted from the disenchantment that many British disabled 
people were feeling with services provided for them. As he puts it ‘Disabled people felt 
the services were paternalistic, institutional, second class, too medically orientated 
and out of touch with their real needs’ (2002: 1). In complement to this account, 
Morris (1993; 1994, cited in Barnes and Mercer, 2006: 39) summarises the following 
failings of state and voluntary sector provision of ‘care’ which gave impetus to the 
movement:  
• Low standards, with complaints of lack of respect, neglect and abuse – in the 
community as well as in residential settings; 
• A failure to ensure equal access and opportunities to engage in everyday 
activities; 
• The presumption of service provider control and user passivity/compliance; 
and 
• A lack of accountability, with little recognition of the rights of service users 
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These failings gave additional motivation to disabled people who wished to leave 
institutions and instead live in the community with personal assistance. Those driven 
by these grievances in the UK differed from their counterparts in the American ILM 
whose campaign was initially concerned with gaining greater independence at 
university in the late nineteen sixties (Evans, 2002).  
Of those demanding independent living in the UK, among the first groups to 
move out of an institution into living in the community were some of the residents of 
Le Court residential home in Hampshire. For Evans, the position they took against the 
institution in which they lived represented a refusal ‘to accept that they were destined 
to spend the rest of their lives excluded from the rest of society’ (2008)
2
. Evans and the 
others who comprised this group wished to apply the principles of independent living 
imported from the USA, including ‘asserting control about the decisions of their lives, 
empowering themselves, taking more responsibility about what was happening to 
them and developing their own choice’ (2002: 3). Following three years of persuasion 
and negotiation, the group negotiated a financial package with their local authority to 
enable them to move out of their institution into their community. In practice their 
local authority ‘provided them with the amount of money, agreed through an 
assessment which they could then use to pay for the support they needed through 
employing their own personal assistants (2002: 4). At this point direct payments to 
users of services were illegal, meaning an elaborate alternative needed to be 
constructed. Barnes and Mercer describe this development: 
‘An innovative arrangement of ‘indirect payments’ was agreed. It 
allowed local authority funding of an individual’s institutional ‘care’, 
subject to an assessment, with individual cash payments in lieu of the 
institutional services received. The money was paid into a trust fund 
(with a local authority or voluntary organisation) on behalf of the 
user. And was used for personal assistance to enable the disabled 
person to live in the community (Barnes and Mercer, 2006: 46). 
Deriving huge benefit from this arrangement, the group sought to share and spread 
their experiences by founding the Hampshire Centre for Independent Living (CIL) in 




1984. This important development involved the creation of a centre available for all 
disabled people, run by disabled people (Evans, 2002). Such an arrangement was 
designed to develop ‘expertise around Independent Living issues which could easily be 
passed on to other disabled people through advice, information, peer support, self-
help, sharing and training’ (ibid: 6). The main initial focuses of Hampshire CIL were with 
ensuring that independence of disabled people living in the community was made 
possible through suitable housing and sufficient personal assistance.  
Also in 1984, the Derbyshire Centre for Integrated Living was founded. 
Although this shared broadly similar priorities to Hampshire CIL, Evans (2002) notes 
that the two centres had quite different approaches. While Hampshire CIL had a 
narrower focus on personal assistance, support and direct payments issues, Derbyshire 
CIL adopted a broader range of priorities inspired by the 5 core services developed by 
the first CIL in Berkley, California. These included: housing, personal assistance, 
mobility/transport, access and peer counselling. To this they added information and 
technical equipment including support (ibid). These became known as the Derbyshire 
seven needs, exerting great influence over incipient CILs in other parts of the country. 
Among the first CILs to follow in the UK were Southampton, Nottingham, Bristol, 
Islington, Lambeth, Greenwich and Lothian (ibid).  
As a key participant in ILM, Evans (2008) stresses the central role CILs have 
played in the push toward independent living, arguing that they were well placed to 
promote further such initiatives because they were: 
Endowed with an invaluable expertise, which was essential in 
supporting a sustainable framework to enable the movement to 
flourish. It was a collective approach which soon developed a 
dynamic network of different models of exchange, ideas and 
practices throughout the country
3
. 
The number of CILs grew through the nineteen eighties and nineties, and although 
they have experienced increasing financial pressures and competition from private 




sector and charitable organisations, by 2008 Evans could report that there were 
roughly fifty across the UK (ibid).  
Differences in how independent living is implemented by different CILs are 
reflective of the fact that independent living is both a governing approach or 
philosophy and a practical delivery method of supporting relationships. As a 
philosophy, IL is a demand that self-determination be understood as a human right and 
a refusal to equate physical needs with dependency. As a delivery method, IL puts 
these principles into practice through measures such as direct payments and individual 
or personal budgets
4
. Such mechanisms have the potential to deliver greater 
independence than monolithic services directly provided by the state. The extent to 
which IL as a delivery method will deliver on the principles of IL as a philosophy will be 
determined by a series of broader circumstances including the level of funding 
received by individuals through each of these mechanisms. 
Another aspect of IL as a practical delivery method is the independent living 
fund (ILF). Along with the importance of the growth in CILs, Evans (2002) highlights the 
achievements of the ILM in campaigning successfully for the introduction of the 
Independent living Fund (ILF) and the legalisation of direct payments. The introduction 
of the ILF followed the decision of the government in 1986 to withdraw an existing 
benefit called the Domestic Care Allowance which had enabled some disabled people 
to live independently (ibid). This provoked a campaign by outraged disabled people for 
the replacement of the Domestic Care Allowance, resulting in the introduction of the 
ILF. Evans emphasises the value of the ILF because of the improvements in flexibility 
and funding it delivered for many recipients. He also points out that it ‘helped some 
people who already had an Independent Living scheme, by providing more money as a 
supplement to their existing arrangements. This allowed them more flexibility and 
choice in how they operated their schemes (2002: 12).  
                                                                                                                                                                          
4
 An individual/personal budget is a budget held by the state but allocated by the user to the provider of 
their support (see Glendinning et al, 2008). A direct payment is a direct cash payment to the individual 
(see Spandler, 2004). 
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Within the successful campaign for direct payments, the BCODP Independent 
Living Committee took on a central role in promoting direct payments. As Evans 
describes, the campaign for direct payments was initiated ‘in order to change the 
legislation to make it easier for local authorities to establish Direct Payment schemes’ 
(2002: 14). Another reason behind the campaign was a disparity in how different local 
authorities viewed the legality of independent living schemes. Local authorities in 
some areas interpreted existing legislation to mean that independent living schemes 
were illegal, meaning they could not be provided. This lent additional determination to 
campaigner’s efforts to change legislation in order that all could benefit from direct 
payments (ibid). An important stage in BCODP’s campaign to legalise direct payments 
was the research it commissioned (Zarb and Nadash, 1994) into the ‘cost implications 
and effectiveness of direct payment schemes’ (Evans, 2002: 18). The results of the 
research were overwhelmingly positive, finding that direct payments offer disabled 
people ‘a higher degree of choice and control, and were more reliable than service 
provision. Service users reported much higher levels of unmet need than payment 
users. They were four times more likely to have difficulty in obtaining back up for 
regular support than payment users. They were less likely to have assistance delivered 
in the manner they wanted’ (Evans, 2002: 19). 
Combined with extensive lobbying this research had the desired effect, as in 
1996 the government legislated to legalise direct payments, which was widely seen as 
a success for the ILM. These positive steps toward independent living were followed by 
further legislation in the first decade of this century, including the commitment to 
develop CILs in every locality of the UK (Cabinet Office - Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, 
2005). In more recent years the principle behind direct payments of increasing the 
autonomy and decision making power of disabled people has arguably been extended 
within the push to ‘personalise’ social care through personal budgets. With the 
economic crisis of 2008 and change of government in 2010, the ILM is facing new 
challenges which I describe in the next chapter.  
To close this discussion of the ILM and relate it to the DPM, it is helpful to 
define more carefully the concepts at work within the ILM. Most fundamentally, the 
ILM has challenged the dominant ideology of independence (Morris, 2014c). Rather 
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than the dominant view which assumes that independence and holding one’s own in 
society requires that one be able to do everything for oneself, the approach of the ILM 
changed the meaning of independence. For the ILM, independence is about being in 
control of one’s life and being able to achieve one’s goals. This necessitates adequate 
levels of assistance and the removal of disabling barriers to bring it about. This 
different approach to independence shifts the focus away from the incapacities of an 
individual towards a consideration of what is necessary to bring about their right to 
independence. 
Comparing the ILM with the broader DPM, Evans comments that ‘it is surprising 
that there have been so few conflicts amongst this group [the ILM], as it is not the case 
with the wider disability movement and its groups where the struggle for power has 
often taken precedence over the main core aims and purposes’ (2002: 30). It may be 
that the more focused priorities of the ILM lent it cohesiveness through a fairly clearly 
defined set of goals. However, the ILM is still subject to a tension between, on one 
hand, political activism, campaigning and protest, and, on the other hand, the 
everyday business of service delivery and promoting choice and control through CILs 
and helping individuals (ibid). This could be read as a tension between working 
towards the narrower goal of independent living, and working as part of the DPM as a 
whole, protesting against and dismantling political, economic and social structures of 
disablism. This is not to say that the ILM has been focused on a modest or overly 
restricted set of objectives. I return to further reflection on independent living in 
chapter 8. 
The Recent History of the Disabled People’s Movement 
I now return to the various strands of the DPM, moving from the earlier history of the 
movement to recent responses to contemporary challenges of disablism. In recent 
years as potential challenges to autonomy and standards of living have emerged (see 
chapter two), protest and opposition has grown. At the same time, degrees of 
disagreement and division have become apparent as differing responses to the 
government programme of austerity have been articulated. I now turn to some recent 
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examples of opposition to government policy, before detailing some apparent divisions 
within the movement. 
Recent Examples of Protest against Government Disability 
Policy 
Among protests against government disability policy, a prominent example is the call 
for a comprehensive, government-funded, cumulative impact assessment on the 
changes I describe in chapter two. This has formed the subject of a petition and a 
campaign, collecting over the required number of 100,000 signatures to lead to a 
debate on the matter in the House of Commons. Other new political mobilisations 
provoked by disability policy changes are the emergence of the ‘grassroots’ 
organisation Disabled People Against the Cuts (DPAC) and the network of non-
academic researchers collectively known as the Spartacus Network. The Spartacus 
Network produced two notable reports into reforms of disability policy. The first of 
these, titled Responsible Reform, was ‘a presentation of the most relevant evidence 
available on Disability Living Allowance (DLA) and the proposals to replace it with a 
new benefit, Personal Independence Payments (PIP) (Campbell et al, 2013: 3). In the 
following year the network produced another detailed research report into 
Employment and Support Allowance, the Work Programme and recommendations for 
a new system of support titled Beyond the Barriers (Benstead et al, 2014). These 
reports received fairly high levels of exposure and were helped in this by a strong 
social media presence. DPAC has also thrived through social media and blogs, making 
connections with other non-disabled activists opposed to the government’s austerity 
program. In DPAC’s case this has been combined with more traditional street-based 
protests. 
Along with the work of the Spartacus Network, another report produced by 
non-academic disabled researchers was written by Inclusion London, DPAC and other 
unspecified DPOs from ‘across the UK’ published as the UK Disabled People’s 
Manifesto: Reclaiming Our Futures in 2013. Its stated aim is to ‘map the key principles, 
demands and commitments that disabled people and our allies can use in campaigning 
and lobbying’ (Inclusion London, 2013: 1). It is intended as a ‘‘road map’ setting out a 
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vision for real sustainable change and alternative approaches to every area of our lives’ 
(ibid: 1). The document adopts an approach informed by the social model of disability 
and addresses the full range of current barriers to equality facing disabled people, 
ranging from education to housing and organisation of support.  
Among the arguments in the UK Disabled People’s Manifesto document are 
seven ‘priority demands’, including ‘A Legal right to Independent Living and Self- 
Determination: The creation of a specific independent living law: a legal right that fully 
enacts and enforces, as domestic law, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
People with Disabilities (UNCRPD) incorporating the 12 pillars of independent living as 
its key goals and principles’ (2013: 3). Later, the authors go into greater depth on this 
demand: 
There must be extensive and sustainable funding for genuine 
independent living and user self-directed support that is free at the 
point of need, paid from general taxation with ring-fenced funding. 
Funding must be at levels that enable disabled people to achieve self-
determined independent living, in its widest sense as defined under 
the UNCRPD, with the realistic option to employ personal assistants, 
at an adequate wage, through the provision of Direct Payments. The 
level of support should be one that enables disabled and non-
disabled people to enjoy the same degree of control over their lives 
that does not involve being forced into residential, group or nursing 
home provision (2013: 5). 
In this passage one can see the presence of a strong commitment to non-negotiable 
rights to independent living, resulting in the rejection of many current policy positions 
of the government. As an example of this wide-ranging critique, the manifesto 
demands ‘a halt to other current welfare ‘reforms’ including the Work Capability 
Assessment, Personal Independence Payments, and benefit caps which are not 
working and are disproportionally impacting on disabled people’ (ibid: 8). 
Of dozens of other demands, I wish to draw specific attention to two which 
illustrate the distinctive response that DPAC and Inclusion London have given to 
reforms and cuts. One is the demand that government: 
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Stop the closure of the cost effective Independent Living Fund (ILF) 
and set up an Independent living task force, co-produced with ILF 
users, to review independent living and specifically the Independent 
Living Fund in order to identify how best to improve, develop and 
extend independent living support building on the successful model 
of ILF provision (ibid:6). 
As we shall see later, this position is notable because other high profile DPOs have 
moved toward reluctant acceptance of the closure of the ILF. The other demand from 
the Manifesto I wish to highlight is: 
The creation of a disabled person citizen’s income that reflects the 
level of income that a disabled person needs to cover the additional 
economic, social, cultural and impairment costs disabled people 
experience, including costs of exclusion from employment and 
additional living costs. It should replace the plethora of different, 
flawed benefits that are currently in place (ibid: 14). 
This is notable because it differs from the ‘radical’ approach of UPIAS and their 
rejection of the income approach of DIG in favour of a holistic approach to the totality 
of disability. That said, in many other ways, the emergence of DPAC could be seen as a 
renaissance in socialist disability protest and a return to the type of historical 
materialist, anti-capitalist disability politics represented by some members of UPIAS 
such as Finkelstein (1980). 
Resurgent Socialism in the Disabled People’s Movement? The 
Example of Disabled People Against the Cuts 
Clifford (2014), an affiliate of the DPAC network, has proposed that its growth should 
be understood as a response to the tendency for DPOs to ‘become subsumed by a 
service delivery and contract culture’
5
. As the presence of more politicised DPOs 
declined, Clifford argued that ‘disabled “professionals” made careers by claiming to 
represent us’ (ibid)
5
. For Clifford, this backdrop meant there was an inadequate basis 
for organised resistance against the government’s policies, meaning the birth of DPAC 
was a necessity (ibid). The resulting mobilisation behind DPAC has seen ‘working class 




disabled people’ discover their ‘own power to effect change and have challenged the 
authority of the disability elite’ (ibid)
5
. Burnip (2012), also affiliated to DPAC, sounds a 
similar note, identifying the existence of a distant ‘disability elite who have little 
experience of working class disabled people’s lives speaking for us with little 
knowledge of how fearful disabled people are or what life actually is like for those 
living on benefits, losing care and support funding and being thrown into even greater 
poverty and despair’ (2012: 3). 
Williams-Findlay argues that DPAC has grown partly in response to a tendency 
within this elite toward ‘a watering down of the ideas expressed by the likes of UPIAS, 
Finkelstein and Oliver to the extent that ‘disablism’ is simply reduced to the experience 
of discriminatory attitudes and practices found within society’ (2011)
6
. Without a 
rigorous analysis of disablism, rooted in politics and economics, Williams-Findlay 
argues that political campaigns are led to stress the vulnerability and neediness of 
specific groups or individual disabled people (ibid). These campaigns, he argues, make 
the mistake of failing to challenge the terms of much of public discourse on disability. 
Rather than making arguments in relation to fundamental rights and the social context 
of disablist social structures, such campaigns offer ‘a simplistic message via 
stereotyped images of disabled people and their lives. In doing so they have assisted in 
constructing the new contours that are being drawn around disabled people in order 
to divide them’ (ibid)
6
. 
Whilst not explicitly referring to DPAC, Oliver makes a similar point, finding 
fault with the recent tendency for the movement to be based ‘upon weakness and 
vulnerability. It asks for special treatment, protection and dependency’ (2012)
7
. In this 
light, Burnip complains that a growing number of DPOs are ‘campaigning from the 
medical/charity model perspective and emphasising how vulnerable disabled people 
are due simply to their impairments rather than because of the barriers they face... 
this is a major threat to any disabled people’s movement in the future as it reinforces 
stereotypical views that we need to be ‘looked after and protected’’ (2012: 2). For 






Burnip, this is a short step away from reinforcing ideas of deserving and undeserving 
disabled people, which have become more prevalent in recent times (ibid). 
For Clifford (2014), DPAC breaks from accommodating charitable arguments of 
this sort, offering a distinct position from the ‘disability elite’ by positioning itself 
openly to the left of the political spectrum, working with the ‘anti-austerity movement 
with core principles based on an understanding of the oppression of disabled people in 
the context of class politics’
8
. In her view this strategy is driven by a necessity to 
engage with the issue of class, driven by ‘the current political climate where attacks on 
disabled people can only be understood within the framework of a wider ideological 
agenda aimed at dismantling the welfare state and attacks on workers’.  
DPAC are unusual in their adoption of class politics, but their deep questioning 
of the underlying assumptions of disability policy should not be taken to mean they are 
an extreme outlier or that their positions lack credibility. Indeed it is notable that some 
more ‘mainstream’ activists have made points that could be interpreted as 
complementary to those made in the UK Disabled People’s Manifesto. For example, 
Morris (2011) has previously worked as a consultant to government on disability 
issues, and would not typically be considered a fringe or radical member of the 
movement. It is of note then that she adopts positions that are quite similar in tone 
and content to some of those taken by DPAC. For example, in summarising her 
argument she states that: 
In campaigning for policies to tackle disabling barriers and enable 
equal access, we need to explicitly and vigorously promote the 
welfare state and the concept of social security in its broadest sense. 
People of all ages who experience impairment and/or illness are at a 
disadvantage in a society and an economy where the market is the 
sole arbiter of opportunities and life chances (2011: 1). 
This fits closely with the position taken by DPAC; that campaigns for disability rights 
must be placed within a generalised opposition to cuts to public services as a whole. 
One notable difference is that DPAC conclude from this that they should work closely 




with trade unions, whereas Morris does not stress this point. Another notable 
statement by Morris is that: 
There is little room for making progress within the ideological 
framework driving current disability policies. We need to develop 
more radical challenges to the current disability policy agenda and 
engage in wider debates, particularly those which question the 
continuing pursuit of economic growth regardless of the damage 
done to the environment, to values and to humanity (2011: 1). 
How this statement might be translated into practical political programs may vary 
widely, but it seems to suggest that a more general challenge to the economic model is 
required to make progress in realising disability rights. Again this could be seen as 
similar to DPAC’s argument that a fundamental challenge should be made to the 
economic model driving disability policy. In their terms this can be understood in terms 
of class conflict, whereas Morris frames the issue in less conflictual terminology.  
DPAC is a ‘network’ without a centrally agreed political position or ideology and 
one should therefore be cautious to ascribe the idea of resurgent socialism to DPAC as 
a whole. That said, it is discernible from the writing of DPAC affiliates that an explicitly 
socialist message is often expressed that stresses the need to address disablism in 
coordination with struggles for social justice in general. In some cases affiliates of 
DPAC argue that this means working with professionals and care/support workers is 
important. This point differs from much of the DPM’s history in which professionals 
and ‘care’ workers have been maligned for their role in the oppression of disabled 
people (e.g. Davis, 1993). In other respects DPAC’s explicitly socialist politics could be 
seen as a revival of the Marxist materialist politics of members of UPIAS such as 
Finkelstein (1980), consistent with historical materialist analysis of disability such as 
that made by Oliver (1990). 
Tensions Surrounding the Positions Taken by Disability Rights 
UK 
We saw above that part of DPAC’s approach is to challenge what they perceive as a 
distant ‘disability elite’. This has been particularly apparent in the criticisms they and 
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others have made of Disability Rights UK (DR UK). While DPAC and others might 
criticise the ‘disability elite’ for complicity in damaging policies, an opposing point of 
view might suggest that failing to engage with government removes the voices of the 
majority of disabled people from the process of policy formulation. Arguably, without 
such engagement valuable innovations such as direct payments or the ILF would not 
have been gained in the first place. The tension around this issue of engagement/co-
option is most clearly apparent in the criticisms of DR UK. 
To begin discussing the criticism made of DR UK, it is relevant to cite Oliver’s 
(2011) concerns over the merger of the Royal Association for Disability and 
Rehabilitation (RADAR) the Disability Alliance (DA) and the National Centre for 
Independent Living (NCIL) into DR UK. His concerns are rooted in the history of these 
organisations. In the case of RADAR, it began as the ‘Central Council for Cripples and 
was rooted in the nineteenth century charity ethic’ (2011)
9
. DA was also an 
organisation primarily conceived as an organisation ‘for’ disabled people ‘formed when 
a group of mainly non-disabled academics fell out with the Disablement Income Group 
over the right way to achieve a national disability income’ (ibid). Oliver notes that 
neither of these organisations has ever been controlled by disabled people. In his view, 
while NCIL began as the Independent Living Sub-committee of the British Council of 
Disabled People (BCODP), it had moved away from a form in which it was controlled by 
disabled people. Given the history of these constituent organisations, Oliver’s concern 
is with the absence of control by disabled people in DR UK and the resulting positions it 
may take. Oliver notes that historically, the greatest successes were achieved through 
the activity of organisations controlled by disabled people, often against the will of 
non-accountable organisations for disabled people. He closes his argument by stating: 
I cannot escape from the lessons of our historical and recent past; 
namely that when non-accountable organisations have spoken for us 
our issues and our lives have been sacrificed on the altars of political 
collaboration, policy compromise and personal opportunism (2011)
9
. 




Oliver is not alone in finding reason to criticise the influential DR UK. For example, 
members of DPAC have made strong criticisms of DR UK, finding fault in its apparent 
decision to accept that the ILF should be closed. As evidence of DR UK’s position, Sue 
Bott (2014), Director of DR UK suggests that the energies put into defending the ILF 
could be better spent on ‘a single integrated system that would assess people’s needs 
and allocate assistance and support based on the outcomes people could achieve in 
their communities and contribute to society’ (2014)
10
. Her argument is based, in part, 
on the reasoning that the ILF is a national scheme providing funds to cover the cost of 
‘care’ and support and is therefore anomalous and inefficient within a system in which 
social care is delivered and charged for through local authorities. Activists affiliated 
with DPAC disagree with Bott’s reasoning. For example, Punton (2014) notes that the 
money given to local authorities to replace the ILF will not be ring fenced, and believes 
that financially pressured local authorities will not provide the necessary support to 
those with ‘severe’ impairments. Therefore, DPAC activists argue that abandoning the 
ILF could mean that they are forced to live in institutions as they are denied the 
finance provided by the ILF (ibid). 
Another point of disagreement between DR UK and some other activist groups 
has been the dispute over the closure of Remploy factories
11
 by the government. 
Traditionally the existence of Remploy factories has been seen as indicative of the 
marginalised and segregated position many disabled people live in, and the disabling 
attitudes that prevail in much of society. As a form of segregation, prominent parts of 
the DPM support their closure, including Essex Coalition of Disabled People, 
Southampton Centre for Independent Living, Breakthrough UK, and DR UK (Pring, 
2012b). In her report for government on disability and employment, the Chief 
Executive of DR UK, Liz Sayce (2011), asserts that ‘In relation to Remploy factories 
there was a total consensus among disabled people’s organisations and charities that 
the factories were not the model for the 21st Century’ (2011:15). This is debatable 
given that others, including DPAC, Inclusion London, Inclusion Scotland and Norfolk 




 Remploy is an organisation owned by the Department of Work and Pensions. Historically it has run 
and subsidised factories producing a number of goods, providing employment for disabled people. Over 
the last two terms of government the factories have been closed. 
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Coalition of Disabled People, have criticised the closure, arguing that the redundancies 
and resulting unemployment of those concerned was not a great sign of progress in 
the position of disabled people in society (Pring, 2012b). In their joint letter to the 
Guardian Newspaper (May, 2012) these organisations stated that ‘our goal and 
demand for inclusive employment must not be used to justify job cuts that will push 
these workers into poverty, exclusion and isolation’
12
. According to the Labour Party, 
as of November 2012, only 3% of former Remploy employees had found employment 
(Ranmesh, 2012). 
A final cause of disagreement with DR UK is the criticism made by The UK 
Disabled People’s Council (UKDPC) of its participation in Disability Action Alliance 
(DAA), an umbrella group formed by the government to produce new disability 
policies, consisting of DPOs, charities, and private and public sector organisations. The 
website Disability News Service carried the following summary of UKDPC’s response to 
DR UK’s participation in DAA: 
Julie Newman, UKDPC’s acting chair, said the appointment had taken 
place “behind closed doors”, and that DR UK was clearly “too close” 
to the government. She said DAA would simply be another “quango”, 
and was certain to represent the views and interests of big business 
and service-providers. She said: “We will be looking at the 
commercialisation of independent living in a way that is in conflict 
with human rights. DAA will effectively be a commercial enterprise 
driven by government.” Newman questioned the “validity” of the 
government’s decision, which “excludes disabled people from setting 
the agenda or defining the terms of reference” (Pring, 2012a)
13
. 
The criticism made of DR UK regarding the ILF, Remploy and the DAA demonstrate that 
some level of division is apparent within the movement. Arguably, this conflicts with 
the answer given to Disability News Service by Liz Sayce of DR UK when she 
commented that DR UK and groups such as DPAC “all want the same thing” but were 
just “different in their tactics” (Pring, 2012c)
14
. Sayce’s comments here fit in with the 









approach taken by DR UK to eschew open criticism of others, generally avoiding 
defence of its own positions, instead preferring to stress unity with other DPOs and 
cooperation with politicians. As a short defence of its position, current chair of DR UK, 
Phil Friend, in an interview with Disability News Service, commented that DR UK would 
“rather be in the tent talking to the government than outside the tent chucking stuff 
in” (Pring, 2012c)
14
. In the same interview, Liz Sayce again defended the approach 
taken of working with government, arguing that if the DPM had not engaged with 
previous Conservative governments it “would never have got direct payments, we 
would never have got the Disability Discrimination Act” (ibid). 
In noting the presence of disputes in the movement I am not seeking to stress 
division but to highlight important points of contestation within current approaches 
taken to challenging disablism. The weight of material criticising DR UK should not 
necessarily be seen as an indication that it is mistaken in the positions it has taken. An 
even-handed way of viewing these disputes may be to see them as evoking the 
dilemma stated by Oliver and Barnes that ‘[t]o get too close to the Government is to 
risk incorporation and end up carrying out their proposals rather than ours. To move 
too far away is to risk marginalisation and eventual demise’ (2006: 2). 
I will not be able to resolve such disputes in this thesis, but it may be that I can 
throw some light on the nature of current challenges facing the movement and 
develop an analysis of current forms of disablism in the UK, informed by wider social 
theory. Hopefully, this might help to inform political activism in the field. By 
interviewing activists from varying backgrounds with differing views in this thesis, I can 
further explore the tensions within the movement. By giving voice to participants 
regarding current challenges and available strategies, I hope to offer an insightful 
account informed by varying perspectives. Such voices are divided on some aspects of 
their analysis but also unified to a degree by a critique of government policy. At a time 
when the challenges to individual disabled people and DPOs I describe in the next 
chapter are driving debate forward, tensions are likely to become even more apparent. 
This need not be seen as unhealthy as debate over both the nature of challenges and 
the possibilities and strategies for resistance can only help the DPM. It is with the 
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purpose of understanding these challenges and possible responses that I proceed for 
the rest of this thesis.  
I conclude this chapter by giving an overview of how I will address these goals 
in the remainder of the thesis. Chapter 2 will provide details of the challenges to 
disabled people in the UK brought about by current disability policy. Chapter 3 begins 
discussion of methods and methodologies, describing the development of the thesis 
and the changes in my priorities and research questions. Chapter 4 continues 
methodological discussion, locating the approach I have taken in relation to prominent 
research traditions within disability studies and social science more generally. Chapter 
5 begins analysis of interviews with activists, probing their perceptions of current 
challenges to the realisation of the DPM’s demands. Chapter six further develops the 
analysis of data presented in chapter 5, broadening the analysis by drawing on 
relevant literature including Roulstone and Morgan’s (2009) notion of ‘enforced 
individualism’ to deepen the examination of participant contributions. Chapter 7 
returns to more direct analysis of interview data, analysing how participants 
positioned themselves in relation to different political strategies. Chapter 8 builds 
upon the analysis carried out in chapter 7, developing a greater understanding of the 
strategic positions taken by participants, in part through an application of Fraser’s 
(1995; Fraser and Honneth, 2003) analysis of injustice and resistance. Chapter 9 turns 
to the perennially contentious issue of the social model of disability, arguing in favour 
of the ’social-relational’ contribution to theorising disability developed by Thomas 
(1999; 2007; 2010; 2012). In chapter 10 I broaden my analysis by introducing 
theoretical insights from contemporary thinking in feminism and Marxism, applying 
them to the current situation of disability activism. The final chapter summarises the 
contribution of the thesis and offers some concluding thoughts.   
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Chapter 2: The Challenges to Disabled People 
Brought About by Austerity 
In this chapter I give a summary of the available evidence regarding the impact of 
reforms to disability policy and cuts to public sector expenditure on disabled people. I 
do not seek to show whether these have been effective in reducing expenditure; the 
scale of the national deficit; or whether such austerity measures are necessary. These 
broader economic questions are of great relevance to the situation of many disabled 
people in Britain, but addressing them adequately would overwhelm the core concern 
of the thesis. Instead I attempt to give an overview of their effect on disabled people.  
The current Government is yet to carry out any assessment of the impact of the 
totality of reforms they have made on disabled people’s standard of living and 
independence. Many suspect that the reason such an assessment has not been carried 
out is the fear among members of the government that it would reveal to the voting 
public the scale and impact of cuts endured by disabled people (Duffy, 2013). There 
does not yet appear to be any studies written by academics on the effect of the broad 
sweep of government policy on disabled people. This thesis is based on the idea that 
developing an understanding of the impact and perception of these cuts and reforms 
as a whole is a valuable exercise. Others, notably Duffy (2013) and Young (2014), 
appear to have reached a similar conclusion. In this context it is of note that the 
Government’s Advisory Committee on Social Security (2014) raised the issue of the 
cumulative impact of welfare reform on disabled people. The committee stressed the 
exposure of disabled people to greater risk than others because of the increased 
likelihood they will be claiming multiple benefits and their comparatively restricted 
capacity to change their behaviour in response to reforms. 
In this section I will firstly draw on Duffy’s (2013; 2014) work on assessing the 
cumulative impact of cuts in government expenditure, providing a summary of the 
changes that appear likely to affect many disabled people. Duffy has been an 
influential voice in the reform of social ‘care’ over the last fifteen or more years, 
particularly in relation to the ‘personalisation’ of services and the increased availability 
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of personal budgets for users of services. In recent years he has become a vocal critic 
of the disability related policies of the coalition government. After discussing Duffy’s 
work, I go on to explore the effect of some specific cuts and reforms in more detail, 
drawing principally on the work of Young (2014). Young is ‘a campaigner and 
consultant based in the borough of Kingston in South West London’
15
. She has been 
‘involved in co-ordinating the ‘We are Spartacus‘ grassroots movement’ which is one 
of the most prominent examples of work produced by service users and allies 
provoked by government policy, concerned with offering detailed critique of policy and 
the suggestion of alternatives. 
Duffy (2014) explains that the cuts that disabled people face fall into two main 
categories: cuts in social care and cuts in personal income (benefits and tax credits). 
This is to say that cuts may be felt through social welfare as cuts to social security 
benefits, or through cuts and changes to eligibility in social care such as reductions in 
personal budgets, direct payments or local authority managed budgets. Changes in 
eligibility to social care may make more disabled people ‘entirely reliant on more 
stigmatised social welfare for the first time’ (Roulstone and Prideaux, 2012: 101).  
Referring to cuts to social care (2013), Duffy reports that the second highest cut 
of any major area of public sector spending is to local government (behind only cuts to 
benefits). By 2015 social care in England will have been cut by £7.5 billion, meaning a 
real terms cut of 33% since the election of the government (Duffy, 2014). According to 
Duffy, this massive cut means in practice that the following services, 
disproportionately (but not only) relied upon by disabled people, will bear the burden 
of social care cuts: 
• Reductions in support, freezing of fees for service providers and the reduction 
of personal budgets. 
• Reducing expenditure on supported housing services funded through 
‘Supporting People’. 




• Increasing the threshold for eligibility for social care; e.g. by 2011, 78% 
Councils had stopped supporting people with ‘Low’ or ‘Moderate’ needs. 
• Increasing charges for social care services effectively being a direct tax on 
those disabled people who have the most severe needs (Duffy, 2013: 17). 
Turning to the cuts to personal income, Duffy notes that the government aims to be 
saving £22 billion a year in cuts to benefits by 2014-2015 (Autumn Statement, 2012). 
To put these cuts into some historical and administrative context it useful to draw on 
Burchardt’s (1999) typology of benefits. She divides the types of benefits available to 
disabled people into four principle categories: 
i) Compensatory benefits. 
Tax free and not means tested, these are awarded to those who have become sick or 
disabled serving in the military or ordinary occupational capacity. 
ii) Earnings Replacement Benefits 
This type of benefit provides an income for those who are unable to earn as a result of 
sickness or disability. They are not means tested but may be taken into account when 
assessing income for other benefits. They may or may not be tied to previous 
employment. An example of earnings replacement benefits is employment and 
support allowance (ESA). 
iii) Extra Cost Benefits 
This category of benefits has come into existence to pay for the extra costs of being 
disabled. This type of benefit is tax free and is not take account of when assessing 
income for other means tested benefits. An example of extra cost benefits is disability 
living allowance (DLA), which is currently being phased out to be replaced by personal 
independence payment (PIP).  
iv) Means Tested Benefits 
Such benefits exist to top up income to a minimum level. The level reached is 
determined by the number of people in the household, any special needs of household 
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members, and housing costs. Means tested benefits are not disability-specific benefits 
but they may be received by disabled people and disabled people may be eligible for 
additional premiums. Examples of means tested benefits include income support and 
also housing and council tax benefit. 
The cuts to benefits highlighted by Duffy fall into the categories of earning 
replacement benefits, extra cost benefits and means tested benefits, among other 
changes that may affect disabled people’s income. The totality of potential cuts to an 
individual disabled person’s income is complex and could be the subject of an entire 
PhD thesis. For the sake of brevity, I again draw on Duffy’s analysis and the following 
summary of the cuts in benefits and tax credits that will allow such a saving: 
Replacing DLA with PIP Time-limiting of contributory ESA 
Change to CPI indexation of benefits Child Benefit freeze 
Council Tax Benefit – 10% reduction and 
localisation 
Child Benefit clawback from higher rate 
taxpayers 
Housing Benefit cuts Tax credit changes 
Universal Credit Abolition of the Independent Living Fund 
Closure of Remploy services Localisation of the Social Fund 
Reductions in Access to Work funding Abolition of the Child Trust Fund 
Abolition of the Health in Pregnancy Grant Abolition of the ESA youth rules 
Abolition of Sure Start Maternity for second 
and subsequent children 
Household benefit cap 
Extension of JSA lone parents with a youngest 
child aged 5-6 
Continued use of ATOS or others 
Transfer of Social Fund to local government Reductions in support for carers 
Table 1. Summary of cuts to benefits and tax credits (Duffy, 2013: 18). 
Young (2014) addresses similar territory to Duffy but chooses to highlight 
particular reforms in order to discuss their impact in greater depth. Her analysis is 
informed by the UK’s legal obligation
16
 to realise disabled people’s right to 
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 Britain is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities 
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independent living and she notes that the Joint Committee of the House of Commons 
and Lords on human rights (JCHR) raised the following concern: 
The range of reforms proposed to housing benefit, Disability Living 
Allowance, the Independent Living Fund, and changes to eligibility 
criteria (for social care) risk interacting in a particularly harmful way 
for disabled people. Some disabled people risk losing DLA and local 
authority support, while not getting support from the Independent 
Living Fund, all of which may force them to return to residential care. 
As a result, there seems to be a significant risk of retrogression of 
independent living and a breach of the UK's Article 19 obligations 
(JCHR, 2012: para 161). 
Informed by these concerns of the JCHR, Young identifies a range of factors which may 
obstruct the realisation of independent living. I follow her identification of these 
factors to structure the following section. In doing so I will not attempt to address the 
full range of cuts and reforms affecting disabled people, but instead highlight a 
number of striking points she makes. Following Young’s structure and summarising her 
argument, I start with her analysis of the impact of changes to housing benefit. 
Examples of the Challenges to Disabled People Brought About 
by Austerity 
1.  Changes to Housing Benefits 
Housing benefits are particularly important to some disabled people because disabled 
people are disproportionately likely to live in poverty and not own their own home 
(ODI, 2009 and Leonard Cheshire, 2008 cited in Young, 2014). Young reports several 
concerns of the JCHR with changes to Housing Benefits. 
One risk to disabled people brought by changes to housing benefits is the 
restriction on Local Housing Allowance (LHA) for homes in the private sector. This 
relatively new benefit (introduced in 2008) was changed in 2011 so that LHA can only 
be paid to cover the costs of the bottom thirty per cent of market prices (Young, 2014). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(UNCRPD). This convention contains, as article 19, ‘The right to live independently and to be included in 
the community’. 
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As many disabled people have very specific housing needs, such as requiring a ground 
floor flat, they may not be able to find adequate housing in the restricted range of 
properties within the lowest third of market values. In Young’s view this could 
constitute a risk to the independence of disabled people if they cannot access 
appropriate housing. 
Young also identifies the under-occupation penalty (often known pejoratively 
as the ‘bedroom tax’) as another threat to the adequate level of Housing Benefit 
required for independent living. Beginning in April 2013, this operates similarly to 
restrictions to LHA, but in this case the risks relate to housing in the social rented 
sector (Young, 2014)
17
. Tenants deemed to have more rooms than they require lose a 
portion of their Housing Benefit, meaning they must cover the costs with other income 
or move to a smaller property. Importantly, this change was applied to existing 
tenancies unlike changes to LHA. Thus disabled people who had occupied a property 
for many years could be forced to move. Roughly two thirds of those affected are 
households in which a disabled person lives (ibid). This is unsurprising given that the 
vast majority of accessible homes with adaptions that promote independence are 
found in the social housing sector (ibid). As disabled people are less likely to be in 
work, they are also less likely to be able to afford the additional costs of compensating 
for a loss in housing benefit (ibid). For Young, this change in policy is again likely to 
mean that the independence of many disabled people could be placed in jeopardy. The 
government impact assessment of the ‘bedroom tax’ estimates that 420,000 disabled 
people would receive a reduction in their housing benefit. Disabled people with a 
‘spare’ room are not exempt and only have recourse to apply for a discretionary 
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 There are signs that the imposition of the under-occupation penalty and resulting challenges for 
disabled people may be reversed. BBC news reported on 5 September 2014 that: ‘Liberal Democrat and 
Labour MPs have joined forces to defeat Conservatives in a Commons vote to partly overturn housing 
benefit changes’ (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-29075300). Carried by a majority of 306 to 
241, the ‘Affordable Homes Bill’ means people who could not be found a smaller home would be 
exempt from the cuts, as well as disabled people who need a spare bedroom or who have adapted 
homes. The BBC's parliamentary correspondent Mark D'Arcy said there was now a "fighting chance" the 
bill would become law. He speculated that the Affordable Housing Bill could clear the Commons, but it 
could be ‘vulnerable to death by a thousand amendments in the Lords’, although ‘Labour and Lib Dem 
peers, plus sympathetic crossbenchers may see it through to the statute book’. 
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housing payment (Morris, 2014a). For Morris ‘Such short-term, temporary payments 
are an inappropriate response to long-term needs’ (2014a: 20). 
Young is also concerned by ‘the adequacy of discretionary housing payments to 
mitigate the impact of proposed changes on disabled people’ (Young, 2014: 39). By this 
she is referring to the inadequacy of Discretionary Housing Payments (DHP) designed 
to offset the problems caused to disabled people by the restrictions to LHA and the 
under-occupation penalty. Rather than simply exempting disabled people from these 
changes, the government has provided local government with funds with which they 
can make discretionary payments to those concerned. Precisely because these 
payments are discretionary, councils do not need to make them in a way that would 
offset the impact of restrictions to LHA and the effect of the under-occupation penalty 
on disabled people. Young argues that DHP are provided unevenly in a way that fails to 
protect the right to independence for many disabled people. Instead, disabled people 
have been expected by some local authorities to use benefits intended for other 
purposes to meet their housing costs (ibid). 
2. Disability Living Allowance 
Having described challenges associated with housing benefits, Young goes on to assess 
the impact of changes to Disability Living Allowance (DLA) on disabled people’s right to 
independence. This benefit represents recognition of disabled people’s right to 
independence because it is designed to address the costs that disabled people 
encounter due to disability and the costs of achieving independence. DLA is of 
fundamental practical importance, but it is also arguably symbolically important 
because it embodies recognition of the need to meet additional costs to realise the 
right to independence (Morris, 2011). Under the Welfare Reform Act 2012, DLA will be 
replaced by Personal Independence Payment (PIP) for working age disabled people. 
This change is premised on achieving a 20% reduction in the cost of the benefit. Young 
(2014) notes the concern of the JCHR that the effect of this arbitrary target on the 
tightening of eligibility criteria for PIP would mean that 500,000 people will either lose 
all rights to PIP or receive a lower sum. Morris (2014a) reports that 560,000 people 
currently receiving DLA will be reassessed for PIP by October 2015. 160,000 of those in 
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this group are expected to receive a lower amount of money (ibid). The lowest rate of 
DLA payments for those deemed in need of assistance with care (mobility payments 
are the other main constituent of DLA and PIP) is not replicated within PIP (Young, 
2014), meaning that those who depended on DLA for a low level of support to enable 
their independence may lose what independence they may have gained and ultimately 
end up requiring more financially costly support if their condition deteriorates (ibid). 
Assessing the eligibility criteria for PIP becomes essential in a situation in which 
the government is committed to an arbitrary reduction of 20% in costs. Young sets out 
the eligibility criteria in the following passage: 
They are based on a set of activities and descriptors for a ‘daily living’ 
component and a ‘mobility’ component. There are ten activities 
relating to the daily living component including, for example, 
‘preparing food’, ‘washing and bathing’, ‘communicating verbally’ 
etc., and two activities relating to the mobility component: ‘planning 
and following a journey’ and ‘moving around’. Each activity includes 
several descriptors, by which a number of points is awarded 
depending on which descriptor offers the best fit with the needs of 
the claimant. For each component, an aggregate score (across the 
activities relevant to that component) is derived to determine 
whether an award is made at the standard or enhanced rate of that 
component (2014: 55). 
DR UK (2012 cited in Young, 2014) reports widespread concern that the eligibility 
criteria of PIP are too narrow and do not reflect the range of activities that DLA 
recognised as significant. Among the activities that are omitted from consideration in 
the criteria for PIP are: 
• Moving around indoors, including using stairs, getting in and out of bed, 
getting to the toilet and other indoor activities. 
• General supervision to keep disabled people safe - lack of supervision could 
put disabled people in danger of injuring themselves during an epileptic fit or 
a fall, or due to the risk of self-harm. 
•  Assistance at night time – under the PIP criteria there is no specific provision 
for assistance required during the night, the nature of which can be very 
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different from the assistance required during the day (DR UK, 2012 cited in 
Young, 2014: 56). 
Along with these omissions, Young reports that the most controversial aspect 
of the introduction of PIP has been changes to the criteria for support with ‘moving 
around’. DLA and other areas of government policy had used the measure of whether 
a person could move without a wheelchair for 50 metres to decide if they required 
assistance with mobility. Under PIP this has been restricted to 20 metres (ibid). This 
means that many disabled people receiving enhanced rate mobility component of DLA 
will no longer do so, including the benefits of the motability scheme
18
. This may risk 
their capacity to access community, educational, medical and commercial 
engagements and Young estimates that this could affect over half a million individuals 
(ibid). 
Morris (2011) argues that PIP assessment involves a medical approach to 
establishing levels of impairment, rather than a social model approach centred on 
establishing experiences of disabling barriers. Giving a positive assessment, Morris 
argues that PIP’s predecessor, DLA, represented a degree of acceptance of the social 
model of disability by recognising the need to create a level playing field to provide for 
the additional costs of living with disability
19
. PIP, on the other hand, she argues, 
embodies a ‘corrupted version of the social model’ (2011: 4). The Government 
replaced DLA because of its concern at the mounting costs of the benefit and the 
‘subjectivity’ of the assessment process involved (ibid). Morris argues that this shift to 
PIP has led to a process based on providing funding to those who are seen as 
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 The Motability Scheme enables disabled people to lease a new car, scooter or powered 
wheelchair, using the Higher Rate Mobility Component of Disability Living Allowance, the Enhanced 
Rate of the Mobility Component of Personal Independence Payment (PIP), the War Pensioners’ the War 
Pensioners’ Mobility Supplement or the Armed Forces Independence Payment. 
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 Morris’s assessment of DLA is perhaps debatable given that it emerged as mobility and attendance 
allowance in the more paternalist early 1970s. Rather than being an approach close to the social model 
of disability, DLA is perhaps more focused on deficits than social barriers. This is apparent as Roulstone 
and Prideaux argue that DLA ‘claimants have to emphasise what they cannot do’ (2012: 157). That said, 
upon its introduction it was ‘well received by those able to establish eligibility for the care and mobility 
components (formerly called the Mobility Allowance, MA) of the allowance’ (ibid: 53). Although Morris 
may exaggerate the link between the social model of disability and DLA, changes toward PIP may still 
represent a departure from reasoning based on the social model of disability. 
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‘dependent’ on support. Those who use aids and adaptations are deemed to be 
‘independent’ through the use of aids/adaptations, and therefore not in need of 
financial support from the state. The assumptions of the new approach, driven by the 
need to reduce ‘welfare dependency’, radically differ from the independent living 
approach of the DPM. The independent living approach challenges common sense 
ideas of independence by asserting that needs for support do not mean one cannot be 
independent. The point of independence is control and self-determination, and not 
that one has to do every task for themselves. By contrast, Morris (2014c) argues that in 
government welfare reform:  
"Independence” is defined as not being “dependent” on benefits. The 
need for support is seen in entirely negative terms and the barriers 
created by discrimination, disabling working conditions and/or a lack 
of jobs are ignored. Instead, the cause of “dependency” is laid at the 
door of individual motivation and pathology, and the route to 




Seen in this way, this departure from, and corruption of, the independent living 
approach is a significant obstacle in realising the goals of the independent living 
movement. 
3. The Independent Living Fund 
In addition to the impact of changes to housing benefits and DLA on disabled people’s 
right to independence, Young also argues that the closure of the Independent Living 
Fund (ILF) could threaten independent living for many disabled people. The ILF was 
intended for those with significant support needs, receiving the highest rate of DLA 
care component, to use to employ a personal assistant with the particular aim of 
avoiding having to live in an institution rather than living independently in the 
community. From 2010 the ILF was closed to new applicants. The Government has 
proposed to close the ILF for existing recipients and devolve the resources to local 
authorities, causing consternation to many disabled people who are aware that local 
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authorities face a struggle to fund their existing social care services, and fear they may 
be forced into living in institutions (Young, 2014). John Evans (2014), a leading pioneer 
of independent living, added his voice to those concerned at the closure of the ILF, 
arguing that users of it are ‘understandably scared by the prospect of having to move 
back into residential care’
21
. 
In 2013 five ILF users applied for judicial review of the Government’s decision 
to close the fund. The court of appeal found in their favour, noting that the then 
Minister for Disability had failed to uphold the legal obligation of the government to 
promote independent living. This legal finding only concerned the legality of the 
decision-making process, and at present the Government intends to proceed with the 
closure of the ILF in 2015. However, Young notes that the legal decision raised the 
issue that the closure of the ILF ‘would constitute impermissible retrogression in 
relation to UNCRPD Article 19’ (2014: 65). Thus Young believes the future outcomes of 
those no longer in receipt of ILF funds should be monitored to ensure that local 
authority funding is sufficient to enable independent living. According to Young, if this 
is not the case, further legal challenges could be brought with reason to believe they 
could be successful given legal obligations under UNCRPD Article 19. The 
Government’s Equality analysis of the closure of the Independent Living Fund (DWP, 
2014) accepted that the value of budgets allocated to service users formerly in receipt 
of ILF funds is likely to fall short of their former award in most cases. If Young is 
correct, this outcome is likely to result in further legal challenges. 
4. Social Care 
As a final set of challenges to independent living, Young (2014) observes that 
tightening eligibility criteria for the provision of adult social care is limiting the number 
of those who are eligible for support in a way that prevents many disabled people from 
receiving social care. She cites evidence (Brawn et al, 2013) to show that since 2006/07 
(before the financial crisis) 69,000 working age disabled adults with moderate needs 





and 8,000 with substantial needs have lost eligibility for social care
22
. Survey research 
produced by a consortium of charities (Brawn et al, 2013 cited by Young 2014) 
revealed that disabled adults: 
• Are failing to have their basic needs met: with nearly four out of ten (36 
percent) unable to eat, wash, dress or get out of the house due to 
underfunded services in their area. 
• Are withdrawing from society: with nearly half (47 percent) saying the services 
they receive do not enable them to take part in community life and over one 
third (34 percent) being unable to work or take part in volunteering or training 
activities after losing support services. 
• Are increasingly dependent upon their family: with nearly four in ten (38 
percent) seeking support services saying they experienced added stress, 
strained relationships and overall decline in the wellbeing of friends and 
family. 
• Are experiencing isolation, stress and anxiety as a result: with over half (53 
percent) saying they felt anxious, isolated, or experienced declining mental 
health because they had lost care and support services (Brawn et al, 2013, 
cited by Young, 2014: 68). 
Complementing these findings, Morris (2014a), drawing on Fernandez et al (2013), 
presents evidence that reductions in social care funding have led to a ‘widespread 
increase in eligibility thresholds: almost nine out of ten councils now only support 
people with ‘substantial’ or ‘critical’ needs. It has been calculated that this has led to 
69,000 working age disabled adults with moderate needs and 8,000 with substantial 
needs losing their eligibility for social care’ (2014a: 11).These potentially significant 
challenges to independent living and quality of life are combined with the move by an 
increasing number of councils to increase their charges for social care services (Young, 
2014). Councils are allowed discretion in how much they charge and are permitted to 
take social security benefits into account when assessing the ability to pay, provided 
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 Local Authority eligibility criteria banding for social care make use of four bands indicating different 
levels of need. Of these four bands, local authorities are increasingly only granting social care to those 
who are classified within the top two bands (‘critical’ and ‘substantial’). 
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they take account of essential disability-related expenditure. However, Young reports 
that there is wide variation in how councils define ‘disability–related expenditure’. In 
some cases this can result in local authorities demanding a portion of the individual’s 
DLA to meet their social care charges. This removes part of the DLA which is intended 
for the separate purpose of meeting additional costs of achieving independent living 
other than social care. 
Overview of Cuts/Reforms 
As the cuts described above take hold, Young and Duffy are strongly of the view that 
many disabled people’s independence and standard of living could be compromised. 
This could be exacerbated by interactions between the changes noted above, 
particularly for individuals receiving multiple benefits and using services that are cut. 
Young (2014) uses the example of the interaction of DLA reform and the introduction 
of an overall cap on total benefits available to an individual to demonstrate the 
challenges posed by the cumulative impact of different policy changes: 
If a family member claims DLA, the family is exempt from the overall 
benefit cap, but if that family member loses entitlement following an 
assessment for PIP, the family’s benefits will be reduced to the level 
of the cap, despite no other change in their circumstances; the loss of 
DLA (and carers’ allowance, if anyone in the family claims that 
benefit) will also have an impact on their ability to meet disability-
related expenses. This may mean the family has to move to a 
different area, separating them from the informal support of local 
friends and neighbours (Young, 2014: 75). 
This is only one example of the way independent living could be compromised by the 
interaction of policy changes. Duffy argues that the overall impact of the combined 
changes will be to lead to ‘growing numbers forced to use food banks… growing crises 
in health care services as social care diminishes…increased personal debt…increased 








Duffy concludes from his analysis that, contrary to the Deputy Prime Minister’s 
insistence that “those with the broadest shoulders should carry the heaviest burden” 
(Clegg, 2012)
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, the combined impact of cuts in public expenditure has been to 
disadvantage and impoverish many disabled people. The cumulative impact of these 
changes, Duffy calculates, will total a cut equivalent to £4,410 per disabled person, or 
nine times the burden of cuts endured by most citizens. This means ‘as a group, 
disabled people, 8% of the population (1 in 13 of us), [will] bear 29% of all cuts’ (Duffy, 
2013: 22). Duffy finds that the situation for the subset of disabled people with severe 
impairments, qualifying for social care provided by local government, is even worse 
(ibid). His calculation is that the total burden of cuts on disabled people with severe 
impairments is £8,832 per person (ibid). People in this situation form 2% of the 
population but bear 15% of all cuts. If Duffy’s analysis is correct, the opposite of the 
government’s rhetorical commitment to fairness is occurring. 
Morris (2014a) reviewed the extent to which the targets of the 2008 
Independent Living Strategy are being jeopardised by welfare reform and cuts to public 
service funding. She found ‘no evidence of significant progress in disabled people’s 
experiences of choice and control’ since 2008 (ibid, 5). Among other negative findings, 
Morris also states that ‘large numbers of disabled people have experienced a 
reduction in their household income since 2010 (ibid: 6). Morris makes the general 
conclusion that ‘disabled people who need support in their daily lives are experiencing 
diminishing opportunities to participate in family and community life’ (ibid: 5).  
I believe the data referred to above suggests growing risks to many disabled 
people’s independence and standard of living. I am unaware of any specific criticisms 
to date of the work of Duffy and Young. Generally the approach of the government has 
been to question if genuine cumulative assessments of this sort are possible due to the 
complexity involved. This may be questioned given that the Government’s own 
Advisory Committee on Social Security (2014) has recommended further analysis of 
the cumulative impact of welfare reform on disabled people. Furthermore, senior 




economists Reed and Portes argue that ‘modelling cumulative impact assessment by 
equality group is feasible and practicable (2014: IV). 
Other studies in this area such as Wood and Grant (2010) involve monitoring 
case studies of people and families facing fears of forthcoming cuts. In follow up 
studies Wood and Grant (2011a; 2011b) and Wood (2012) explore the impacts of cuts 
and reforms as they are experienced in varying ways in individual lives. Research of 
this sort can add to understanding of the interaction of different cuts and the 
differential impact upon disabled people of differing identities, backgrounds and 
characteristics. In the cumulative national scale research of the sort carried out by 
Duffy and Young, the fact that not all disabled people will be affected equally can be 
obscured. Qualitative research can hint at issues of intersectionality and how 
discrimination, inequality and oppression associated with disability can combine with 
other forms of political oppression and privilege. 
As well as the challenges to individual disabled people noted above, DPOs, 
including CILs, are also arguably facing problems. DPOs are vital parts of the DPM, and 
could be classified as ‘social movement organisations’, carrying through the aims of 
the DPM. I will now discuss the challenges facing DPOs. This is important, not least 
because, through their expertise and knowledge of the needs of disabled people, DPOs 
could mitigate the impact of some of the changes noted above. 
Current Challenges to Disabled People’s Organisations 
The challenges facing DPOs has been the subject of less scrutiny in recent years. 
However, as we shall see in later chapters, participants interviewed for this thesis felt 
the situation of DPOs were an important part of the picture of evolving current 
challenges to disabled people. It is then worth noting the research carried out by 
Inclusion London, a pan-London Deaf and Disabled People’s Organisation (DDPO), 
involving a survey in 2012 with 54 London-based DDPOs about their experiences of the 
funding cuts. Their key findings include that one in five of the organisations they 
surveyed were facing closure in the forthcoming two years. Further findings included 
that 40% of those surveyed had experienced cuts in funding in the preceding year. 
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More than half of those surveyed (31/54) expected further funding cuts in the 
following year. The falls in funding were mainly caused by cuts in local authority 
expenditure. 
The authors of this report fear that personalisation and choice and control for 
disabled people will become increasingly difficult to achieve without the presence of 
DDPOs able to provide ‘independent, accessible information, advice, independent 
living services and peer support networks’ (Inclusion London, 2012: 2). Overall, the 
authors of the report were concerned that: 
The reduction in user engagement, campaigning, advocacy and peer 
support activity provided by DDPOs greatly undermines the 
Government’s aim of positively changing attitudes towards 
Deaf/disabled people and supporting greater participation by Deaf 
and disabled people in the wider community (Inclusion London, 
2012: 2). 
The challenges facing DDPOs are such that they could add further to the possible 
failure to meet obligations under the UNCRPD (ibid) (highlighted by Young above). 
Having discussed in detail the challenges of cuts and reforms to individual 
disabled people, and having briefly touched upon challenges to DPOs, I will now turn 
to the related problem of high levels of prejudice and cultural demonisation directed 
at disabled people. This means moving from discussion of material disadvantages to 
analysis of challenges at the cultural and/or ideological level. This is an important area 
because cultural and ideological challenges to disabled people could arguably serve to 
justify regressive policy changes and distract the public from the denial of 
independence that many disabled people will experience. To better understand 
current challenges to disabled people, I now turn to this cultural element. 
Current Cultural Challenges to Disabled People 
Changes in disability policy and cuts to benefits and services can only be carried out in 
the longer term if the voting public are willing to accept them. The way in which 
disability and issues such as social security benefits are portrayed and culturally 
constructed will play a role in how the policies described above are perceived, as well 
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as the esteem in which disabled people are held more generally. In this light, some 
have noted an apparent shift in the manner in which disability is portrayed in the mass 
media. 
Briant et al (2013) tried to test if this is the case by comparing the output of five 
newspapers in 2004/05 against their output from 2010/11, using a ‘comprehensive 
content analysis’. Briant et al found that media coverage has shifted toward a 
politicisation of disability, characterised by ‘increased discussion of disability as a 
benefit problem, and of disabled people as a burden on the state’ (2013: 878). This 
occurred within the context of an overall increase in discussion of disability, 
represented by a 43% climb in the total number of articles concerning disability (ibid). 
To give more detail, in 2004/05 there was still a large number of articles 
concerned with disability benefit claims as a problem, but they tended to differ in 
finding the fault with government policy and professionals rather than disabled people 
themselves. Notably, while 9.5% of articles from this period about disability were 
critical of government policy on disability, there were none that defended government 
policy. By contrast, in 2010/11 most of the papers were supportive of government 
policy and particularly its attempt to reduce spending on welfare. At the same time, 
articles that expressed sympathy with disabled people (albeit usually in stereotypical 
reference to triumph over adversity) fell from 29% of all tabloid articles to 22%, 
reducing the overall number of positive depictions of disabled people. This is 
consistent with falls in the number of articles about disability in which discrimination 
against disabled people was the main story. In tabloids this was a fall from 19.5% to 
14.4%. 
Briant et al go on to argue that the media portrayal of disabled people amounts 
to a process of demonization. They base this on factors such as an increase in the total 
number of articles describing disability benefit recipients as ‘undeserving’ (127 in 
2010/11 compared with 81 in 2004/05). To illustrate their case further the authors cite 
indicative examples of the demonization of disability benefit recipients such as an 
Express story which claimed that 75% of incapacity benefit claimants were ‘skiving’ and 
a Sun headline which included the claim that the ‘Work-shy are Largely to Blame for 
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Deficit Crisis’. These perhaps extreme examples are arguably consistent with a pattern 
of increases in the overall use of pejorative terms such as ‘scrounger’ or ‘cheat’, 
climbing from ‘12% of tabloid articles in October– January 2004/05 (63 occurrences) 
compared with 18% of tabloid articles (144 occurrences) from October to January 
2010/1’ (Briant et al, 2013: 880). 
Briant et al explored the impact of these changes on the public through holding 
five focus groups with non-disabled people and two with people who self-identified as 
disabled. Asked to describe a typical story on disability in the media, ‘by far the most 
common’ answer given by non-disabled focus group participants centred on benefits 
and benefit fraud. Such participants nearly always drastically over-estimated levels of 
benefit fraud when compared to official government estimates. The result is that a 
large amount of participants believed changes in government policy are justifiable 
because they target undeserving benefit recipients who are not genuinely disabled.  
Briant et al do not specify or speculate upon any causal link connecting the 
cultural shifts they document to reforms/cuts. However, one can conclude from their 
research that any attempt to address potentially harmful changes in disability policy 
will need to address the public support that has grown for these changes, and the 
mistaken beliefs this support is based upon. 
Summary 
The end of this chapter draws to a close the presentation of background information 
within this thesis. An overview of the history of the DPM was given in the first chapter, 
and in this chapter some of the challenges currently facing disabled people have been 
highlighted. Among the challenges discussed have been those related to housing 
benefit, including restrictions on LHA and the impact of the under occupancy penalty. I 
have also discussed the replacement of DLA by PIP, the closure of the ILF, changes to 
social care eligibility and challenges to DPOs. These are combined with the cultural 
challenges described by Briant et al. I have only been able to summarise some of the 
more prominent current challenges to disabled people and have not referred in any 
depth to a significant number of further challenges (see table 1, p24). 
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Although I have detailed many reasons to believe that disabled people are 
facing considerable challenges, I do not wish to have depicted disabled people as if 
they have no agency, or as if they are in a position deserving of pity or charity. In the 
remainder of the thesis I rely heavily on the anti-disablist accounts of disabled activists. 
It is my belief that structuring the thesis around such accounts can counteract any 
impression given in this section that disabled people are increasingly ‘vulnerable’ or 
deserving of charity. 
In the next chapter, I turn to issues of method, with particular stress on the way 
in which the thesis has developed. 
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Chapter 3: The Development of the Thesis 
In this chapter I present the steps through which the thesis developed, detailing how I 
have responded to the views of participants and other factors as the thesis evolved. 
This will provide a greater sense of the choices I was presented with and the reasons 
that the research developed in the way it did. To do this I will begin by explaining how I 
arrived at my area of research interest. This is followed by a discussion of why I chose 
to research disabled activists and how I went about identifying and accessing 
participants to interview. Subsequently, I discuss my chosen method of data collection, 
my experiences of carrying out interviews, and my method of data analysis. In closing, I 
discuss ethical considerations, including the issue of anonymisation. 
Throughout this and the following chapter I hope to portray a sense of the 
reflexivity and co-construction that marked the research process. In chapter four, I will 
discuss in depth how I conceived of the role of the researcher within my approach to 
research. In this chapter I will reflect on the way in which pre-judgements suffuse the 
entire process of research design, data collection and data analysis. I will not seek to 
downplay or ignore this in the hope of presenting findings that appear 
uncontaminated by researcher-influence, but seek to be as honest as I can about my 
conscious and possibly even unconscious influences. Precisely because they are my 
pre-judgments, it is of course possible I will be unaware of their influence. Through a 
frank discussion I hope to minimise this possibility. Acknowledging the role of pre-
judgment is consistent with the critical realist perspective presented in chapter four, 
which acknowledges the ‘concept-dependence’ of all observation. To reflect this, I will 
describe the strength and limitations of my chosen methods and how I might have 
done things differently. 
How the Focus of the Thesis Developed 
As is often the case in qualitative research, the concerns of the thesis have undergone 
successive revision as I have moderated my initial preconceptions in response to what I 
have learnt in interviews and from surveying the relevant literature. 
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The thesis was initially conceived as an inquiry into the apparent contradiction 
between individual forms of empowerment promoted by the ‘personalisation’ of social 
care, and collective forms of political empowerment that provide a platform for 
campaigning for greater independence. In particular, I was interested in whether the 
pursuit of individual empowerment in personalisation could come at the cost of 
collective political strength, undermining the collective contexts/spaces which can 
promote solidarity and mobilisation. As I began to carry out interviews and continued 
to follow the written output of disabled activists and disability studies scholars, it 
became increasingly clear to me that this concern with individualism versus 
collectivism could be a crude and reductionist lens through which to view 
personalisation. Indeed, from my perspective as an non-disabled ‘outsider’ to the 
movement, one of the continually fascinating aspects of the anti-disablist struggle was 
that it seemed to combine collective and individual empowerment in a relatively 
harmonious fashion, as de-institutionalisation and resulting gains in independence 
could allow participation within forms of collective mobilisation. This could create a 
virtuous cycle through which collective mobilisation would feed into further individual 
empowerment, and so on. 
There was another problem with my relatively narrow concentration upon 
personalisation in a thesis based upon learning from disabled activists. As I began 
interviews, talk of “personalisation” was rarer than I expected as participants tended 
to frame developments such as personal budgets and direct payments within the 
DPM’s longer standing principle of independent living. Demands for conditions that 
would bring about independent living for British disabled people had long preceded 
the government’s policy rubric of personalisation. In the context of activism, 
independent living had commonly been successfully combined with other more 
collectivist aspects of disability activism. As evidence of this, the prominent activist and 
disability studies academic Michael Oliver maintains that the possibilities for social 
change fomented by the DPM had been ‘based upon the bedrock of three big ideas 
which have emerged exclusively from our movement and have been based entirely on 
our own experiences; the ideas are, of course, the social model of disability, 
independent living and civil rights’ (1999a: 17). 
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If the abstract ideas of personalisation and independent living are similar or 
overlapping, the contention that there could be a tension between the individualism of 
personalisation and the collectivism of activism might appear alien to participants and 
my reading audience. In sum there appeared to be two problems. Firstly, I had based 
initial interview invitations and interviews upon the idea of personalisation, rather 
than the more familiar and meaningful language of independent living. Secondly, 
divorcing the mechanisms of personalisation (or what participants knew as 
independent living) from other aspects of disability activism, and presenting it as if it 
could be in tension with them, failed to reflect the manner in which activists assumed 
such mechanisms were part of a complementary whole, augmenting and mutually 
reinforcing collectivist practices and mobilisation. 
My concern with personalisation’s potential to weaken collective mobilisation 
flowed from my prior work experience. My earliest experiences of the term came as a 
support worker in a large housing association as I became familiar with praise for 
“personalisation” and its purportedly huge potential to change the organisation. This 
fed into a degree of scepticism on my part as I noted how a wide range of practices 
(including closing homes/projects) were seen as justifiable through the discourse of 
personalisation and endowed with unquestionable status through their association 
with this term. I felt these practices were questionable and this informed my initially 
sceptical and one-sided attitude to personalisation.  
My initial reading into the subject was premised on my understanding that 
“personalisation” was an important term. My concentration on this term in particular 
filtered the range of literature I encountered. This led to a narrower range of literature 
than could have otherwise have been the case, as I was led toward material in the 
Guardian newspaper, the community care website and social work practice journals. It 
was only later with my introduction to disability studies journals and interview 
participants that I began to understand more keenly that the DPM had its own 
analytical frame through which to conceive of individualised funding mechanisms. This 
was brought home to me further during initial interviews carried out for the thesis. In a 
sense this validated my decision to interview activists, in that through interviewing 
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them I was prompted to reflect and change my initial interpretation of the topic at 
hand. 
In addition, while I planned the project and did my best to immerse myself in 
the relevant literature, my initial concern with the tension between collective 
mobilisation and individual empowerment seemed self-evidently important. On paper, 
this had seemed like an obvious and important theme for investigation, but my 
interviewees did not directly refer to this as an important theme.  
It may have been an error to begin the study with a research interest that failed 
to reflect participants’ concerns. However, I can look back more positively upon my 
decision to change course in response to their priorities. The process by which I altered 
my topic illustrates the principle of fallibilism (Sayer, 2000); the point being that our 
ideas are consistently shown to be wrong or mistaken, meaning the objects of 
knowledge cannot be reduced to different linguistic constructions of them. Rather 
than seeing different views of the world as incommensurable and free-standing 
constructions, accepting the potential fallibility of one’s views can encourage one to 
accept when we may have been wrong, misguided or simplistic. 
 With the benefit of increased engagement with participants, I chose to reflect 
the way in which participants construed personalisation as one part of a greater whole, 
encompassing other complementary goals. This caused me to revise my topic to allow 
other concerns to be discussed in the context of my central concern with 
personalisation, meaning I could minimise constraints on the range of factors 
participants felt were relevant to discussion. This resulted in a second version of my 
primary research question, as it shifted from ‘what is the relationship of 
personalisation of social care to the collective political mobilisation of disabled people’ 
to a more general concern with ‘to what extent does personalisation realise the 
demands of disabled activists for the reform of social care?’ This revised question went 
some way to address the broader range of issues that participants wished to discuss. 
At this stage I still felt a central focus on personalisation remained important, 
continuing my belief that it encapsulated important dilemmas for the movement. In 
part this continued stress on personalisation was because I was reluctant to broaden 
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the scope of the thesis to such an extent that it became unfocused or vaguely defined. 
My choice at this stage to retain an integrating focus on personalisation was not purely 
an a priori judgement of its importance, but followed other researchers with more 
experience of disability activism and the demands of disabled people for change. They, 
for example, had noted the potentially problematic issue of the lack of collective 
contexts/spaces in a landscape of support provision based on individual 
empowerment, or even atomism (Roulstone and Morgan, 2009; Ferguson, 2007). In 
this sense there was good reason to initially premise the thesis on this tension. Whilst I 
realised that positing a dichotomy between collective and individual empowerment 
could be misleadingly simplistic, I did not want to rule out instances in which it 
remained an important issue. Indeed, later in the development of the project I drew on 
the notion of ‘enforced individualism’ (Roulstone and Morgan, 2009) to show how 
many current challenges to disabled people could be conceptualised. 
Even as I broadened my focus in this way, I was still concerned that I was 
imposing an excessively restrictive lens onto the full range of responses that 
participants wished to give. My second revised question was still principally concerned 
with the defined boundaries of social care and personalisation, but in light of my 
interviews I started to believe this was also narrow and restrictive. This was confirmed 
to me by reading about the forms of disablism that exist and how they interact with 
one another (Thomas, 1999). For example, the area of social ‘care’ and personalisation 
I had focused on could not be easily divorced from cultural patterns of disablism, or 
from economic exclusion and subordination of disabled people. This was most 
obviously the case during interviews as participants invariably sought to go beyond the 
discussion of personalisation to address the restrictions imposed by cuts to benefits 
and services that disabled people relied upon. This may not have meant that concerns 
with personalisation had gone away, but rather that other issues were considered to 
be more pressing and worthy of urgent discussion. There was an ethical and political 
need to adapt to the concerns of my participants, especially as my thesis was based on 
articulating activist accounts of anti-disablism, implying an endorsement of anti-
disablist politics on my part. As well as the ethical and political case for changing topic, 
I would also argue it was methodologically sound to adapt to what I was learning. In an 
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inductive process of theory generation in which one builds hypotheses or theories 
from the data, it is best to flexibly adapt one’s theoretical framework to track what 
participants find most important. Similarly, an informal type of inductive analysis takes 
place as researchers revise their focus in response to new information and ideas. The 
way in which the topic changed, in response to participants concerns during the 
interview stage of the thesis, can thus by seen as part of the broader process of theory 
generation. 
Eventually I decided upon a third and final focus of the thesis, changing to a 
more general concern with ‘activist perceptions of contemporary disablism and the 
prospects for resistance’. This allowed me to follow what was most important to 
participants: the subject of their campaigning, and the means by which they could 
achieve their objectives. This final development meant I was no longer centrally 
preoccupied with personalisation. It did not end my interest in it, but it meant I could 
explore participants’ perceptions of disablism and anti-disablism against a backdrop 
that included personalisation. 
As well as adapting the topic for the reasons described above, another reason 
was my exposure to accounts of disabled people’s current struggles, particularly 
through the flourishing online oppositional culture that had emerged in resistance to 
the impact of the government’s program of austerity on disabled people. I could 
discern from this oppositional culture and from interviews, less stress on 
personalisation and more on the general scenario of a government program of 
austerity and the impact this was having on the standard of living of individual disabled 
people and the survival of DPOs. Although this represented a shift from my focus on 
personalisation, it was inclusive of challenges to the potential of personalisation such 
as cuts to the levels of personal budgets that disabled people received. 
Adapting to participants predominant concerns is an advantage of evolving 
qualitative research in general, and in particular of semi-structured interviews which 
allowed me to follow participant concerns and to revise the focus of my questions and 
the subsequent focus of my analysis. From an experimental, positivist point of view, 
adapting to participant concerns and changing my research objectives could be seen as 
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a sign of under-specified research goals, and of an interview technique which does not 
adhere to pre-defined questions with sufficient rigour. I argue to the contrary that by 
adapting to participant concerns I could better track the evolving nature of disablism in 
general, following the present trends considered most important by my well-informed 
participants. If I was to illicit ‘thick’ data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) from my 
participants, it was logical that I explore what they considered important, reflecting 
the value of their interpretation within my thesis. It was therefore a methodologically 
sound choice to widen my research question. To gain the most revealing insights from 
my participants and maximise the space available for their valued perspective to be 
heard, I decided to respond to the aspects of disablism they considered most 
important. 
Even though my focus changed, the reason I was initially interested in 
personalisation was the extent to which it would empower or disempower disabled 
people. There was, therefore, no great jump or break in my underpinning motive. It 
might be argued that placing the political priorities of participants above a previously 
more policy-orientated concern with personalisation reflects a degree of partisanship 
on my part. I would openly concede that my politics have played a role in choosing to 
change topic, although I would also argue it is methodologically sound for the reasons 
stated above. If participants considered personalisation to be an increasingly abstract 
concern in the face of mounting cuts, I was willing to shift my research focus 
accordingly. The overriding goal of representing anti-disablist perspectives was more 
implicit at an earlier stage when I was concerned with personalisation, but it was still 
present through my preference for interviewing activists. As I adapted my topic, this 
overriding goal became more explicit. 
After adapting my overall research question for the third time, I could still rely 
to a great extent on the sub-questions that had guided me from my second 
formulation of the question. These questions formed the loose structure I used to 
guide interviews. The interviews frequently touched on other subjects than those I 
reproduce below. They could be seen as ‘guided conversations’, in that I tried to follow 
what participants considered most important, rather than following a rigid schedule. 
That said, the following questions are a good summary of the topics covered: 
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• What ideas and principles and priorities have motivated participants to 
engage in activism? 
• What do participants understand by personalisation? 
• What variations exist between the approaches of different activist groups and 
how do their views on personalisation vary? 
• Can personalisation work for everyone? 
• What are the strengths and weaknesses of current government disability 
policies?  
• Do personal budgets and the promotion of the idea of personalisation mean 
activist goals have been achieved? 
• What goals remain for disabled activists? 
• What role do participants perceive Centres for Independent Living or User Led 
Organisations to have had in the development of independent living? What do 
they believe their current and future role to be? 
By asking what participants understood by personalisation, I gauged the extent to 
which they felt it was a pressing issue and then chose whether to follow these up with 
further questions on the matter or jump to other questions. Broader than 
personalisation, if participants did not wish to discuss ‘support’ or ‘social care’ and 
preferred to dwell on other arenas of disablism and resistance, I could adapt to this by 
asking about the strengths and weaknesses of government policy more generally. 
Using my questions in this way allowed me a useful degree of flexibility. 
The way in which I could retain the questions above, even after I had shifted 
focus for a second time, demonstrates some continuity in my focus. Indeed, there is a 
danger with the above presentation of it appearing as if there were abrupt and 
discontinuous changes in topic as I realised the restrictive effect of my initial concerns. 
The actual process was more of a gradual evolution over the course of twenty 
interviews. For example, between the three changes in research question, there were 
moments where I had come most of the way to changing focus, even if I had not yet 
formally changed course. Given the degree of continuity between my research 
concerns, it should not be underestimated how much my initial concerns must have 
continued to influence my later findings and readings of the interview data. 
57 
My shift in focus may have just reflected my growing level of clarity about what 
it was I was aiming to investigate. The general motive for the research (to represent 
activists’ perspectives) was always apparent, and one of the most difficult decisions 
was the breadth of the disabling factors that were under consideration. My initial 
concern with the individualism of personalisation versus the collectivism of activist 
mobilisation was excessively narrow and excluded too much of participants’ 
experience, serving to ‘fence off’ so much of participants’ experience of disablism from 
my analysis. As I continued to revise my focus to reflect the complexity and breadth of 
contributions I opened the door to consider more factors I had previously excluded. 
With my final focus settled, the opposite drawback was apparent to the one I had 
begun with. Exploring the totality of contemporary disablism and resistance in Britain 
risked framing my research in such a general way that detail would be lost and 
subsumed under broader theorisations. Broader theorisations could be built on 
uncertain foundations if I failed to give due attention to the micro-dynamics of 
disablism in the pursuit of broad theorisations. 
Therefore, another potential drawback was that my questions might appear to 
lack specificity or direction, and this was apparent in one or two occasions when 
participants were unsure what type of answer I was trying to illicit from them. Overall, 
these drawbacks were a price I was willing to pay for the ability to better reflect the 
full range of relevant factors which participants wished to reflect upon. To have 
imposed a primary concern with personalisation onto participants could have divorced 
the realm of ‘care’ and support from more structural dimensions of disablism. This 
would have represented an unsustainable division between private and public politics. 
My conviction, informed by relevant literature, was that the everyday politics of 
support should not be separated off from the rest of disablism. An insight of the social 
model of disability, and of the ‘social oppression paradigm’ (Thomas, 2012) in disability 
research is that disabled people face multiple disabling barriers and relations of 
oppression. Everyday life is highly politicised for many disabled people as they 
negotiate disabling relationships of care and support. I did not wish to separate such 
forms of disablism from others. In this I was motivated by a holistic picture of anti-
disablement such as that promoted by Derbyshire Centre for Integrated living 
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(Priestley, 1999). By joining more ‘personal’ aspects of disablism in the realm of 
support and personalisation to the others considered relevant by participants it was 
also more possible for me to probe the intersection between individual biographies 
and social structures (Wright Mills, 1959). 
Why I Chose To Interview Disabled Activists 
Although the choice of focus for this thesis shifted, the choice of participants remained 
constant. In the earlier focus of the thesis on personalisation, it was thought that 
disabled activists could put forward an especially revealing insight into the 
development of it. The DPM had done the most to push for previous developments 
associated with independent living, achieving successes such as direct payments 
(Morris, 1993; Bornat, 2006). Personalisation could be seen as comprising an element 
of independent living, along with other influences (Needham, 2011). Although at any 
earlier stage, my knowledge of independent living was low, I already thought it 
important to find out from activists how much they perceived the principles of 
personalisation to be consistent with their earlier campaigns. From an early stage I felt 
it was necessary to limit the group of participants I worked with to those with physical 
impairments, rather than other groups who could be defined as disabled such as 
people with learning difficulties or people with mental health issues (these groups can 
overlap in cases in which people have multiple impairments). I believed that 
interviewing people with physical impairments was advantageous because of the long 
trajectory of activism this group had in the UK through campaigning for independent 
living. Their narrative in relation to the reform of social care and changes in disability 
policy was rich and could contribute much to an understanding of how disability policy 
had changed in the UK. Restricting my sample in this way also had the practical benefit 
of keeping my attempts to find participants within a relatively focused sample group. 
Finding participants from every group that could possibly be included under the 
description of ‘disabled people’ could have become very challenging, requiring that I 
work through multiple organisations at the same time. 
As I note above, the overall theme of the thesis changed to encompass more 
aspects of disablism and better reflect the views of activist participants. This is 
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methodologically sound because the thesis is premised on the value of activist 
interpretations. As a justification for this contention, I argue that the views of activists 
are to be valued because their insight and consciousness has been raised through 
political activity, challenging disabling oppression, and learning how disablism 
responds to opposition. Activists have learnt from confronting disablism how 
successful resistance can best be achieved. They are also likely to be informed about 
the internal challenges within disability activist groups and the dilemmas and problems 
associated with collective mobilisation among diverse disabled individuals. This group 
included activists involved in academia, particularly in the field of disability studies. I 
sought to interview disabled activists, rather than disability activists. ‘Disability 
activists’ refer to a broader category of person who may not themselves be disabled, 
but are engaged in anti-disablist politics. I decided to interview disabled activists rather 
than disability activists for a number of reasons. Firstly, I wished to foreground the 
views of disabled activists because I believe that they often have the longest and 
richest history of activism in this area. I also argue that disabled people's awareness of 
disablism and anti-disablism is often greater because they experience disablism first 
hand. A final reason is my position as a non-disabled researcher and the way I can 
avoid an excessive influence of my own views by working with disabled activists. 
To fully justify my preference for activist contributions, it is useful to contrast 
the knowledge typically produced by academics with that produced by ‘movement 
intellectuals’ with activist experience. The term ‘movement intellectuals’ refers to 
members of social movements who produce their own distinctive form of knowledge. 
While the knowledge of academic intellectuals is to be valued for some reasons, the 
knowledge produced by movement intellectuals is typically to be valued for other 
reasons (Barker and Cox, 2002). In particular, the strength of academic theorizing is the 
development of ‘a broad conceptual armoury’ that tends to ‘treat what are, precisely, 
movements as static ‘fields’, to embed their understanding in an uncritical acceptance 
of the givenness of those institutions which movements often set themselves against, 
and to marginalize the position of the actor’ (ibid: 2). Movement intellectuals share 
this interest in developing a ‘conceptual armoury’, but only in service of a set of 
arguments for the purpose of ‘formulating 'case propositions' of a very definite and 
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practical nature. These take the form, in essence, of practical proposals, i.e. 
propositions that 'This is what we should do' (ibid: 2). I follow Barker and Cox in that I 
believe activist views can contribute something distinctive to academic discourse 
owing to the differing needs of movement intellectuals. Their interest in ‘case 
propositions’ of a practical nature may be of particular interest in that they are likely to 
drive forward practical insights into what activists consider to be the most detrimental 
and urgent forms of current disablism. Activist accounts offer a practical analogue to 
the political theory of Holloway (2005) (see chapter ten), in that they focus on the 
instability of disablism and how to end it, and not an academic consideration of why it 
persists. In this sense their theory may differ from typical disability studies academic 
production which may tend toward a static and reified depiction of disability. 
The distinction between the knowledge produced by movement intellectuals 
and the knowledge produced by academics could be overstated in the case of disability 
studies because the paradigm of disability studies has its roots in the work of organic 
intellectuals such as Hunt (1981), Finkelstein (1980) and Oliver (1990). By use of the 
term organic intellectual I refer to Gramsci’s (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1998) 
distinction between traditional and organic intellectuals. The application of Gramsci’s 
class-based analysis may not map onto disability precisely, but the distinction can 
highlight the role of disabled activists in analysing their situation and laying much of 
the groundwork for disability studies. In Gramsci’s distinction between traditional and 
organic intellectuals, ‘traditional’ refers to professional intellectuals ‘literary, scientific 
and so on’ whose position ‘derives ultimately from past and present class relations and 
conceals an attachment to various historical class formations’ (Hoare and Nowell-
Smith, 1998: 4). In the case of disability, traditional intellectuals are equivalent to the 
generations of academics and professionals who worked in the broad field of disability 
and depended upon it for their income, in the same way that Gramsci’s traditional 
intellectuals ultimately derive their status and income from existing class formations. 
In the area of disability research, traditional intellectuals would profess neutrality and 
objectivity while failing to challenge oppression and disablism (e.g. Miller and Gwyne, 
1972). ‘Organic’ intellectuals by contrast are the ‘thinking and organising element of a 
particular fundamental-social class’ (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1998: 4). Disabled 
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activists fit this role as those who emerge from disability activist groups to articulate 
the demands of the wider movement. For Gramsci, the working class was perfectly 
able to produce its own organic intellectuals of this kind, and in disability activism this 
also has proved to be the case. Organic intellectuals are motivated by a self-conscious 
knowledge of their role in change and would absorb valuable ideas from ‘the more 
advanced bourgeois intellectual strata’ (ibid). This is evident in the work of disabled 
activists such as Finkelstein (1980) who draws on work from outside disability activism 
to make his case. 
Disability studies, particularly in its earlier phases, was marked by the strong 
influence of writers and campaigners who can be considered as organic intellectuals. 
Beginning with activists such as Paul Hunt, they were conscious of the way in which 
traditional intellectuals had failed disabled people (Hunt, 1981) and understood that 
they would need to drive change, in part through their own production of knowledge. 
Later, activist accounts proved insightful in the accounts given of disability rights and 
activism in an important book that reflected upon the struggle of the DPM (Campbell 
and Oliver, 1996). 
Viewing disabled activists as organic intellectuals is a way of viewing the 
development of disability studies, and of locating my work within it. It could be argued 
that some of the more intractable debates in the discipline are representative of an 
underlying gulf concerning the extent to which activist knowledge production can sit 
alongside that of academics. Writers such as Watson (2012) and Shakespeare (2006) 
suggest that knowledge produced by activists, such as the social model of disability, is 
‘too simplistic and is better suited to the political arena as radical rhetoric for a 
movement than as the basis for an academic model’ (Watson, 2012: 193). On the other 
side of the debate, Oliver suggests that the academisation of disability studies and the 
‘declining influence of the disabled people’s movement’ makes it harder for the 
discipline to maintain a focus upon ‘the disabling society’ and for it to produce work 
that is relevant to non-academic disabled people (2009: 179). For Oliver, this can be 
attributed in part to the increasing tendency for work to be ‘academic articles to 
promote the individual’s career’ (ibid). This critical take on much of disability studies 
could be seen as a concern with the growing control over disability studies by 
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‘traditional’ intellectuals, who by virtue of their position in the disabling society are 
less driven by the need to urgently challenge disablism.  
By choosing to interview activists for this thesis I am taking the side of the 
debate that places great value on the contribution of activist knowledge within 
disability studies. As I suggested in chapter two, many disabled people are currently 
facing acute problems brought about by changes in government policy. Activists with 
experience of past challenges are well placed to contextualise the extent and nature of 
current challenges. They can also provide a snapshot of how disabled activists 
currently conceptualise these challenges and how they believe successful activism may 
best take place. These qualities of activist accounts can also balance out the limitations 
of my own perspective. I have some limited observational experience of disablism as 
experienced by people I have worked with and in the life of a family member, but I lack 
the first-hand experience of anti-disablist struggle that my participants could 
contribute. Being a non-disabled person does not mean one cannot have experience of 
anti-disablist struggle, but clearly there is a difference between this and being a 
disabled person with first-hand experience of disablism.  
This relates to my earlier distinction between disabled activists and disability 
activists. It may be that disability activists who are non-disabled have a more extensive 
knowledge of the political struggle than some disabled people. However, it is only 
disabled activists who can combine knowledge of political struggle with experience of 
disablism. There is an important link from experience of disablism to knowledge of 
how best to challenge it. This is why I chose to try to interview disabled activists in 
particular. In my own case, I am non-disabled and lack extensive experience of anti-
disablist activism, but believed that I had some research skills and knowledge of social 
theory that could aid in understanding how to challenge current forms of disablism. By 
working with disabled activists I felt I could limit the risk that I produce a static, 
academic exercise in theorising the stability of disablism and domination of disabled 
people. 
As it becomes embedded in academia, there is arguably a tendency for 
disability studies to become detached from activists and their organic knowledge of 
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their struggle, contemplatively and uncritically accepting the givenness of aspects of 
disablism which disabled people may oppose. In another arena, Holloway (1991) has 
made the point that structuralist political-economists can slip from analysing what is 
necessary for exploitation and injustice to occur, to prescribing what is necessary for 
this to happen, as if resistance had no role in the reproduction of domination. This 
problem is arguably present in disability studies when academics use disability as a 
vehicle for tenuously related theoretical contemplation in the production of ‘academic 
articles to promote the individual’s career’ (Oliver, 2009: 179). By drawing upon the 
insights of activists, I hope to avoid this and contribute to what has been called 
‘movement relevant theory’ (Bevington and Dixon, 2005), meaning theory produced 
for the movement, not just theory produced about the movement. 
This completes my argument for having chosen disabled activists as the sample 
group for this thesis, but it leaves the issue of how precisely to define and identify 
activists to interview. 
Defining Disabled Activists 
To identify participants I required a conceptualisation of what constituted a disabled 
activist. It was my view that self-identification was the primary criteria for this, 
although I did impose some limits on who could participate. To see why self-
identification is important, it is worth recalling the way in which the emergence of 
disability studies and the DPM rested on the self-mobilisation of disabled people 
against disabling conditions. They self-identified as disabled activists and campaigned 
for equality. This involved a re-definition of disability as oppression, most clearly stated 
in the social model of disability. Disabled people had thus seized the power to define 
disability and who could be considered disabled. This took the power away from 
medical or other professionals to define disability and enabled disabled people 
themselves to define it. As disablism is essentially seen in a negative light, as a process 
of oppression, it is for disabled people to self-identify if they see themselves as 
disabled or not. Hughes makes the point that ‘for the DPM it is the social processes of 
discrimination and oppression that create the material circumstances out of which 
solidarity and politicisation arise’ (2009: 679). He goes on to quote Oliver (1990: 120) 
64 
who argued that one of the key objectives of the disability movement is to create ‘new 
solutions to problems defined not by health professionals but by disabled people 
themselves’. For me to have insisted on some confirmation of an individual’s 
impairment would have been to utilise a medicalised model of disability, and I was not 
inclined to do this. 
A collective dynamic of oppression means there is arguably a degree of 
commonality to the oppression that is experienced by disabled people (Priestley, 
1995). This implies a shared identity formed through a common experience of 
oppression. Such an argument is not without problems, and the discussion concerning 
the extent to which there is a common identity among diverse disabled people is a 
recurring theme within disability politics. For the purposes of this chapter, I want to 
argue that the commonality of disablism means that people with diverse backgrounds 
and impairments should be equally able to claim for themselves the identity of a 
disabled person. This provides a means of defining who disabled people are and, I 
believe, much of the means of defining activists for my purposes as well. 
To define disabled activists more specifically I needed to consult the relevant 
literature. Although there is a large amount of literature concerning the complexities 
of disability identity and the ways in which people may be defined as disabled, I found 
relatively little has been written about the identity of disability activists in particular. 
Of those works I found on disability in Britain from a social movement perspective 
(Beckett, 2006; Campbell and Oliver, 1996; Hughes, 2009; Shakespeare, 1993), there 
tends to be a presupposition of an unproblematic category of ‘disabled activist’ and 
little explicit discussion of the identity of disability activists, that is, who is, and who is 
not, defined as such. 
Within the literature I found two more elaborate discussions of this issue. 
According to Kelly (2010) much can be inferred about activist identity, and what it 
excludes through the identities which are implied by the campaigning activity at hand. 
For example, she argues that groups of disabled activists campaigning for personal 
independence schemes presuppose that ‘disabled people’ equates to the identity of 
that smaller group of disabled people who are most likely to benefit from such 
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schemes. Another useful source on disabled activist identity is from Hughes (2009). 
Following Shakespeare and Watson (2002), he notes the lack of a ‘mass movement’ of 
disabled people and observes that most disabled people do not wish to be identified as 
‘disabled’. He states that the exclusion of impairment from the mobilising idea of the 
DPM (the social model of disability) creates a divide between disabled activists. He 
identifies activists he terms ‘biological citizens’ who see medical professionals as 
potential allies, believing they are better served by engaging with medicine, to expose 
it to critique, drive it to reform, and to make it more accountable. He argues that 
biological citizens differ from other disabled activists in actively identifying with their 
diagnostic category, thereby engaging more actively with the medical profession. He 
distinguishes these activists from what he terms ‘social model stalwarts’. Such 
individuals tend to have little faith in scientific or technological progress, and even 
have dystopian views of scientific research (Hughes, citing Shakespeare, 2006). 
I return to the topic of identifying disabled activists when I discuss the 
practicalities of finding participants later in this chapter (p66-67).  
Access Issues 
I began trying to find activist participants by approaching the National Centre for 
Independent Living (NCIL) to request details regarding the number and geographical 
distribution of Centres for Independent Living (CILs) and the contact detail of an 
individual within each CIL who could serve as a primary contact. CILs had become 
synonymous with the DPM in my mind and this seemed like an obvious place to start. I 
also felt that they occupied an important collectivising role in a support landscape 
increasingly characterised by reforms that could fragment sources of collective identity 
for the DPM (Roulstone and Morgan, 2009). Choosing to begin searching for 
participants through CILs may have been an imposition of a pre-conceived notion of 
disability activism on my part and also reflected my initial focus on personalisation and 
the valuable role CILs can play when uptake of personal budgets is growing. 
I did not have as much success contacting CILs through the NCIL as I had hoped, 
even after repeated attempts by phone and email; perhaps because it was going 
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through significant changes at the time as it merged into being part of DR UK. Instead I 
researched Centres for Independent living online and began to build up a picture of 
their spread. I sent out an information sheet and invitation to these organisations, 
asking if they could circulate my information sheet to anyone who they thought could 
be interested in participating. 
I began to receive a small number of replies but generally struggled to garner a 
great deal of interest in my research. Of course I cannot know why people did not find 
it an enticing prospect. Possible explanations include that there is a great deal of 
research carried out with and ‘on’ disabled people. Part of the critique of standard 
disability research I shall discuss in the next chapter is that it mirrors wider social 
relations as relatively powerful academics research disempowered individuals (Oliver, 
1992). This occurs while the most powerful and influential members of society are 
rarely researched in the same depth. Other grievances disabled people have felt with 
research on disability are that the language and concerns of academics are frequently 
irrelevant to disabled people (Oliver, 2009). These reasons, along with the exploitative 
and parasitical history of unethical disability research (Hunt, 1981) mean many 
disabled people may be disinclined to participate in research projects on disability, 
particularly when carried out by a non-disabled researcher. The frustration of many 
disabled activists with such research may explain why they were uninterested in my 
research. More prosaic reasons may also have been responsible for my difficulties in 
accessing research participants such as the alien language of personalisation (as 
opposed to independent living) used in my information sheet, the relatively low profile 
of my academic institution in disability research, or simply a failure of persistence on 
my part, meaning that my information sheet did not reach enough potential 
participants. It is also possible that the challenges to disabled people and DPOs that I 
document in this thesis may have contributed to difficulties finding participants, as 
individuals and organisations found themselves involved in more pressing personal and 
political challenges. 
Regardless of the reason for the difficulty in accessing research participants, it 
presented me with a need to change my strategy to find more participants. Through 
the initial progress I made with establishing some contacts in centres for independent 
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living, and the small number of interviews that followed, I conducted a form of ‘snow-
ball sampling’ as initial interviewees put me in contact with their contemporaries. I 
also benefited from two contacts at my university who put me in contact with 
colleagues who, in turn, were willing to make contact with suitable participants on my 
behalf. As I conducted more interviews, four more interviewees made contact ‘out of 
the blue’ reporting they had recently been given my information sheet. I can only 
assume that awareness of my research had percolated through networks of friends, 
colleagues and fellow activists, and eventually found its way to more prospective 
participants. 
As I made progress with finding potential participants I was faced with the need 
to decide if they were suitable as participants. Whilst I did not believe I should have 
the power to define activism, it would be absurd not to use any criteria at all. The first 
opportunity to enter the research process was in response to my advertisement; the 
phone call that followed was therefore the first opportunity to gain any idea of who I 
was likely to interview. I did not question potential participants too closely at this 
stage, but sought to gain some confirmation that they could be considered disabled 
activists (see below). Generally this did not present any particular dilemmas. One 
exception was in the case of two individuals without a physical impairment. One was 
recommended by other activists, deeply steeped in the anti-disablist struggle and 
proved to be a very informative interviewee. The other had worked as the support 
worker of a prominent disabled activist in Scotland. The individual assured me she 
could be considered a disability activist, and I accepted this on the basis that her values 
were as important as if she had impairment. Although I had my doubts if the person 
should be considered as a disability activist and stressed to her the purpose of my 
research and my interest in speaking to disabled activists, I accepted her argument and 
proceeded with the interview. In the event I felt the interview was less successful with 
little reference made to the wider movement against disablism. This may of course 
have been a case of an overly restrictive view on my part of what should be considered 
activism, but I chose to omit her interview data from the analysis stage of the thesis. In 
other cases some individuals had more and less involvement in activism ‘writ-large’, 
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and in some cases I needed to be mindful that my own pre-conceived idea of activism 
could be mistaken, and could potentially exclude important experiences. 
When potential participants made contact, I wrote to them by email to confirm 
my interest in interviewing them and to confirm or suggest a time and place for the 
interview to take place. I attached to my email a formal invitation to participate, a 
consent form, and another copy of the information sheet they had initially 
encountered. I sent the email in large font size in the belief this would be accessible to 
more participants. In the same email I checked if the participant had any needs that I 
should be aware of prior to interview. 
Summary of Participants 
I eventually interviewed twenty individuals between March 2012 and January 2013. I 
did not inquire into the precise nature of the physical impairment that participants 
lived with, but it was evident that nineteen participants had a physical impairment. 
Eleven of them were female and one was from a BME background. Interviewees were 
spread across England and Scotland, with three in Scotland and seventeen in England. I 
did not gather data on the age of participants but I believe participant ages averaged 
at roughly fifty. Fifteen participants were active in working for a DPO, and some others 
were ‘retired’ from activism or were primarily involved within academia. 
Strengths and Limitations of Sample 
By accessing participants with physical impairments through established organisations 
of disabled people, I ran the risk of excluding those who did not share the views typical 
of individuals associated with CILs. By contacting individuals from these organisations, I 
may have been mobilising a research strategy that confirmed my pre-existing beliefs 
about disabled people’s priorities. Although I did consciously choose to interview 
people with physical impairments rather than just assuming they equated to disabled 
people in general, this decision may have meant that I excluded potential participants 
who could easily be defined as disabled activists. In this I may have operationalised 
what is presupposed as the typical disability activist within disability studies literature.  
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The narrowness of the group commonly assumed by the label ‘disabled activist’ 
has also been said to frequently equate to disabled man (Morris, 1991). I did not have 
to grapple with this issue in depth in relation to my sample because eleven of twenty 
participants were women. Another criticism of the mainstream disability movement 
has centred on its exclusion of those from ethnic minority backgrounds (Priestley, 
1995). This was replicated in my study as I was only able to interview one person with 
a non- white/British heritage. The age of the participants I interviewed was slightly 
younger on average than I had envisaged. I was seeking discussions with older activists 
who could place the current state of disablism and anti-disablist resistance in a 
historically grounded account and present their views on areas of progress and decline 
in challenging disablism. Due to the problems I experienced in accessing participants, I 
decided to interview a few younger activists, although twelve of the activists had been 
active since the nineteen eighties and were over fifty years of age. 
Again due to the difficulty in accessing participants, I needed to look as far and 
wide as I could to interview informed and experienced activists. In the end I 
interviewed individuals from South East England, the West Midlands, Humberside, 
North West England, North East England, Glasgow and Edinburgh. I do not wish to 
discuss the specific location of each participant for fear of compromising anonymity. 
The choice to interview participants from Scotland introduced some challenges owing 
to the different system of social care provision in place. In the event, two of the three 
interviewees from Scotland had experience in campaigning south of the border. They 
also emphasised the commonality of many of the challenges that they shared with 
their English counterparts such as the limits imposed by the control of taxation in 
Scotland by Westminster. A final means by which I needed to be flexible in order to 
secure elusive interviews was to agree to carry them out over the phone rather than in 
person in nine of twenty cases.  
My sample was narrow in some respects, mirroring the stereotype of the 
British disability movement as consisting of white wheelchair users. This narrowness 
had its own advantages. For example, the individuals I interviewed were typically 
involved with DPOs, and many had long histories in disability activism. They were thus 
part of relatively cohesive group of people with a degree of shared history and 
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identity. What I would have gained from interviewing a more heterogeneous and 
diverse group of activists might have made it more difficult to draw any meaningful 
inferences and could have left me with fragmentary, contradictory data that was more 
difficult to interpret. As I argue above, the opinion of my sample group, however 
‘unrepresentative’ it might be of disabled activists in general, is of particular interest 
for those seeking to understand disablism and anti-disablist resistance. This is 
appropriate for qualitative research of the type I have developed in this thesis, in 
which qualities of thickness or depth is more important than breadth or 
comprehensiveness. 
Retrospectively, I see my definition of this group as being informed by certain 
tacit criteria I absorbed from the literature and discussions with supervisors: 
• Has the person been the subject of disablism? 
• Do they campaign against disablism? 
• Do they express a theory of disability (including tacit)? 
• Do they have a physical impairment? 
• Do they have ties to the DPM? 
I did not formally gauge the extent to which potential participants matched up 
to these criteria, but they came close to expressing the picture of a disabled activist I 
had imagined. Each of these criteria seems to express an important aspect of disability 
activism, but it is also hard to operationalise any of them in practice. For example, how 
could I conclude with any reliability whether someone had endured disablism? Even if 
one could accurately operationalise these criteria, there still remains the ethical 
problem of imposing a definition of activism onto self-identifying disabled activists. As I 
note above, self-identification as an activist, and self-definition of what constitutes 
disability, is itself an important moment in the anti-disablist struggle. If I were to 
impose a restrictive definition of disabled activist I could be guilty of the type of 
unethical power dynamics which marked earlier disability research by non-disabled 
researchers (Stone and Priestley, 1996). Refusing to impose excessively restrictive 
criteria also has the advantage that it could lead to a more diverse pool of interviewees 
than would otherwise have been the case, balancing out some of the exclusion I may 
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have been guilty of by basing my recruitment strategy on a restrictive picture of what 
constituted a disabled activist. 
Use of Semi-Structured Interviews 
The wide ranging and mutable nature of my subject lent itself to qualitative methods 
of inquiry. Qualitative methods are open to participants discussing a wider range of 
experiences and are less likely to predefine areas out of consideration that may prove 
important. In the Emancipatory Disability research (EDR) approach I discuss in chapter 
four, the preference has generally been for qualitative methods (Priestley and Stone, 
1996). This followed strong criticism of national disability surveys by Abberley (1992) 
for creating a divide between ‘expert’ non-disabled researchers and the lay-person 
perspective of disabled people. Barnes also notes that quantitative research was 
generally marginalised by EDR because ‘up to now large scale surveys and detailed 
quantitative analyses have never captured fully the extent and complexity of the 
oppression encountered by disabled people’ (2003: 10). 
Other disability researchers not allied to EDR such as Shakespeare (1996) have 
also spoken out in favour of qualitative methods in researching disability because they 
can allow participants to exercise a greater degree of control over the expression of 
meaning and the direction of the research process. Morris (1991 cited in Priestley and 
Stone, 1996) also values the qualitative approach in disability research, particularly 
because of the role of oral tradition in the emergence of social movements. 
Overall, I felt that one-to-one semi-structured interviews would do least to 
restrict the range of factors that participants could refer to when discussing 
contemporary disabling forces and modes of resistance. This is in keeping with my 
argument above that giving voice to participants’ perspectives was the motor force 
behind the approach I adopted. In contrast to alternatives such as group interviews, 
carrying out semi-structured interviews could better allow participants to move 
between discussing disabling social structures and more ‘personal’ and smaller scale 
experiences such as ‘psycho-emotional’ disablism (Thomas, 1999) that are equally 
important. Disability politics is intertwined with the individual struggle of many 
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disabled people to secure independence in their everyday lives, and collecting data at 
the level of the individual allowed me to probe the relation of these forms of 
disablism.  
Quantitative methods inevitably exclude dimensions of experience; this could 
be unhelpful given that disablism constitutes a complex and multi-levelled 
phenomena, comprised of challenges at different levels. My choice of semi-structured 
interviews is also in keeping with an ethical requirement that participants determine 
what they consider to be relevant to discussion of contemporary disablism. An 
opposing approach of using more strongly structured interview schedules would 
involve a greater risk that I could, as a non-disabled researcher, exercise an 
unwarranted degree of control over the topics discussed and themes to emerge. In this 
respect it may have been better if I had exercised even less control through using a 
more loosely structured interview schedule. 
I chose to stop formal data collection after I had completed twenty interviews 
for a combination of reasons. Firstly, I had struggled to carry out as many interviews as 
I had hoped and continuing to try to find as many interviewees as possible meant I 
might risk using up time that I might be better advised to use writing up my thesis and 
analysing the interviews I had collected. This factor was particularly acute given the 
need to complete the thesis according to a particular schedule. Second, although there 
was a great deal of variation among interviews, there was also a degree to which I was 
encountering repeated themes and my categories of analysis were becoming 
‘saturated’ (Mason, 2010). As I tried to gain more interviewees the energy and time 
expended on securing the interview started to appear excessive in proportion to the 
likelihood I would encounter many new insights through carrying out the interview. 
Stopping to collect further interview data at this point accords with Strauss and Corbin 
(1998) who argue that saturation is reached when further research would be ‘counter-
productive’ and the discovery of new themes would not necessarily add anything to 
the overall analysis. I also needed to consider that what I could bring to the process of 
analysing data is an important aspect of carrying out an insightful analysis (ibid) and 
that time spent learning more about the field in question and repeatedly analysing the 
existing data may be time well spent. I felt that many of the interviews I had carried 
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out were richly detailed and could stand by themselves as adequate sources for my 
data analysis. I was also in the fortunate position of being able to access the written 
output of many other disabled activists through ‘grey’ literature such as online blogs, 
meaning I could gain further insight and knowledge into disabled activist views without 
interviewing more people. It might be that a more experienced researcher than myself 
would have been aware of gaps in the analysis of disablism and resistance within 
interview data, but I felt I had gained the foundations of a strong analysis. 
Ethical Considerations 
I gained ethical approval in my first year of study from the University of Central 
Lancashire to proceed with my research. 
To give greater context to ethical dimensions of my research, it is important to 
note that there is a history of exploitative research carried out by non-disabled people 
with disabled people. In response to this, the emancipatory disability research 
approach (EDR) was developed. I discuss this more in the next chapter, differentiating 
and locating my work in relation to it. I am aware that there is more I could have done 
to have included disabled people in the production of my thesis, particularly at the 
earliest stages of its development. This could also have benefited me in bringing me to 
a settled research question more quickly. There were time and resource limits which 
stopped me from doing this. With more time and awareness of the history of disability 
research, I would also have attempted to gain more advice from disabled people 
through a consultative forum to address the issue of being a non-disabled researcher 
working with a supervisory team of non-disabled people. It is a cause of regret that I 
did not do more to include disabled people at stages other than interview, particularly 
as I have little sense of how my research will be received, other than through the large 
amount of writing by activists I have read. 
A more positive ethical aspect of the research is that by interviewing disabled 
activists I was likely to encounter challenging and politicised voices who would 
forcefully make their perspective known to me. There was a difficult balance to walk 
between theorising their contributions and saying something original without 
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distorting or misrepresenting these important contributions. I tried to carry out 
interviews in a collaborative manner, allowing participants to guide interviews within 
the broad themes I had pre-determined. I stressed the opportunity to withdraw from 
the research process at any stage, and emphasised that there would be no 
consequences to this. I carried out a pilot interview and gained some feedback on my 
performance as an interviewer. When the thesis is submitted I will send it to all 
participants, asking for their feedback. 
With more time I would like to have had the opportunity to get feedback from 
participants before submission of the thesis. I will be emailing and/or phoning every 
participant quoted in this thesis to ask them if they would be willing to read and 
provide feedback. When I have done this I will reflect on their feedback and possibly 
incorporate their feedback into analysis in resulting publications.  
Anonymisation of Participants 
Initially I offered participants the opportunity to be anonymised or known in the 
completed thesis. Participants were more interested in being anonymised than I had 
expected for activists, the majority of whom wishing to be anonymised. Some worked 
in organisations that depended on government funding and they did not wish to be 
public in their criticism of government. Some participants wished to read the excerpts 
of their interview before they would approve use of their interview transcript within 
the thesis. This meant I had to weigh up the balance of harms from anonymising all 
participants or leaving some participants as named. The harm that could result from 
anonymising someone who wished to be named seemed relatively slight. The harm 
that could arise seemed greater if someone was named and, through association, 
identified someone who wished to be anonymised. I therefore elected to anonymise 
all participants, use pseudonyms to refer to them and edit out any identifying features 
such as explicit reference to local organisations. Having made this conclusion, 
however, I raise the danger that it could diminish the visibility and profile of the 
participants and remove their voice, while I, as a non-disabled non-activist, benefit 
from their contributions and can increase my profile and voice. 
75 
The Process of Data Analysis 
I was informed predominantly by narrative analysis in the analysis of interviews. I was 
initially drawn to narrative analysis because I had noted how, outside of disability 
studies, narrative analysis has been used as a lens through which to view political 
issues. For example, Andrews (2007) explores narratives both for how people view 
struggles for power, but also for how they locate themselves within this process. In her 
words, she is interested in: 
what kind of stories people tell about how the world works, how they 
explain the engines of political change, and the role they see 
themselves, and those they regard as being part of their group, as 
playing in this ongoing struggle (ibid: 8).  
Narratives are well suited to these purposes, partly because they are, paradoxically, 
both larger and smaller than individual lives. They are smaller in only ever being a 
snapshot of a given moment and partial because of this (ibid). However, they are larger 
than individual lives by functioning as ‘windows onto political movements and times 
which are not reducible to individual human beings. They derive their very meaning 
from being part of a larger whole’ (ibid: 205). Without reference to this larger whole, it 
would be difficult to make any sense of what is said in an individual narrative. 
Narratives are, for these reasons, a vehicle for insights into the political. 
This point by Andrews seems to say a lot about the political interest in 
narratives, because it tends to diminish the strong contrast that is sometimes drawn 
between the individual and society. Narrative draws attention to the dynamic at work 
between the two and is useful in disability studies in which critics of theorising 
personal experience have expressed concern about the depoliticising consequences of 
research into personal lives (e.g. Finkelstein, 1996). 
In the process of analysis, the power and influence of the researcher inevitably 
exerts a degree of influence. To place some limit on the extent to which I could read 
whatever I chose into the data, I used a relatively rigid method of narrative analysis. 
Through my reading on the subject of narrative analysis, I was drawn to the method of 
Williams (1984) cited by the scholar of narrative methods Riessman (2008). Here, as 
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Riessman describes: ‘the investigator works with a single interview at a time, isolating 
and ordering relevant episodes into a chronological account’ (2008: 57). Applying this 
meant turning each transcript into a series of narratives each in chronological order. 
After this had been done for every interview, I followed Riessman’s guidance that the 
researcher ‘zoom in, identifying the underlying assumptions within each interview and 
naming (coding) them’ (ibid). Analysis comes from keeping the story intact and 
analysing from the individual case (initially), and not ‘by fracturing the biographical 
account into thematic categories’ (ibid: 57). When this process was completed for each 
interview, I began to trace similarities and differences between accounts. Particular 
cases can then be used to ‘illustrate general patterns, and the underlying assumptions 
of different cases can be compared’ (ibid: 57). 
The themes that emerged from my analysis reflected pervasive themes in the 
majority of accounts. Although not all of the central themes I derived from interviews 
were referred to by most or all interviewees, the mention of some arguments even by 
a small number of participants made them significant. For example, participants who 
stressed the challenge of isolation facing many disabled people were making what I 
saw as a significant contribution because the DPM has generally sought to stress the 
independence, risk taking, and individual flourishing that could occur through 
individualised funding. As individualised funding of social care interacted with cuts to 
personal budgets, this produced the possibility of individual isolation, meaning 
participants would broach the topic. In other cases, themes were referred to more 
frequently, but they were not invoked explicitly, rather implied or suggested by the 
arguments at work. An example of this is the challenge I identified from interviews of 
obstructively individualistic conceptions of empowerment that lack a grasp of 
structural disablism. In interviews it was rare that language of “structural disablism” 
was ever used even though some of the participants were very aware of the terms of 
debate in disability studies. Part of the role of the social researcher is to theorise and 
this necessarily involves some transformation of the language at work and a degree of 
subjective judgement. In constructing such theorisations some of the fine complexity 
of individual accounts is inevitably lost. Within the analysis chapters of this thesis 
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(chapters 5-9) I hope to minimise this by providing counter examples in an attempt to 
avoid an overly reductive account of what was discussed in interviews. 
To give more practical detail regarding the form of narrative analysis I have 
used, I refer to Riessman’s typology of forms of narrative analysis. I have practiced 
something close to the form of narrative analysis described by Riessman (2008) as 
thematic narrative analysis. In essence, this differs from other forms of narrative 
analysis (performative or structural) in placing emphasis on the told and not the telling. 
Although the main focus is on content, and on societal context rather than local 
context, I have also tried to use elements of the performative form of narrative 
analysis. As I am in the position of being an ‘outsider’, it would be misleading to 
represent data as if this had no influence on the interview process. I have tried to 
avoid this and to indicate when I think my outsider status could have altered what was 
said. 
In analysing the data for narratives I have sought to understand how 
participants’ stories account for the fluctuating degree of success gained by the DPM 
and the forces and actors that have impeded and facilitated the achievement of its 
goals. This involved trying to understand what sociological concepts and power 
relations they have invoked within their explanations. This is part of the process of 
developing ‘thematics’ from the data, which is influenced by ‘prior and emergent 
theory, the concrete purpose of the investigation, the data themselves, political 
commitments and other factors’ (Riessman, 2008: 54). 
In the next chapter I discuss the significance of broader methodological 
paradigms such as emancipatory disability research and critical realism to my 
approach. I then explain how this relates to my choice of narrative analysis as a 
method of data analysis.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I explained the development of the project and gave details of the 
research process and the choices I made. In this chapter I will discuss in more depth, 
and with more explicit detail, the epistemological and methodological positions which 
underpin the thesis. Doing so will require that I locate the approach I have taken in 
relation to other research traditions, and particularly to other traditions in disability 
research. I will not be able to offer an exhaustive overview of the entire corpus of 
disability research, but will highlight some important traditions that are of particular 
significance to my work, situating my approach in relation to them. First, to place my 
research in a historical context, I will discuss the critique of conventional disability 
research made by disabled academics and activists. Following this I will detail the 
principles of Emancipatory Disability Research (EDR). EDR is perhaps the most well 
discussed and developed methodological framework to have emerged from disability 
studies. I then discuss the influence of critical realism on my approach and the 
relevance of narrative methodologies to my analysis. 
The Critique of Disability Research by Disabled Activists and 
Academics 
To situate disability research historically and politically, Oliver (1992) argues that the 
way in which the ideological category of disability is ‘produced’ is increasingly 
contested by disabled people. He describes how the production of disability has 
passed through stages in which it was first produced as a medical problem, and second 
as a social problem, in both cases requiring the intervention of relevant professionals 
(ibid). It is a cause of frustration for Oliver that research has nearly always ‘operated 
within these frameworks and sought to classify, clarify and map and measure their 
dimensions’ (1992: 101). As disabled people have organised and subjected the 
conventional production of disability to critique, a crisis in the production of disability 
occurred in which conventional productions are increasingly displaced by the DPM’s 
production of disability as oppression (ibid). Through this process, the ideological 
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production of disability becomes a critically important political domain. It is within this 
charged political climate that disability research unfolds. For Oliver, the question facing 
disability researchers is simple: ‘whose side are you on?’ (ibid: 101). He relates this to 
the model of disability mobilised in the research process - social models of disability 
are associated with political commitment to disabled people’s emancipation, while 
individual models of disability are connected with oppressive productions of disability 
(ibid). 
Oliver’s analysis is coupled with a concern with the role of the outsider 
researcher who may impose alien views of disability onto their ‘subjects’. To correct 
the production of disability in medical or individual terms by ‘outsider’ researchers 
requires a consideration of ‘the social relations of research production’ (1992: 101). By 
this Oliver means the way in which researchers are typically seen as specialist, skilled 
and legitimately powerful, while the researched are assumed to be passive and 
relatively ignorant. Experts, lacking democratic control by disabled people, occupy an 
elite role in which they decide the subject, method of investigation and conclusion of 
research into disability. Stone and Priestley liken this role of expert to that of a 
rehabilitation professional who assumes they are best placed to ‘define the self-
concept, goals and inner motivations of disabled persons and determine their ‘real’ 
wishes and potential’ (1996: 703). Casting themselves as an expert, such researchers 
implicitly assert that the knowledge and experience of disabled people does not count. 
Stone and Priestley argue that research produced by such ‘experts’ is constructed as if 
it is removed from the structures which produce disability, but it is implicated in their 
reproduction (ibid). 
Oliver (2009) finds fault with most research into disabled people’s lives in three 
other ways. Firstly, it does not adequately reflect the experience of disability from the 
perspective of disabled people. Secondly, it fails to provide any useful information that 
could influence policy formation in a way that would improve disabled people’s lives. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most revealingly for the purposes of this thesis, it fails to 
acknowledge the struggle of disabled people, or to recognize the political dimension of 
disability. Thus for Oliver, as disabled people become aware of the discriminatory and 
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oppressive constitution of disablism, their alienation from research about disability 
grows as it becomes increasingly irrelevant to their needs. 
These failings can be seen in both interpretive and positivist research. Both of 
these research traditions have been the subject of criticism by the DPM and are 
perceived by many to have failed the cause of disabled people (Barnes, 2008). The 
positivist tradition has been typified by large scale national surveys, aiming to collect 
data concerning the prevalence of different impairments and the difficulties of living 
with such impairments in daily life (ibid). Such research was designed to be directly 
relevant to policy in social ‘care’ and the social security system (ibid). In the case of 
interpretive research, there was a large amount of small scale research into chronic 
illness and disability by sociologists and psychologists, the latter approach focusing on 
adaptation and coping with impairment (ibid). Both types of research can be criticised 
for inadequate involvement of disabled people and an operationalization of ‘individual 
deficit models of disability’ which ignored the impact of disabling structures (ibid, 
2008: 466). 
In the case of positivist informed research, many disability scholars lament its 
dominance in disability research (Oliver, 1992; Barnes, 2003; Stone and Priestley, 
1996). Such critics believe the influence of positivism in disability research has resulted 
in the distortion of the experience of disabled people. For them, positivism assumes 
that researchers can access the truth of the social world as it really is, without 
reference to participant accounts of disablism as oppression. Yet, it is argued that it 
would be difficult for oppression to be researched in an objective way. Insofar as 
positivist research denies the need to take sides, it is implicated in disablement 
because detached objectivity is not possible in a situation characterised by oppression 
(Oliver, 1992). Rather than committing to political change, positivist research assumes 
that positive change can come about through a ‘social engineering approach to the 
policy making process’ (Ibid, 1992: 107). Oliver argues that, contrary to much of 
history, such an approach assumes that the necessary level of social change will take 
place if sufficient evidence is provided to policy makers. 
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As well as positivist research, the other dominant approach to disability 
research is through interpretive inquiry. This too has been seen as failing disabled 
people (Stone and Priestley 1996; Oliver, 1992). Although it is radically at odds with 
the epistemology of positivism, and at least in some cases takes disabled peoples’ 
views of their situation more seriously, it is not perceived to have done much to serve 
disabled people’s interests. According to Oliver (1992) this may be attributable to the 
hierarchical relations embedded in the research process. As he puts it ‘interpretive 
research still has a relatively small group of powerful experts doing work on a larger 
number of relatively powerless subjects’ (ibid: 106). 
The potentially harmful impact of interpretive research can be seen in a 
particularly notorious example of disabling research from the nineteen seventies. 
Miller and Gwyne’s (1972) research was perceived to reinforce existing prejudices and 
discrimination against disabled people and continues to serve as an exemplar of 
disabling research (Barnes 2008). Their qualitative research investigated the lives of 
disabled people living in five different residential institutions. Barnes (2008) reports 
that the research was initially instigated by disabled residents of Le Court Cheshire 
Home, who requested that academic researchers at the Tavistock institute research 
their living conditions. These residents had been engaged in a long struggle to 
democratise their institutional lives in order to gain a greater degree of control over 
the patterns of their daily existence (ibid). Their attempts to change the practices of 
the institution were met with resistance by staff and management. It was into such a 
divided institutional environment that Miller and Gwyne entered to conduct their 
research. 
The researchers based their research on the assumption that it would be best 
to adopt a balanced and objective viewpoint and to avoid taking sides. This approach 
could not conceal that the researchers had effectively sided with the staff of the 
institution, arguing that the limitations of having an impairment meant that the 
demands of the residents were unrealistic (Barnes, 2008). Instead of the institution 
changing to meet the demands of residents, the researchers advocated that staff 
adopt an ‘enlightened guardianship’ approach that took greater account of the 
resident’s needs and desires. Residents perceived this to be an act of complicity in 
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oppression. Paul Hunt condemned the researchers as ‘parasite people’ trapped within 
an individual understanding of disability that assumed it was the biological restrictions 
of impairment that were the ‘whole root cause of the problem’ (1981: 41). This 
condemnation of research ‘on’ disabled people was to become ‘a central reference 
point for later writers exploring a new direction for disability research’ (Barnes, 2008: 
5). 
Emancipatory Disability Research (EDR) 
As described above, disabled activists have long been critical of much research into the 
lives of disabled people. The critique of existing research ‘on’ disabled people is the 
foundation upon which Emancipatory Disability Research (EDR) is built. In 1991 a series 
of seminars funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation provided a forum for the 
development of an approach informed by ‘critical social research’, ‘action research’ 
and the social model of disability (Barnes, 2003). This followed the development of the 
social analysis of disability (Oliver, 1990) and the need to develop an understanding of 
how this could be operationalised within social science research. 
EDR can be seen as building on the criticisms of previous disability research to 
develop a new approach. In a thesis such as this, which is based upon working with 
disabled activists, discussion of EDR is almost unavoidable. If I were to ignore the 
powerful arguments and proactive demands made by proponents of EDR, I believe it 
would be an evasion of the challenging points made by advocates of this approach. 
This does not however mean that I must agree with all of EDR, or adopt it wholesale. 
Engaging with it is a reflexive act, forcing me to be honest about the status of my 
approach and its relation to the critique of conventional disability research by disabled 
activists and academics. 
In order to do this I will outline the five fundamental principles of EDR 
identified by Stone and Priestley (1996) and then discuss how far my own research 
meets these criteria. It is worth bearing in mind that although the structure I borrow 
from Stone and Priestley presents EDR as a fairly static, agreed-upon approach, EDR is 
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really ‘more a set of principles-fairly loosely defined rather than a set of rules for doing 
disability research’ (Zarb, 1992: 127). 
The Five Principles of EDR: 
1. Choosing an Epistemology 
For Oliver EDR requires a ‘re-definition of the problem’ (1992: 112) such that research 
is re-framed to focus on the disabling structures of society rather than individual 
disabled people. The research agenda for EDR that follows is not concerned with ‘the 
disabled people of the positivist and interpretive research paradigms but the disablism 
ingrained in the individualistic consciousness and institutionalised practices of what is, 
ultimately, a disablist society’ (ibid: 112). To the extent that research can respond to 
the need for such an agenda, it can play a role in challenging disablism. To do so 
requires that it break with individual models of disability and work within a social 
model of disability framework. This means that EDR is built upon a fundamental shift in 
the ontological position regarding disability (Barnes and Sheldon, 2007). For Stone and 
Priestley, this first principle of EDR represents ‘a radical epistemological shift from the 
models adopted by positivists and interpretative perspectives’ (1996: 674). Overall, 
proponents of EDR are quite clear that EDR ‘must adhere to the social model of 
disability’ (Barnes and Sheldon 2007: 240). 
In many ways the emergence of EDR is intertwined with the emergence of the 
social model of disability. The social model, according to Barnes has ‘stimulated the 
adoption of a more justifiable emancipatory research paradigm that draws explicitly 
upon disabled people’s collective experience and so challenges directly the widespread 
social oppression of disabled people’ (2008: 458). Adoption of the social model can 
then be seen as a prerequisite for working within the EDR paradigm. For Finkelstein 
(1999), EDR suffers when the social model is accepted in principle without enough 
thought given to how it is to be put into practice within research that challenges 
disabling social structures. This means that EDR must be practically inclined toward 
investigating what ‘can be transformed, has to be transformed, or that we want to 
transform in the process of confronting the exigencies of the disabling society’ 
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(Finkelstein, 1999: 859-860). This causes Finkelstein to criticise much of research for its 
distance from the objective of dismantling disabling barriers. He questions if many 
projects are as informed by the social model as they claim to be, and doubts if the 
removal of all reference to ‘the social model’ from such research outputs would make 
any difference to its findings. 
2. Surrendering Objectivity 
As we saw above, research which aspires to detachment and objectivity, such as that 
conducted by Miller and Gwyne (1972), has been strongly criticised. Instead, advocates 
of EDR propose openly committed, politically engaged research. Following Hunt (1981) 
many writers take a partisan view of this matter, arguing that researchers will either be 
part of the solution, through politically engaged research, or part of the problem by 
failing to condemn the existence of oppressive structures (e.g. Oliver, 1992; Barnes 
and Sheldon, 2007). For Priestley (1997) the critique of positivism is particularly 
relevant when social movements (such as the DPM) are the subject of research. He 
draws on Touraine (1981) to argue that it is necessary to identify with a social 
movement in order to gain understanding of it. ‘Committed research’ is the ideal to 
aim for, in which research contributes to the development of the movement and 
provokes permanent change in the movement effected by the research. This can allow 
research to go beyond superficial analysis as the researcher adopts an ‘agitator’s 
function’ (Stone and Priestley, 1996: 5), assisting the group’s analysis of its situation. 
A requirement for ‘commitment’ and partisanship may open up proponents of 
EDR to accusations of bias, particularly from the medical and positivist traditions 
(Barnes and Sheldon, 2007). Colin Barnes has done the most to fully justify this 
position. He argues that all information can be interpreted in multiple ways and that 
those who do the interpretation are subject to myriad social pressures and forces 
(Barnes 2003). For him, this is reflected in the commonplace conviction of social 
scientists that ‘all judgements are coloured by personal experience’ and that ‘all 
propositions are limited by the meaning implicit or explicit in the language used in 
their formation’ (ibid: 11). He argues that the reason much disability research is not 
sufficiently informed by these insights and aware of the theory-ladeneness of 
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observation is that it has been dominated by medical and academic interests (ibid). As 
the social model and EDR have gained ground, proponents of EDR are less often seen 
as biased and medical/individual views enjoy less dominance (ibid). 
In addition, Barnes and Sheldon (2007) dispute that adopting a position of 
political commitment must mean advocating a subjectivist politics where one’s view is 
wholly determined by political allegiance. Their reasoning here follows Oliver who 
argues that disablism is not only a result of ‘the thoughts and actions of individuals or 
groups’ but is ‘objectively structured by the social and material relations of capitalism’ 
(1999b: 184). Oppression can then be examined as an objective reality, meaning it is 
‘difficult to support the notion that those involved in disability research should put 
aside any claims to objectivity’ (Barnes and Sheldon 2007: 10). This perspective is not 
typical of accounts of EDR in general which tend to reject positivism whilst assuming 
this requires no justification. Barnes (2008) argues that a more explicit discussion of 
methodology should take place within EDR. I return to the issue of objectivity and EDR 
below. 
3. What’s In It for Participants? 
Politically committed research within the EDR paradigm demands that the researcher 
consider the relevance of their research to improving the lives of disabled people. For 
example, Barnes (2008) holds that political gains are ‘centre stage’ for EDR. This can 
take the forms of ‘removing social barriers, changing perceptions of disability, and 
generating political action’ (ibid: 467). Relevant research would identify forms of 
discrimination and propose the removal or disabling barriers or the transformation of 
social structures. The researcher is active in challenging oppression rather than merely 
reporting oppression and resistance from the side-lines (Oliver, 1992). 
Unlike conventional research which has been implicated in the existence of 
disabling social structures through reproducing dominant individual models of 
disability, EDR must represent a ‘confrontation with power which structures the social 
relations of research production’ (Oliver, 1992: 110). Such a confrontation mirrors the 
need for similar processes to occur in other domains of social research in which 
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research is carried out by those who have power on those who do not (ibid). The point 
of EDR is not ‘attempts it might make to study the other end of existing power 
relations but attempts it might make to challenge them’ (ibid: 110). The requirement 
for practically relevant research is so strong that Oliver is critical of his own work 
(1988) for its failure to deliver tangible political gains. 
This need for research of immediate political relevance is a demanding test, 
and it can be that good research is rejected for reasons beyond the foresight of 
researchers. As a supporter of EDR, Barnes (2008) recognises this and accepts that the 
reason why research may or may not have an impact is usually beyond the control of 
an individual researcher. 
4. Reversing the Social Relations of Research Production 
Oliver (1992) focuses his presentation of EDR primarily on ‘changing the social 
relations of research production’. This means overturning the divide between expert 
(usually non-disabled) researcher and the disabled researched, allowing disabled 
people themselves to set the agenda for research. It is central to this view that 
research is part of the wider web of social relations and cannot be separated from the 
social relations which underpin disablism. 
Following Oliver’s (1992) extensive and seminal contribution on the topic, 
Stone and Priestley argue that the failures of prior research can be attributed in great 
part to the relationships which underpin the research process. If research is to be 
relevant and anti-oppressive it must build solidarity and collaboration into research 
designs and put the skills of the researcher at the disposal of disabled people and their 
priorities. Changing research relations in this way would challenge socially prevalent 
patterns of inequality, privilege and oppression. It would also reverse the tendency in 
prior research to treat disabled people as passive subjects who cannot express 
themselves properly, requiring researchers to assess their needs instead. 
In practice, changing the relations of research production means addressing 
questions such as who controls the research process as a whole, what it will be about, 
and how it will be conducted (Barnes, 2008). It also means questioning the 
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opportunities that exist for disabled people to criticise research outputs and influence 
further research (ibid). Changing the relations of research production may be the most 
frequently discussed and fundamental aspect of EDR, but Finkelstein (1999) warns that 
it is dangerous to assume that control and participation is equivalent to working 
according to the social model of disability. 
5. Personalising the Political and Politicising the Personal 
Unlike the other principles I have listed here, the extent to which research should 
encompass personal experience is disagreed upon by advocates of EDR. For Barnes and 
Sheldon (2007) this represents the ‘hotly contested’ issue of EDR. They argue that the 
issue can be seen as a manifestation of the tension between, on one hand, the 
privileged expertise of disabled people on their experiences of disablement, and, on 
the other hand, the conviction that it should be disabling structures and not individual 
disabled people that are the subject of EDR. They note that the politicisation of the 
personal has been a key aspect of politicising disability for many disabled people. For 
this reason and others, they endorse research that considers ‘personal experience’, so 
long as it highlights the way in which disabled people frame issues in a distinct way 
from their oppressors. Presenting research of this sort is a political act which serves to 
critique the frames and constructions of disablism (ibid). This must be balanced with 
awareness of the danger that an excessive stress on personal experience can diminish 
the knowledge of collective disablement as a form of shared social oppression. 
Experience can be a starting point, but not an ending, and should be analysed primarily 
for what it can tell us about disablism (Thomas, 1999). 
The most strident criticisms of including individual experience within EDR were 
made by Finkelstein (1996). He expressed concern that focusing upon the subjective 
attitudes and feelings of individuals could risk undermining the valuable shift that has 
taken place toward viewing disability as a form of oppression. Without a strong focus 
on disabling barriers, he feared the movement might lose ‘an objective, practical and 
‘hands on’ approach towards the struggle for social change’ (ibid: 2) focused on the 
disabling barriers ‘out there’. Finkelstein bemoaned the tendency towards what he 
considers to be an apolitical stress on personal experience: ‘Gone is the original social 
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interpretation that the reality of disability can be most appropriately understood by 
focusing on the disabling barriers out there. Now insight is to be obtained by focusing 
on the subjective reality of our disabling experiences’ (ibid: 2). The concern here is that 
the stress is not on removing disabling barriers but the way individuals experience 
disabling barriers. For Finkelstein, this risks putting action behind contemplation and 
passivity. He goes further and argues that a focus on subjective experiences is a short 
step away from re-introducing the focus on impairment that characterised individual, 
medical models of disability. This means that the theorisation of individual experiences 
could displace knowledge of objective social structures, in favour of ‘subjective 
realities’ that are promoted as if they were a reality for all disabled people. 
Contrary to Finkelstein, Stone and Priestley (1996) endorse the arguments of 
those such as Morris (1991) who identify ‘the importance of differences in the 
personal experience of impairment and disablement and the primacy of such 
experience as research data’ (Stone and Priestley, 1996: 707). Such writers wish to 
combine a representation of the subjective realities of individual disabled people with 
a commitment to a social model of disability. This means attempting to balance both 
commonality and difference of experience (of disablism) in research design. This would 
give voice to ‘the personal as political whilst endeavouring to collectivise the political 
commonality of individual experiences’ (ibid: 710). Stone and Priestley appear to 
acknowledge that this puts them in a position of tension with advocates of the social 
model who tend to stress collective processes of disablement and can be suspicious of 
individual stories, especially in reference to impairment. The tension can also run in 
the other direction as writers such as Morris (1992) have questioned if models of any 
sort can tend to objectify and obscure individual experience. 
Constraints on the Potential of EDR 
Those who have done most to elaborate the EDR approach freely admit that they were 
only able to partially realise the goals of EDR in their own research (Oliver, 1997; 
Priestley, 1995; Zarb, 1992). In different ways these writers recognise the constraints 
which limit the degree to which EDR can be fully realised in practice. For example, Zarb 
(1992) believes that there is only so much progress that can be made toward EDR 
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through research involving collaboration and genuine partnership, without far more 
fundamental changes being made to the social and material relations of research 
production. Until such changes can be made, it is misguided to suppose that EDR can 
be spoken of as a practical reality or even to suppose that what it would involve can be 
fully understood (ibid). Among the most stubborn constraints upon the development 
of EDR is that there is a ‘clear relationship between the level of participation of 
disabled people in decision-making about the research, the extent of consultation 
during and after the research, and who instigated and funded the research’ (Zarb, 
1992: 129). The majority of funding of large-scale research has been for work based on 
the individual models of disability and this constrains changes in the social relations of 
research production (Zarb, 1997). Oliver sums up the constraints of material relations 
of production by arguing that challenges to existing power relations are ‘unlikely to be 
funded by institutions located within existing power structures' (1992: 110). 
For Zarb (1997), this should not lead to despair but instead serve to provide a 
more accurate picture of what can be immediately achieved, and the important 
choices that are available within these constraints. A decade later, Barnes and Sheldon 
report that the funding situation has improved for EDR, but that ‘it is clear that the 
emancipatory research paradigm is still not fully supported in the current market-led 
academic environment’ (2007: 249). Even when the material relations of research 
production allow the conduct of EDR, many disabled people lack the ‘time or 
inclination, even if politically aware to take control of research’ (Barnes, 2008: 470). 
The Relationship of my Research to EDR 
I will now discuss the extent to which my own approach fits in with the principles of 
EDR described above. 
In the first instance of ‘choosing an epistemology’ I share with proponents an 
agreement on the importance of the social model of disability. That said, I do not 
believe this should mean that researchers cannot consider aspects of disabled people’s 
lives other than those concerned with oppression. I endorse a pluralist approach, while 
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also wishing to articulate the tensions between different approaches to disability 
research. I return to my reasons for supporting pluralism below (see p.64). 
The second principle of ‘surrendering objectivity’ is the one that is perhaps 
least characteristic of the approach I have taken. As I understand this principle, the 
point is that the impossibility of objectivity means research should be based on an 
open political commitment to the emancipation of disabled people. Although I agree 
with Barnes (2003) that researchers judgments are unavoidably coloured by their 
preconceptions and existing theoretical frames, the rejection of the notion of 
objectivity in accounts of EDR seems under-theorised and articulated in insufficient 
detail. More specifically, I find the substitution of objectivity with political partisanship 
problematic. 
The first problematic aspect of this is that developing research built on political 
allegiance to disabled people is not as straightforward as it might appear. Trying to 
realise this in practice could be criticised for assuming a homogenous group of disabled 
people with interests and priorities akin to those expressed in the principles of EDR. 
Contrary to the claims of Barnes and Sheldon (2007) that partisanship need not mean 
subjectivism, it could be argued that the interests and goals attributed to disabled 
people in EDR are only one of a variety of subjective views on the nature of disablism 
and appropriate political goals for disabled people. 
A second problematic consequence of this principle is that ‘surrendering 
objectivity’ in favour of partisan pursuit of political goals leaves uncertain grounds on 
which to base the claims made in research informed by EDR. ‘Surrendering objectivity’ 
and substituting it with political allegiance is a response to the impossibility of pure 
objectivity and the necessarily theory-laden nature of social-scientific knowledge. This 
involves a ‘flip’ from the rejection of naive neutrality and objectivity to an 
endorsement of the opposite extreme, assuming this is the only alternative. What 
follows is a privileging of a particular view and the claim it has advantage in terms of 
understanding society. This outright rejection of any version of objectivity assumes an 
over-demanding conception of objectivity which is far divorced from the version of it 
defended by critical realists. Sayer (2000) referring to this approach more generally, 
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argues that this sort of privileging can lead to a new form of foundationalism, replacing 
a faith in direct observation and pure foundations of truth with a strong privilege of a 
singular perspective as it serves as a replacement foundation. This is what seemed to 
be the problem with EDR, as it responded to critiques of pure objectivity by 
substituting it with political partisanship as an alternative ground for knowledge 
claims. Although social science cannot claim objectivity for what it asserts this does not 
mean that the value or preferability of claims should be reduced to the political 
allegiances underpinning them. 
Like Sayer (2000) and other critical realists I do not believe that subjective 
preference or political allegiance is the only valid way to arbitrate between claims. 
When views clash, they can be assessed for their explanatory power or ‘practical 
adequacy’ meaning the extent to which they ‘generate expectations about the world 
and about results of our actions which are realized’ (Sayer, 2000: 43)
25
. Practical 
adequacy of this sort does not mean practical adequacy in relation to one set of 
questions or referents will be the same as in another. Something may be practically 
adequate in some situations but judged to be dangerous or undesirable for its general 
effect. From this perspective, substituting flawed claims to true objectivity with 
political allegiance can undermine the claims made on these grounds. 
This is not to advocate a return to foundationalist claims to pure objectivity. 
Reflexivity is always required to increase awareness of researcher’s situatedness and 
to ward off projections and selections which can lead to misrepresentation. The 
requirement in EDR that one openly admits political allegiances is thus to be valued. 
However, political allegiances should not be seen as rigid codes which determine the 
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 Sayer clarifies his notion of practical adequacy: ‘If truth were purely a matter of convention, we would 
be able to live by any convention we cared to invent: we don’t because we can’t. We can drop the idea 
of truth as absolute but we can’t ignore the relationship between discourse and the world. We can act 
more successfully on the basis of some conventions than others because their relationship to the 
structures of the world is different’ (1993: 326). Later he further clarifies his argument: ‘The fact that 
language itself is constitutive of knowledge (though not uniquely so), need not prevent us distinguishing 
discourses which do provide a successful guide to action in the social and natural worlds from those 
which don’t. But though sometimes two or more kinds of discourse or knowledge may perform equally 
well in this respect, not just any discourse or convention will be practically-adequate. We can’t get 
outside discourse to see how it compares with real objects, but it is evident from observation and action 
within a particular world-view or discourse that some conventions about what is the case hold and 
others don’t‘ (ibid: 330). 
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conduct of the research process. The principles of EDR and those of the DPM are as 
fallible as any other claims to knowledge, and are equally as subject to revision. 
Requiring subordination to political allegiance is therefore problematic. Proponents of 
EDR are right to criticise claims to neutrality and objectivity and to recognise the 
situatedness of knowledge. Recognition of this situatedness must be balanced by a 
conception of the possibility of error and misrepresentation, requiring acceptance of 
an independent reality about which both researchers and participants may be 
mistaken. 
Tacitly, some proponents of EDR seem to accept that there are limits to their 
rejection of objectivity and endorsement of academic partisanship. For example, 
Barnes (1991) has drawn upon extensive empirical evidence to make the case for anti-
discrimination legislation. This work was not simply a reflection of political allegiance 
but a marshalling of evidence about a shared object of knowledge that was used to 
persuade others, including those who may have begun with quite different allegiances 
and values to supporters of EDR and the DPM. 
Following from my doubts regarding the substitution of objectivity with 
political subordination, the principle of ‘surrendering objectivity’ is not characteristic of 
how I conceptualise my role in the research process. Rather than subordinating my 
research to an allegiance to a pre-defined politics, I wish to maintain a degree of 
independence in formulating my own view. I take this position because I do not wish to 
assume that I should always refer to an allegiance to a pre-defined politics or defer to 
the expertise of participants. 
Moving on from the second principle of EDR to the third; ‘what’s in it for 
participants’, I am ambivalent on this issue. I agree that much disability research has 
failed to benefit disabled people and has even been actively damaging. While disablism 
persists, the political impact and benefit of research will always be relevant. However, 
the call for disability research that practically benefits disabled people may tend 
toward an instrumental view of knowledge that construes ‘benefit’ too narrowly. For 
example, Shakespeare (1997) notes that Oliver himself had a beneficial impact on 
many disabled people with his sociological and theoretical text The Politics of 
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Disablement (1990). It was not policy orientated or of direct political significance, but it 
had an important indirect impact on politics ’because it gave intellectual credibility to 
the social model and validated the analysis and direction of the disability movement’ 
(Shakespeare, 1997: 187). This example shows that it would be unwise to adopt an 
overly instrumental view of what constitutes useful research. I follow Shakespeare on 
this point and have written my thesis in the hope that it could be of interest and use to 
disabled people, even if it is not a detailed program for political action or a practical 
policy prescription. 
I am largely in agreement with the fourth point about changing the relations of 
research production, and in practice I could and should have done more to incorporate 
the views of participants during the planning of the thesis and the process of data 
analysis. I can truthfully claim that I was less aware of the significance of this issue at 
an earlier stage of research and that I would change the level of participation of 
participants and other disabled people at every stage if I carried out similar research 
again. For example I could have attempted to work with an advisory group of disabled 
people or activists to develop questions and analyse my findings. In later stages of 
analysis I would like to have engaged more with participants to discuss my analysis, but 
time and resource constraints, and the unexpected length of time required to conduct 
data analysis meant I lacked the time to do so. If I had fostered more contacts at an 
earlier stage, it may be that they would have helped by clarifying issues in analysis, 
reducing the length of time required to conduct analysis.  
Regarding principle five and the need to theorise personal experience, I am 
strongly in favour of those who take the view that personal experience and private 
issues should form part of the subject of disability research. In my research regarding 
politics ‘writ large’, I did not set out to probe this type of issue and I did not expect that 
participants would be comfortable with me doing so. I may have been mistaken in this 
regard because the micro-level of personal experience may be exactly where many 
current challenges of disablism are most keenly felt. By planning a thesis based on 
public politics and national government policy, and advertising the opportunity to 
discuss these issues in particular, I may have been guilty of putting into practice exactly 
the public/private divide for which some disability research has been criticised 
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(Thomas, 1999). That said, in carrying out my research I did not anticipate that those 
who had volunteered to participate and had self-identified as an ‘activist’ would expect 
to discuss their private lives. I may have been wrong in this but I did not wish to appear 
disrespectful or over-familiar.  
The Necessity of a Pluralist Outlook in Disability Research 
To further contextualise my approach I now draw upon Priestley (1998) who provides a 
useful description of the varying academic approaches at work in disability research. 
This gives a different and broader way of locating my approach than that offered by 
EDR. He draws a contrast not just between individual and social models but also 
materialist and idealist explanations. Priestley argues that these two distinctions 
should be seen as inter-related rather than the subjects of separate debate. This is 
observable in individual models of disability which can operate materially through a 
medical or biological focus, or in a form of idealism in the focus upon the psychological 
negotiation of living with impairment. Equally, social models can also be more skewed 
toward idealism or materialism. In the case of materialism, social models would lead to 
the study of structural and material conditions, and in the case of idealism, culture and 
representation. The research that results from materialist or idealist social 
conceptualisations of disability will lead to divergent conclusions, either stressing 
structural and institutional disablism or disabling attitudes and representations. 
Priestley’s central case is that disability research should be pluralist in outlook. 
While individual research projects may be concerned with only one dimension of 
disability, researchers should not be closed to research and experience at work in 
other dimensions of disability (ibid). Priestley develops this analysis to show the four 
basic combinations of idealism and materialism, and social and individual models of 





Nominalist Position 1 
Subjective Materialism 
Social phenomena have no real 
existence beyond material 
individuals 
 
Social phenomena may be shaped 
by biology 
 




Social phenomena have no real existence 
beyond the experience of voluntaristic 
individuals 
 
Social phenomena may be shaped by 
attitudes and beliefs 
 
Symbolic interactionism, phenomenology 
and interpretative paradigms, feminists 
psychologies 
Realist Position 3 
Objective materialism 
Material society exists beyond the 
individual 
 
Social phenomena may be shaped 
by political economy, structural 
patriarchy, etc. 
 
Historical materialism, structural 




Idealist society exists beyond the 
individual 
 
Social phenomena may be shaped by 
social values, culture etc. 
 
Positivist sociology, social constructionism 
and cultural relativism 
Table 2: Four paradigms for the study of social phenomena (Priestley, 1998: 77) 
I will now discuss the four positions in more detail and examine their relation to my 
research. Position one is commonly referred to as the ‘medical model’. In this case 
disability is seen as biologically determined and located within the material condition 
of the body. The research that follows may concern physical rehabilitation, drug 
development or surgical intervention (ibid). Although the effect of much research in 
this tradition has been oppressive, because it can involve applying bio-medical 
solutions to social problems, it does not have to be oppressive. The key point is that 
this analysis can only accommodate consideration of impairment and cannot attend to 
disablism. Although this position is of limited significance to my work, I will also want 
to avoid the crude denial of the significance of impairment for which the social model 
is sometimes criticised (Shakespeare, 2006). Through a pluralist outlook I would also 
want to resist the criticism that the social model can leave medicine and the body 
solely to medics and remove it from the realm of politics (Paterson and Hughes, 1999). 
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Position two again is an individual model, but it focuses on ‘cognitive 
interaction and affective experience’ (Priestley, 1998: 80) rather than biology and 
views disability as the ‘product of personal experience and negotiation of social roles 
between individuals’ (ibid). Concerning itself with the analysis of identity and 
experience, relevant methods reflect a grounding in subjective idealism. These could 
include ‘phenomenology, interpretative psychology and symbolic interactionism’ (ibid). 
There is a great deal of research of this type, typically concerned with psychological 
adjustment to impairment, or attitudes of non-disabled people to impairments. A 
famous example is Goffman’s study of stigma (1963). This position can also refer to a 
quite separate tradition of mainly feminist writers who have sought to introduce a 
greater emphasis on personal experience in disability studies (Morris, 1991; Thomas, 
1999). These writers try to reconcile this argument with a political commitment to 
position 3 or 4 (see below).  
As I note above, I strongly endorse approaches which aim to synthesise anti-
disablism and analysis of personal experience. My work has not predominantly been 
characterised by work that considers personal experiences and it could be argued that 
my framing of the thesis in terms of activism and politics writ-large reflected the 
absence of an appreciation of this dimension of disability in my formulation of the 
project. My ideal would be to follow the lead of writers such as Thomas (1999) and 
Morris (1991) who seek to transcend the public/private dualism that often separates 
‘private’ aspects of politics from consideration of politics in general. In practice, 
however, this position does not characterise my analysis very well because my 
interviews tended to focus on the public domain of shared challenges, shared 
campaigning and modes of organisation. 
Position three is commonly referred to as ‘the social model’ but it only refers to 
one possible social model which views disability as the product of material relations of 
power within a specific historical context. The subject of analysis and investigation are 
disabling barriers. This analysis has underpinned much of the work of the DPM, and 
has informed seminal works in disability studies (Oliver, 1990; Barnes, 1991). This 
position excludes consideration of impairment because it is a social rather than an 
individual materialist position. Yet it is also consistent with the analysis of Thomas 
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(1999) who develops a materialist feminist approach to disability, incorporating an 
analysis of ‘impairment effects’ within a relational concept of disablism rather than a 
conception of disabling barriers. 
This position is the one that I accepted most intuitively and I found it to be 
capable of yielding insights of impressive depth in the work of others. My intuitive 
preference for this position may in part be a consequence of my prior knowledge of 
the historical-materialist framework that informs it. I continue to endorse this position, 
although not to the exclusion of others. Where I try to make original contributions in 
this thesis they can normally be identified with this position. I could not hope to make 
original contributions identified with all of the positions. My preference is in part 
pragmatic in that, in my judgment, ‘material relations of power’ seem to be a very 
salient feature of disability in the UK currently. 
Position four could also be described as a social model of disability, but it is not 
commonly known as such. It would more likely be known as social constructionism, 
and has more recently been associated with ‘critical disability studies’
26
 (Shildrick, 
2012; Goodley, 2013; Vehmas and Watson, 2014). This philosophically idealist position 
differs from position three in viewing disability as formed through ideas, or in other 
terms, as a social construction of a given cultural community. It is therefore primarily 
concerned with cultural representations. Priestley notes of this position ‘the 
characterisation of disability as a social construct is premised (implicitly or explicitly) 
upon the notion of cultural relativism. That is to say, it assumes that the construction 
of disability is a product of specific cultural conditions’ (1998: 81). The extent to which 
‘people of difference’ are included or excluded from social life is determined by 
cultural perceptions of difference. Research of this type might highlight the variation in 
how attitudes to disability are constructed in different cultures. Proponents of this 
approach understand disability as determined by social labelling and role expectations, 
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 Drawing on Meekosha and Shuttleworth (2009) Goodley argues that critical disability studies denotes 
the following: ‘a shift in theorizing beyond the social model; the influence of disciplines 
previously on the outskirts, such as psychology, entering the field; attempts to challenge the dogmatic 
tendencies of some theories and theorists through reference to eclecticism; and the merging of Marxist 
accounts with those from feminism, queer and post-colonial studies. The word 
‘critical’ denotes a sense of self-appraisal; re- assessing where we have come from, where we are at and 
where we might be going’ (2013: 632). 
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and for the purposes of research projects exclusively characterised by this approach, 
do not require that material factors are invoked. 
I recognise the importance of this position for what it can tell us about the 
cultural dimensions of disability. It characterises my approach insofar as I have been 
led to conclude that cultural forms of disablism are a powerful force at work in 
contemporary disablism. I would object to cases in which this approach is used to 
argue that biological impairments and economic relations of power can be reduced to 
artefacts of language or culture
27
, as Vehmas and Watson (2014) claim. In such cases 
adopting this position in an exclusivist mode works against the pluralism that Priestley 
argues is necessary for disability research in general. If the position is adopted 
pragmatically, without reducing non-discursive factors to discourse or denying the 
importance of other modes of inquiry, I see no reason to object to this position. 
Whilst the above positions are, in Priestley’s words, ‘over-simplified’ and ‘very 
generalised’ they do explain much about ‘underlying differences between 
contemporary disability theorists’ (1998: 79). They are not mutually exclusive, 
although there are differing degrees of tension between them. Because they are not 
mutually exclusive it is possible to combine elements of some or all of them in an 
analysis of disability. The main inference I take from them into my presentation of 
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 Critical realism shares with weaker versions of social constructionism the belief that reality is 
necessarily interpreted, that is, we cannot perceive from a neutral or mind-independent position. The 
critical realist therefore has no issue with a weak form of social construction which holds that there is a 
‘necessarily interpreted element in the construction of any theoretical understanding and any social 
object’ (Bhaskar and Danermark, 2005: 284). Critical realists object when it is argued, or assumed, that 
the phenomenon under investigation is just an interpretation, idea or belief. Strong social 
constructionism collapses the objects of knowledge into what is known about them, or conflates 
‘existence of social objects to the participating agents’ concept or understanding of them’ (ibid: 284). 
Critical realists hold that social constructions pertain to our knowledge of nature and non-human reality, 
not to nature itself. This is the reason that we are continually shown to be wrong in our observations 
and predictions about the objects of our knowledge. If there was no difference between constructions 
of the world and the world itself, we would never be wrong. Strong social constructionists who ignore 
this reduce explanation to the cultural level only, excluding consideration of extra-discursive factors 
such as biology. 
The view that there is an equivalence between what is known about something and the existence of the 
thing itself is known by critical realists as the epistemic fallacy. It involves a conflation of the ontological 
and the epistemological. In the case of disability, the ontological existence of the biological body is 
conflated with the epistemology of what is known or believed about bodies (William, 1999). This does 
not rule out inquiry into the ways in which the body is represented or conceived of, only the claim that 
‘representations are constitutive of the reality that portray’ (Williams, 1999: 814). 
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critical realism is that they suggest pluralism is an important aspect of any research 
approach into disability. Each of the positions represents important aspects of disabled 
people’s lives and researchers should be aware of what is excluded in research that 
mobilises one of these positions at the expense of the others. Researchers may make 
the methodological and pragmatic decision to bracket dimensions of disability out of 
consideration in a given research project, but this does not mean the dimensions 
excluded are necessarily any less important. 
The Relevance of Critical Realism to my Approach 
Another means of showing the importance of pluralism to the study of disability is to 
draw on the work of critical realists in the field. I also use critical realism to show how 
it can be reconciled with a social analysis of disability and to augment my decision to 
base my thesis around the views of activist participants. 
Like Priestley (1998), applications of critical realism to the study of disability 
have stressed that disability research must be pluralist. The critical realist demand for 
pluralism reflects a view of disability as a multifaceted phenomenon, in which 
mechanisms from differing strata of social and biological reality interact. In the terms 
used by Bhaskar and Danermark, disability may involve ‘physical, biological, 
physiological or medical/clinical, psychological, psycho-social, socio-material, socio-
cultural and normative elements’ (2005: 288). One of the useful aspects of this 
understanding is that it directs attention to the ways in which mechanisms at different 
levels interact. 
For Bhaskar and Danermark it is a mistake to conceive of disability as meaning 
the political aspect of disabled people’s lives, because it excludes consideration of 
other factors. Their justification is that all ‘types of determination may play a role in 
the onset or maintenance of a particular disability’ (ibid: 281). This later point seems to 
assume what it sets out to demonstrate: namely that disability is, at least in part, a 
biological phenomenon, which has an ‘onset’. This differs markedly from accounts of 
disability and disablism which view disability as one means by which the experience of 
impairment can be socially realised within a society (Gleeson, 1997). In such accounts 
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disability is seen as social and variable, meaning it could be replaced by another more 
positive social experience for those with impairments. 
Although I value the pluralism in Bhaskar and Danermark’s approach, I disagree 
with their assumption that the category of disability must refer in part to a biological 
fact that has ‘an onset’ or ‘maintenance’. Bhaskar and Danermark assume throughout 
their discussion that disability refers to a totality of factors which always includes 
impairment. Advocates of the social model of disability, including pluralists such as 
Priestley (1998), accept the extra-discursive reality of impairment and recognise the 
value of diverse research approaches into disabled people’s position in society, but use 
‘disability’ to refer to the oppressive relations those with impairments can experience. 
In this sense, advocates of critical realism and the social model can talk past each 
other, using differing terminology. In my view this is regrettable because it alienates 
proponents of the social model from the valuable means of conceptualising the need 
for pluralism provided by critical realists. The opposition of proponents of the social 
model to the approach of Bhaskar and Danermark is bound to follow from their 
insistence that disability is in part biological.  
The critical realist argument here is meta-theoretical, establishing what 
disability research should investigate in the most general terms, rather than what the 
content of the interaction of those mechanisms will be. The advantages of maximal 
inclusiveness and complexity of such an approach has much to recommend it. 
However, when it is combined with a rejection of disability as a political and social 
category, it tends to negate the political urgency this lends to research. Analysis of 
disability as a political category brackets or abstracts from other factors, such as 
impairment, but need not deny them. This is not to say there are no potential dangers 
related to the social model such as social reductionism of biology into social factors. 
Through the impairment/disability dualism, crude and one-dimensional versions of the 
social model of disability may also concede too much ground to the biological and 
medical domain, when medicine is also in part a political arena (Paterson and Hughes, 
1999).This latter point may be a genuine problem with the social model but adopting 
critical realism without the political category of disability could also have its 
disadvantages, such as taking the political urgency out of disability studies. 
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Perhaps a way out of this conflict would be to suggest that Bhaskar and 
Danermark’s use of the term ‘disability’ could be changed instead to refer to ‘disabled 
people’s lives’ which would be less contentious. If this were the case, the advantage of 
Bhaskar and Danermark’s approach is that it does not assume the prevalence of a 
given mechanism in any concrete example of a disabled person’s life. It would instead 
be the subject of concrete investigation into which mechanisms are most significant in 
a given example. What it seems is required is a way to reconcile the pluralism of critical 
realism with the urgency and focus lent by the social model. I would also now like to 
suggest that the social model may not be as incompatible with critical realism as is 
often assumed. 
Initially, it can be said that, contrary to Williams (1999) and Bhaskar and 
Danermark (2005), the social model, or at least an analysis inspired by the social model 
(Thomas, 1999; Gleeson, 1999), does not have to mean reducing the biological body to 
social constructions, or reducing the ontology of the body to the epistemology of what 
is known about it. For example, the analysis of disablism in Thomas (1999) and Gleeson 
(1999) proposes that disablism is a category that emerges from how impairment is 
socially realised in a given context. It is difficult to see in these cases how the social 
model can be said to reject a role for biology. The assumption in these accounts is that 
the separation of impairment and disability is a useful basis for analysing their 
interface. Impairment can itself cause pain and difficulty, and this need not be denied 
by those who make a social analysis of disability. Impairment is always a prerequisite 
for disability, but disability is only one possible social form that the lives of people with 
impairments may take. 
Thomas (2004) believes that criticisms of the social model, such as those of the 
critical realists, are in part caused by the simplified version of social relational thinking 
that can be manifest in writing on the social model. Supporters of the social model and 
critics of it both need to grasp that ‘disability only comes into play when the 
restrictions of activity experienced by people with impairments are socially imposed, 
that is, when they are wholly social in origin’ (Thomas, 2004: 580). To critics of the 
social model who assume that the social model denies the non-social causes of 
restrictions of activity, the supporter of the social relational view can say ‘ Yes, of 
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course impairment causes some restrictions of activity – but these are not what is of 
interest in studying and combating disability’ (ibid: 581). This circumscribed definition 
of disability fits in well with my specific interest in this study in the political activity of 
disabled activists. 
From a critical realist perspective, when we have defined that our area of 
interest is disablism, it may be that such a concern can fit in within a critical realist 
framework more comfortably. Within the open systems
28
 that are theorised by critical 
realism, disablism can be seen as one of a number of interacting mechanisms that 
intersect in the lives of disabled people. As a meta-theoretical, philosophical position, 
critical realism is quite right to stress the multi-faceted nature of the influences on 
disabled people’s lives. However, it is quite defensible that disability studies concerns 
itself primarily with the social mechanism of oppression that is defined as disablism (or 
for some as ‘disability’). Another way of reconciling this view with critical realism is to 
refer to the critical realist theorisation of the stratification
29
 of reality. This 
philosophical argument states that reality is stratified into irreducible levels at which 
distinct but interacting mechanisms operate. In this light, disablism could be seen as 
concerning one specific strata of the reality of disabled people’s lives, referring to the 
political domain. In the lived experience of individual’s lives, mechanisms operating 
through different strata will interact, but in the case I develop above, it is the 
seperability of disablism from other aspects of disabled people’s lives that allow it to 
be elaborated in full and understood as distinct in its interface with other mechanisms. 
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 An open system must be understood in contrast to closed systems. Closed systems are defined as 
being ‘cut off’ from external influences (Collier, 1994: 128) and unaffected by outside influences. A 
closed system is typified by a scientific experiment, which have the value of closing the open systems of 
nature and allowing predictions. The critical realist view is that such closure is impossible in social 
science because societies are open systems. Open systems lack the features of a closed system and only 
feature regularities that are short-lived, or feature no regularities at all (Sayer, 1992). 
29
 Stratification refers to the way that our knowledge of the world is necessarily ordered into distinct 
disciplines. Thus physics is ‘more basic than chemistry, which is more basic than biology, which is more 
basic than the human sciences’ (Collier, 1994: 108). An important caveat is that mechanisms in 
operation at the level of one strata cannot be reduced to the mechanisms of a higher strata. Thus while 
everything in the humans sciences must operate according to the laws of physics, it would make no 
sense to try to explain emergent social processes such as disablist oppression through physical laws. 
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Using the Notion of Contrastive Explanation as Support for 
Drawing Upon Disabled Activist’s Views 
I will now draw again on critical realism as an epistemological justification for my 
endorsement of activist views in this thesis. In discussing my ambivalence towards 
EDR, I argued that it could go too far in subordinating the judgment and independence 
of researchers to political allegiance to the emancipation of disabled people. At the 
same time, my project is built upon an appreciation of the interpretative value of 
disabled activist’s contributions, particularly when exploring the themes I set out to 
investigate. Critical realism offers a way to conceptualise the value of particular 
perspectives and positions without requiring that one subordinate their approach to a 
pre-defined political allegiance (Sayer, 2000; Lawson, 1999), as seemed to be the case 
in EDR.  
Lawson’s (1999) analysis is of value here in his attempt to demonstrate the 
value of critical realism to standpoint feminism through the concept of contrastive 
explanation. Contrastive explanation is concerned with questions such as “why this 
rather than that”? It can highlight what type of questions we might concern ourselves 
with by highlighting important contrasts. This concept figures in my thesis as a way of 
highlighting the unusual and revealing perspective of activists as a group who are more 
rarely involved in disability research than might be the case, and who experience 
society in a distinctive and different way from others. 
To give some context to the case made for the importance of contrastive 
explanation, it is important to note that Lawson follows other critical realists in arguing 
that society is an open system meaning that it is difficult to produce the closed 
experimental systems characteristic of natural science. As an alternative epistemology 
for use in social science he proposes the theory of contrastive explanation. Lawson 
describes contrastive explanation in the following way: 
When phenomena in an open system are generated by a multiplicity 
of causes, the particular one singled out for attention depends upon 
the contrast identified as puzzling, surprising, unusual, undesirable or 
of interest in some other way. And this in turn will reflect the 
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interests and understandings of the individual or group of 
researchers or interested onlookers involved (2003: 233). 
He goes on to clarify further that: 
The task of detecting and identifying previously unknown casual 
mechanisms seems to require the recognition of surprising or 
interesting contrasts, and the latter in turn presupposes people in the 
position of being able to detect relevant contrasts and to perceive 
them as surprising or otherwise interesting and to want to act on 
their surprise or aroused interest. The initiation of new lines of 
investigation requires people predisposed, literally prejudiced, to 
looking in certain directions (ibid: 234). 
Contrastive explanation focuses the attention of the social scientist upon observed 
differences or contrasting views, rather than demanding of the researcher that they 
explain everything relevant to a particular phenomenon. In my case, the views of 
activists can be contrasted with those of politicians, academics and others, highlighting 
the differing social situation that disabled people find themselves in from non-disabled 
others. 
Lawson suggests that different standpoints can allow one to find interesting 
contrasts, and that standpoints are therefore an unavoidable and indispensable aid to 
explanation. They can aid in formulating contrastive explanation because people in 
certain positions may be better placed to recognise interesting or surprising contrasts. 
Lawson puts this point as follows: 
science, or the knowledge process more generally, can benefit if 
undertaken by individuals who are predisposed in different ways, 
who are situated differently […] the endeavour to attract diverse 
voices into the scientific community or any prominent (or other) 
discussion can be supported on grounds not just of democracy or 
fairness but also of good methodological practice (1999: 41).  
Through this argument, critical realism gives further grounds to place value on 
the contribution of the participants in this thesis because disabled activists are well 
placed to make surprising contrasts. One reason among many for this is that their 
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point of view seems to be absent from dominant representations of disability and 
policy.  
Lawson does not only use contrastive explanation to argue that the process of 
knowledge production can benefit from the inclusion of perspectives that are 
predisposed in differing ways. He also argues that it can augment the claim of 
standpoint feminists that marginalised positions are privileged for the insights they can 
provide. Here marginalised perspectives are to be privileged because of their capacity 
to recognise contrasts of importance. Lawson believes marginalised perspectives are 
well-suited to yielding contrastive insights because they denote ‘both an insider and an 
outsider position. To be marginalised you are outside of the centre. But equally to be 
outside you first have to belong’ (2003: 234). In Lawson’s view the ‘duality of belonging 
yet being constrained from the centre […] facilitates an awareness of contrasts of 
significance. For unlike the dominant group, the marginalised are forced to both be 
aware of the practices, values and traditions of the dominant group as well as to live 
their own’ (ibid: 235). This means that those in marginalised positions are well placed 
to detect contrasts between themselves and dominant groups, how each functions 
and how they are interrelated. 
This way of privileging marginalised groups corresponds well to my interview 
group who are part of a group who are marginalised from British society to the degree 
that it provokes their political mobilisation. They are also an insider in that they are 
seeking to mobilise to change the politics of the society. Disabled people are aware 
both of the practices and values of non-disabled people and of disabled people (in as 
far as there is any difference). This enables them to better perceive differences 
between the two, enabling them to analyse the structures that separate them and that 
they share with non-disabled people. This way of valuing participant positions does not 
have to assume they are truer than others, or that they should be beyond doubt and 
scepticism. A position may be preferred over another for the differing contrasts it can 
throw up, potentially leading to important new lines of enquiry. 
Contrastive explanation does not mean marginalised positions are valued 
because they can offer truer accounts, but that they can lead to important and novel 
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lines of inquiry through interpretive insights. Nor does using the notion of contrastive 
explanation mean having to endorse judgemental relativism in which any basis for 
arbitrating or discriminating between claims is rejected. As Lawson puts it ‘the 
prevalence of many different voices, even if all are considering the same phenomenon, 
may merely reflect a focus on differing contrasts’ (ibid: 236).  
Lawson believes the concept of contrastive explanation can be useful to 
feminists because it can avoid the judgmental relativism he detects in some standpoint 
feminism. Contrastive explanation avoids this, and is consistent with critical realist 
arguments for practical adequacy and explanatory power, meaning using it as an 
invitation to diverse perspectives does not lead to a relativist refusal to discriminate 
between these perspectives. In the context of this thesis this is important because it 
means I can argue for the importance of participants’ point of view, without having to 
accept EDR in full as the justification for doing so. Activist views represent a 
marginalised and alternative view to those who produce the culturally dominant 
narratives of austerity and disabled people. From their position disabled activists can 
produce novel accounts of the contrasting fortunes of disabled people compared to 
others in the current political-economic conjuncture. . 
Just as Lawson’s argument can serve to highlight the value of activist 
interpretations, so too can it be used to theorise the value of the roots of disability 
studies in activism. This is to say that the politicised origins of disability studies and 
many of its participants can be seen as a source of insight and strength. Contrastive 
explanation gives a way of valuing an interpretation without construing it as an 
‘objective’ point of view or mistaking it for a reason to devalue other views. It is of 
note in this context that Vehmas (2014) criticises the tendency in disability studies 
toward the conflation of the value of an argument with the background of the person 
making the argument (the ad hominem fallacy). One would clearly wish to avoid this 
fallacy, but within Vehmas’ case against it, his attempt to decouple one’s background 
from academic debate tends to undermine any means by which one could value 
particular interpretations, such as those with experience of disablism. Here the notion 
of contrastive explanation can enable us to value the politicised perspective of activists 
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without any implication that those with differing background experiences should be 
devalued. 
The Relevance of Narrative Analysis to my Approach 
In chapter three I described the importance of narrative analysis to the way in which I 
analysed interview data. I believe that narrative analysis can help fill a gap within both 
EDR and critical realism, created by a tendency to write out personal experience and 
the production of intersubjective meaning from research. In the case of EDR, as I noted 
above, the influential activist Finkelstein asserted that one of the drawbacks of 
researching individual experiences of disability is that it is similar to a ‘return to the old 
‘case file’ approach to our oppression’ (1996: 2). To justify his view, he quotes the 
UPIAS policy statement from 1976: 
We already know what it feels like to be poor, isolated, segregated, 
done good to, stared at, and talked down to far better than any able-
bodied expert. We as a Union are not interested in, descriptions of 
how awful it is to be disabled. What we are interested in, are ways of 
changing our conditions of life, and thus overcoming the disabilities 
which are imposed on top of our physical impairments by the way 
this society is organised to exclude us (UPIAS, 1976). 
This view has continued to be represented by some among disabled activists and 
writers in disability studies (Oliver, 1996) who argue that impairment is irrelevant to 
social disablement, and that theorising impairment and personal experience could let 
individual models back in and distract from dismantling disabling barriers. 
Critical realism, according to Fairclough et al (2004), has also paid too little 
attention to semiosis, meaning the intersubjective production of meaning. Although 
critical realism is open to the influence of discourse, alone it is unlikely to help in 
overcoming a need within disability studies for consideration of personal experience 
and intersubjective meaning. Fairclough et al criticise critical realism for taking ‘symbol 
systems, language, orders of discourse, and so on for granted, thereby excluding 
central features of the social world from its analysis’ (2004: 39). These factors are 
interpenetrated with other types of social relations and institutional orders, and for 
critical realism to achieve a more comprehensive analysis of the social world, they 
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argue that analysis of semiosis and related issues must be integrated into critical realist 
analysis (ibid). This would allow one to consider when semiotic factors are over 
determined by extra-discursive factors and vice versa (ibid). As a route to achieving 
this goal, Fairclough et al recommend the integration of critical discourse analysis with 
critical realism because it can provide ‘explanatory contextualisations of the 
production, communication and reception of semiosis, and provide a means of 
thinking about the articulation of the semiotic and extra semiotic in social 
transformation’ (ibid: 23). They are also open to other approaches concerned with 
meaning and semiosis that could contribute to critical realism. 
In this context I propose that narrative analysis may be a useful complement to 
fields in which personal experience and semiosis have been under-theorised. I agree 
with Fairclough et al that critical realism has to acknowledge that social science is also 
about interpreting meanings and not only about identifying causal mechanisms. 
Narrative analysis can be consistent with critical realism if it is granted that narratives 
are construals
30
 and not constructions of reality (Sayer, 2000). Given this assumption, 
critical realists can agree with Riessman (1993) that narratives do not give direct 
unmediated access to life experiences. Narratives are representations involving 
interpretation and selection, just as my own readings of narratives will be similarly 
interpreted and selected. 
This is also consistent with the work of writers such as Morris (1991) and 
Thomas (1999) who have argued that disability studies and anti-disablement cannot 
exclude consideration of individual experience. Thus narrative analysis can ‘fill a gap’ in 
both critical realism and disability studies. Thomas (1999) argues that narratives are a 
form of situated account that can challenge the purported neutrality of individual 
model representations of disability. The personal is not only about impairment and can 
be an arena in which disablism operates, particularly through ‘psycho-emotional 
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 Sayer argues that strong social constructionists make the error of reducing ‘construal to production or 
construction’ (2000: 34). By this he means that our concepts and theories do not exhaust what there is 
to the objects of our knowledge. He writes ‘although all observation is conceptually mediated what we 
observe is not determined solely by concepts, as if concepts could anticipate all empirical question, or as 
if theories were observation-neutral’ (ibid: 41). While it is essential to understand construal, meaning 
the mediation of observation by our pre-existing conceptual frameworks, this does not amount to what 
is often understood by the term ‘construction’.  
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disablism’ (ibid). The separation of disability and impairment in social analyses of 
disability does not mean that personal experiences need to be considered as 
equivalent to non-social impairment. Disability studies thus needs to explore 
experience and the intersection of personal biography with politics, exploring 
narratives ‘principally, though not exclusively, for what they can tell us about disablism 
and other forms of social oppression’ (ibid: 151). In this respect narrative analysis is 
relevant to my work. The interviews for this thesis were principally concerned with 
public political issues, but participants would also join individual experiences to 
political structures. In this way, narrative was a good way of linking the two. 
Narrative is also of interest to understanding the background against which 
participants expressed their thoughts. Although participants preferred to frame 
personal budgets and direct payments in terms of independent living rather than 
personalisation (see chapter 2), personalisation is the dominant narrative through 
which these policies have been promoted in recent years (Needham, 2011). Writing on 
personalisation, Needham argues persuasively that it, and associated polices, have 
spread through its narrative power rather than any ‘harder’ form of evidence 
concerning outcomes for disabled people. Its fluid and contestable nature cannot be 
defined in a way that evades the different ways in which actors frame its. As she puts it 
‘personalisation has spread because it is a potent story about public services, with all 
the discursive advantages that stories have over other forms of communication’(ibid: 
13). The view of personalisation that emerges for Needham is of ‘a set of stories that 
were being told about public services and the people that use them. The process 
through which personalisation was spreading was by telling compelling stories about 
the personal, about the individuals whose lives had been transformed through new 
ways of thinking about public services’ (ibid: 4). This view influences my analysis in 
later chapters. Narrative is thus doubly significant for my analysis, informing the way I 
analyse participant contributions and the way I understand the policy and political 
background informing reforms to support services. 
Together with critical realism and aspects of EDR, narrative analysis forms one 
of three core methodological elements in the approach I have pursued in this thesis. 
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Chapter 5: Challenges to the Disabled People’s 
Movement 
This chapter uses my analysis of interviews with activists to identify three significant 
current challenges to the realisation of the DPM’s demands. I use the term ‘challenge’ 
to reflect the way in which participants made predominantly negative evaluations of 
recent developments, but frequently balanced this by noting positive co-
developments. This ambivalent analysis of challenges mixed criticism of unwelcome 
developments, and prescriptions to overcome these challenges, with the need to not 
undo welcome developments in the process. The first challenge I identify below is the 
exposure of individual disabled people to increasingly high levels of social isolation. 
The second challenge discussed is the deterioration in the conditions facing DPOs. 
Thirdly, the ideology underpinning policy development is discussed with attention 
given to the ambiguous and limiting construction of ‘choice’ involved. These challenges 
intersect and interact but they are operating at different levels: individual, 
organisational and ideological. In the concluding discussion, I begin to explore how 
these challenges intersect, overlap and are mutually reinforcing. Firstly, I present a 
detailed examination of data regarding each of the challenges in turn. 
The Challenge to Individuals: Isolation and a Loss of Autonomy 
for Individual Disabled People 
As we saw in chapter two, there is growing concern at the cumulative impact of central 
and local government cuts to the funding of social care and support for disabled 
people. For example, the end of the ILF and changes to disability benefits could 
negatively impact on the security and autonomy of many disabled people. In this light, 
it was common for participants to detail the growing danger of isolation and alienation 
for individual disabled people. A key theme was that cuts to the funding of personal 
budgets and valuable services were restricting the range of activities that disabled 
people could engage in. 
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Being involved with a high-profile DPO, ‘Roger’ is in a good position to give an 
overview of the impact of budgetary cuts on disabled people. For example, he 
explained how new applicants for care were facing the likelihood their application 
would be rejected: 
“Most people who are now coming into the situation of applying for 
care are having their care support request rejected.” 
Even those who are ‘fortunate’ enough to receive care funded through the 
state may find that, without the level of budget required to do more than have basic 
and personal care, engagement in social and community life beyond one’s own home 
is increasingly limited. The quote below from Roger illustrates the isolation and lack of 
social interaction that this can breed; showing how individuals can be forced by an 
absence of adequate funding to live very individualised and isolated lives: 
“Now with care cuts, it tends to be about the very most basic things 
in life; getting yourself out of bed and getting fed, and that’s not 
independent living that’s about surviving.” 
Roger chooses to dramatize the extremity of the situation by referring to the way in 
which many disabled people are only “surviving”, stressing the low levels of support 
and limitations imposed on the people he works with. Later, he contrasted this 
isolation with the potential for disabled people to be engaged in their communities: 
“Independent living should be about whether you can engage with 
your local community, and part of that is being able to go to your 
local shop, go to your local library and find out what’s on the local 
information board, and to see people that live in your street and your 
community and get involved with that, and that is quickly 
disappearing; its more and more about the basics.” 
Here Roger is drawing a comparison between the increasingly restricted situations he 
perceives many disabled people to live in, with the rights of disabled people as 
asserted by the independent living approach. In the excerpt above “independent 
living” refers not only to self-determination, but also to active participation in, and 
contribution to, a community. When this is compared to “surviving”, the depth of the 
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problem is made vivid and apparent. A version of independent living that includes 
active social participation evokes citizenship discourses (Morris, 2005). If disabled 
people are denied the resources to do much more than “survive” clearly they will be a 
long way from being able to exercise anything like citizenship rights. 
Another participant in a similar role, ‘Andrew’, went even further in describing 
the restrictions faced by disabled people he had encountered through his work in 
another prominent DPO. In his experience, current challenges did not only concern 
restrictions on accessing the community, but also on basic support around the house 
within an isolated existence at home: 
“There was a time when community care legislation recognized that a 
social life was pretty good for people’s health, and would recognise 
that having a clean house and a clean body is probably quite a good 
idea too. Those days are long gone; we talk about existence and 
support that keeps people alive rather than support that gives people 
a life, and at the risk of sounding a bit dramatic, that’s pretty close to 
where we are and have been for some time.” 
Suggesting that even a clean house and clean body may not be possible for those 
already living isolated lives, Andrew indicates the depth of the problem. Referring to 
“existence and support that keeps people alive rather than support that gives people a 
life” Roger makes a distinction between support that merely ensures the preservation 
of the body in some degree of cleanliness and health, and support that enables people 
to engage in social participation and recreation. Support that “gives people a life” goes 
beyond the physical basics to facilitate activities that provide the stimulation 
characteristic of an independent life. In the case of both Roger and Andrew, they use 
notably dramatic language such as “surviving” and “support that keeps people alive”; 
clearly feeling such language is justified to express the degree of challenge to disabled 
people’s independence. 
 Another individual to speak out strongly on these issues was ‘James’ who felt 
that his dignity and independence could be undermined by the abolition of the ILF, 
pointing toward the probable isolation that may result: 
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“In two thousand and fifteen the ILF is actually going to close for all 
disabled people, and that means that even people like myself who 
have had independent living support throughout their whole lives will 
have to go back cap in hand to our local authorities and ask them to 
top up our budgets to the standard. And they can’t afford to provide 
the part that they’re doing at the moment, so we fear that once this 
happens, disabled people are going to be isolated alone in their 
communities because they’re not going to have the amount of care 
and financial support to enable them to go out in their local 
communities. Local authorities will just say they want to provide the 
minimum support; basically making sure you get bathed, toileted, so 
disabled people are going to get isolated, institutionalised, not just in 
big organisations, but become isolated and institutionalised in their 
own homes.” 
The phrase “go back cap in hand to our local authorities and ask them to top up our 
budgets” speaks to the anger provoked by his situation. A key demand of the DPM has 
been ‘rights not charity’ and having to ask for what is required to live independently 
may be experienced as an attack on one’s dignity. Anger is to be expected if a 
regressive move occurs away from the guarantee of disabled people’s right to 
independence, requiring them to plead for adequate support from a council which has 
no duty to provide it. James’ last phrase, in which he warns of disabled people 
becoming “institutionalised in their own homes”, says a great deal about the evolution 
of challenges to disabled people’s autonomy. In the early days of the DPM it would 
have been assumed that the starkest oppression of disabled people occurred through 
segregation in institutions, whereas now this older challenge coexists with an 
increasing tendency toward isolation and ‘institutionalisation’ in one’s own home. The 
meaning of ‘institutionalisation’ here seems to suggest that whilst disabled people live 
in the community, the level of support they receive only allows them a degree of 
autonomy, choice and social participation equivalent or similar to life in an institution. 
In this context, it is significant that James refers to “minimum support” restricted to 
being bathed and toileted and allowing little choice. This supplements the testimony of 
Roger and Andrew in their references to “surviving” and “support that keeps you 
alive”. 
Offering further evidence of the challenge of isolation resulting from reductions 
in funding for social ‘care’, ‘Vera’ is again in a very good position to judge the extent of 
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the problem through her work in a large DPO. For Vera, the issue demands particular 
attention is given to the way in which recipients of individualised funding can have 
their budget reduced without the attention or uproar that might meet the closure of 
collectivised support services. This adds a further aspect of individualism and isolation 
as reductions in funding are often faced and challenged alone: 
“I’m fully in support of direct payments; absolutely fantastic, but I 
can see some dangers, and I can see the danger that people can get 
very isolated and they’re very easy to pick off, and funding starts to 
get reduced, you know and that’s precisely what’s happened in lots 
of ways, I mean we get endless calls from people with direct 
payments who’ve had their payment reduced. “ 
The strengths of direct payments and personal budgets can partly derive from the 
sensitivity of individually negotiated agreements, designed to be more responsive to 
the needs of the person than a collective institution could be. However, for Vera, it is 
the very individualised nature of these negotiations that opens up the possibility of 
individuals being ‘picked off’ as they face reductions in their budgets without solidarity 
from peers facing the closure of a shared service. In this sense, the apparent virtues of 
tailored and individually negotiated funding can be turned against recipients to reduce 
their budget. These individuals will often lack the collective resources of day centre 
contemporaries or strong local DPOs to challenge the decision. Reacting to this 
dynamic did not raise doubts for any participants about the validity of direct payments 
or personal budgets as a means to bring about independent living, but instead brought 
into question the context in which the personal budgets are made available. I develop 
this topic in greater depth in the third section of this chapter. 
The direct impacts of isolation described above can be combined with a more 
indirect psychological impact felt by others as a result of changes in the wider climate 
of expectations. These effects seem to go beyond those directly affected. For example, 
‘Mary’ expressed her frustration that less than the very most minimal support is being 
made available, and went on to explain the psychological impact of this on her friends 
and, indirectly, herself: 
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“I’ve had a couple of friends who’ve applied for direct payments and 
the assessment process has been quite traumatic and at the end of 
the day all that they have received, to be quite crude about it, is 
support to go to the loo four times a day. Full stop, end of story. And 
I just think for those people who have substantial physical need, it’s 
ridiculous, almost to the point where I feel guilty that I do have 
substantial support, it’s like survivor guilt.” 
The example of only having support to “go to the loo four times a day” exemplifies the 
inadequacy of support received by many and the loss of dignity that may result. It is 
not surprising that distress can result from a process in which one is denied the means 
to live a fully social life. In some cases this is likely to further diminish the quality of life 
of those concerned as other problems are compounded by resulting psychological 
difficulties. By referring to her ‘substantial support’ in this contribution, Mary is also 
suggesting differences in the degree of challenge faced by herself and her friends. It 
may be that individuals like Mary with a background in activism, high social capital and 
assertiveness are less likely to suffer from the isolation described by many 
interviewees. However, at the same time, there still appears to have been an indirect 
impact on Mary, perhaps derived from her identity as a disabled person, feeling 
solidarity with those experiencing isolation, and a degree of what she refers to as 
“survivor guilt”. Knowledge like this of differential awarding of resources, has the 
potential to politicise larger numbers who identify with the challenge to disabled 
people in general, or, more pessimistically, to lead to division as those with more 
resources hope to not fall into the same situation as those less fortunate than 
themselves and withdraw further, potentially leading to greater isolation. 
Many of the interviewees had campaigned for independent living and disability 
rights for over a decade, and some expressed a degree of shock and “fear” at a 
direction of travel which many felt was unethical. Some felt that progress toward 
greater autonomy for individual disabled people had been reversed. As Mary stated: 
“It feels to me like it was someone who was active during the 
nineteen nineties, who achieved changes that really benefited 
people’s lives, that those changes are being eroded hugely, and it 
feels today like there are lots of fears for the future. I mean thinking 
about the potential closure of the independent living fund, hearing 
about things like the potential move from DLA to PIP.” 
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This type of view was not uncommon. We saw above that Andrew contrasted recent 
developments with community care legislation, noting that it had “recognised that a 
social life was pretty good for people’s health”. This reference to older legislation in a 
superior light suggests he, like Mary, perceives a backward trend in the level of 
support currently experienced by disabled people. Whilst the view that the degree of 
support available to most disabled people was deteriorating was only unequivocally 
articulated by a minority of the participants (five interviewees expressed this view 
clearly), a degree of negativity on this issue could be inferred from the despondent and 
negative tone of many contributions, particularly with respect to the anger many felt 
at developments in benefits policy. Participants may have been hesitant to make an 
argument that conditions in general had taken a clear and decisive turn for the worse, 
when this suggests an almost epochal shift and requires a certain degree of confidence 
in one’s ability to discern trends at a national level. Participants may also have been 
hesitant to make this kind of assertion at the time of interview because the effects of 
these measures were being anticipated or just beginning to be felt. Tellingly, no 
participants felt that conditions had improved of late and few were able to point to 
valuable policies initiated by the current government, although one (‘David’) did feel 
that developments under the coalition had brought about a combination of 
opportunities as well as challenges. 
In summary, this section has been based around the current challenge of 
isolation and potential loss of social participation for many disabled people. We have 
seen how participants expressed concerns about the possibility of isolation and 
alienation in their lives and those of other disabled people. Cuts to personal budgets, 
funding of services and the abolition or reform of redistributive benefits were seen as 
restricting the range of activities that disabled people could engage in. As budgets are 
limited so even adequate basic and personal care can be threatened, engagement in 
social and community life beyond one’s own home was viewed as increasingly difficult 
for many. These challenges were also seen as creating a climate of fear, and for some 
people this was perceived to be having a negative indirect effect beyond those directly 
affected. 
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It is possible these changes might appear to some as the withdrawal of 
discretionary and precarious benefits, but for many participants they were 
experienced as coercion as some disabled people are effectively forced to live more 
isolated lives. The outrage and fear expressed by many participants about the current 
situation was often related to shifts in policy away from the rights-based independent 
living approach many of them had campaigned for. The perceived discrepancy 
between the principles of the DPM and those underpinning the government’s policies 
will be explored further in the third section of this chapter. 
In the next section, I will explore participants’ views about the challenges facing 
DPOs. This is important, not least because these organisations could mitigate and 
challenge the isolation faced by disabled people described above. 
The Challenge To Organisations: Conditions Facing Disabled 
People’s Organisations 
I now turn to the second challenge identified from participant contributions 
concerning challenges to DPOs. Before detailing the challenges they face, it is 
important to note how most participants emphasised the crucial role they could play. 
For example, ‘Kate’ described the integral role that was foreseen for DPOs in the 
formulation of the ideas of independent living: 
“[Q]uite clearly in the independent living movement’s mind, direct 
payments always went with a support system so that you weren’t left 
on your own trying to manage the full workload by yourself, that you 
had an organisation, a CIL, that would help you at whatever level was 
needed, whether it was a bit of moral support or actually sitting with 
you while you interviewed people, or doing payroll or whatever, you 
know it would be support at the level you required it. That idea got 
lost along the way because it was just seen as being too expensive.” 
Describing the flexible role DPOs could play, Kate argues that they can provide the 
necessary peer-support and advice through which more may be yielded from direct 
payments and markets in support. In addition, DPOs may also serve a political role in 
which poor treatment from professionals can be challenged and restricted budgets can 
be highlighted. Most participants felt that DPOs played an indispensable role, and 
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without them, many felt that the risk of isolation in the lives of individual disabled 
people is increased, as many disabled people face the challenges of reduced budgets, 
reduced benefits and defunding of services without the organised support of peers. 
Adding further to data regarding the perceived value of DPOs, it is important to 
note that they were seen by participants as a vital supplement to the individual 
empowerment possible through extending individualised funding to more disabled 
people. Support for individualised funding was often expressed with the caveat that, 
for the most to be gained from personal budgets, DPOs were necessary to provide 
advice and peer support. Responding to my provocations regarding critical literature 
on the subject of personal budgets, ‘Rachel’ felt these criticisms were excessive and 
betrayed an ignorance of the value that DPOs can have in mitigating the downsides of 
personalisation, warning of the limitations of personal budgets without User-Led 
Organisations (ULOs) or CILs: 
“The problem with some of those critiques [of personal budgets] is 
that they’ve missed the role of ULOs and CILs in it. So yes if you sat 
somebody with a learning disability in front of a computer, and they 
didn’t have the skills to use the A4e
31
 site and then they were given a 
pre-payment card because someone didn’t trust them and thought 
they’d spend the whole thing on Jack Daniels, then yes that’s not 
choice and control. Do I think it can be done well if there is a ULO and 
peer support at the heart of it and it’s a community approach? 
Definitely.” 
Within this answer, Rachel firmly dismisses arguments against personal budgets in 
general, but in arguing for the unique value of ULOs and CILs, she also gives an 
example of the manner in which personal budgets could develop without their input. 
The example of a person with a learning difficulty navigating an A4e site could certainly 
be imagined as part of the problem of isolation developed in the first section of this 
chapter. Overcoming this type of problem was not seen as likely to come about purely 
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through the extension of personal budgets to more people. Most interviewees felt that 
‘user-involvement’ should go beyond the isolated demands of individual personal 
budget recipients to include the collective input of DPOs. To illustrate this, ‘Beverley’ 
explained her experiences of the absence of responsiveness and real user-control in 
markets lacking the input of DPOs: 
“Disabled people want service user involvement, that’s part of the 
disabled people’s movement: wanting service user involvement. You 
know the agencies have no service user involvement. So they may or 
may not provide the service, if you don’t like the service, you may or 
may not have another agency you can go to, and if there isn’t one, 
you’re stuck and there isn’t much you can do about it.” 
In making this point Beverley contrasts the level of choice available in uncompetitive 
markets of care agencies with services characterised by active user-involvement. The 
collective input of disabled people is something Beverley perceives to be entirely 
absent from care agencies who have “no service user involvement”. Individual disabled 
people can be forced to make do with what can be a poor service when markets do not 
function to their benefit because of a lack of local competition between agencies and 
the low level of budgets awarded to individuals who cannot pay for more flexible 
services. These conditions were used by participants to add to the case for the value of 
DPOs. Rachel re-iterates this point, identifying the importance of DPOs in the context 
of personalised funding and the growing risks of isolation and denial of autonomy: 
“The first thing is that people live where they want to live; that they 
have the choice over support and that they have the chance to have 
contact with other disabled people and non-disabled people, and I 
think that’s why Roulstone and Harris
32
 put such an emphasis on CILs 
and ULOs in their disability policy book because without advocacy 
and peer support it can be individualised [… ] So it’s that collective 
voice and that peer support that needs to be there, otherwise it’s just 
individualised and that’s where people are at risk.” 
Pointing to the essential value of “advocacy”, “peer support” and “collective voice”, 
Rachel is again suggesting that markets of personal budget recipients and agencies 
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without DPOs will fail to deliver on the potential of personal budgets. It is of note that 
she points to the danger of services becoming “individualised”. The individual 
responsiveness of personal budgets, or the way they are “individualised”, is often seen 
as their great strength, but here this term is used to denote a potential weakness of 
personal budgets. The point is that, without the collective input of CILs and ULOs, the 
increasing availability of personal budgets may develop into a situation in which 
isolated individuals are left without adequate power, understanding or resources to 
navigate ‘care’ markets. The emergence of CILs underpinned and supported the 
campaign for direct payments, and it has long been seen as a necessity that DPOs are 
present within a locality to support individuals to access the best support possible 
(Barnes and Mercer, 2006). As is made clear by Vera below, the absence of DPOs from 
many areas is a departure from the version of independent living campaigned for by 
the DPM: 
“[W]ell the original idea behind independent living was that there will 
always be disabled people’s organisations to support disabled people 
in independent living, and um those organisations don’t exist in every 
area and a lot of them …have actually have folded due to funding 
pressures” 
In this quote Vera helps to take our discussion on from the value of DPOs to the 
challenges they face. Vera, like many other participants with direct experience of 
working in DPOs, stressed the significant challenges that DPOs are currently 
encountering. The first of these challenges is the increasingly competitive procurement 
environment they face. This procurement environment was seen to be inimical to the 
flourishing of DPOs as they compete with larger organisations that have greater 
resources and expertise to deploy in securing tenders. It was felt by several 
participants that competitors to DPOs generally offered a poorer service because of a 
lack of the values, expertise or democratic control by disabled people that characterise 
DPOs. The qualities that distinguish DPOs from other providers were not perceived to 
be valued within procurement. 
As in the case of care and support budgets for disabled people, reductions in 
funding to local government as a whole has driven a requirement for reductions in 
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spending on DPOs. For DPOs, funding has to be applied for through a competitive 
tendering framework that has been increasingly common within local government, 
since the so-called ‘purchaser-provider split’ (National Health Service and Community 
Care Act 1990). For ‘Robert’ it was unsurprising that DPOs would fail to win contracts 
when they are made to compete on primarily cost-based criteria: 
“You’ve got some local authorities who’ve taken the approach of 
doing competitive tendering and very often it’s the big companies 
with the huge economies of scale, who can undercut the price of 
some of the user-led organisations, who are getting the contacts, and 
so the user-led organisations are going under.” 
As DPOs compete with more commercially orientated organisations who may have no 
history of working in the disability field, there is no longer the chance of a council 
‘block’ awarding a grant to a DPO that could provide some stability of funding for the 
organisation. There are few restrictions on who is able to compete with DPOs for 
services (such as brokerage), and, according to Andrew, they have suffered through 
competing with organisations with inbuilt commercial advantages: 
“throughout the last, I don’t know, ten years it’s become increasingly 
difficult for small organisations, with the move from funding local 
organisations, and particularly local disabled people’s organisations 
by grant, to expecting them to tender, as part of the commissioning 
process, it’s very difficult to compete, particularly with large 
organisations who can deliver economies of scale and can employ full 
time tendering teams” 
Andrew here is emphasising the need to compete with organisations that benefit from 
in-built advantages of “economies of scale” and “full-time tendering teams”. The 
procurement framework allows these organisations to benefit from their strengths, 
but the values and practices of solidarity and peer insight that characterise DPOs are 
not similarly recognised. Arguably this portrays an ignorance of the reasons that DPOs 
came into existence in the first place, including the capacity to give disabled people an 
organised voice in the provision of support. Even within an economistic cost-benefit 
procurement framework, it could still be argued that DPOs strengths are not 
accounted for, in that the support of DPOs could be a cost-effective means of limiting 
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the damage done through the isolation and loss of participation resulting from the 
government’s austerity program. In this context, ‘Liz’ noted the value of DPOs for 
individual disabled people, making the connection between the collective input of 
DPOs and the realisation of the goals of individuals: 
There needs to be a lot more attention given to the outcomes for the 
individual because if you look at the evidence where there’s a strong 
CIL, there’s a very vibrant community of disabled people living 
independently and accessing employment. 
The evidence referred to by Liz does not appear to have convinced all of government 
of the value of investing in DPOs or creating a procurement environment in which they 
can flourish. Under the last government the value of ULOs was officially recognized in a 
set of design criteria by which progress could be measured toward the goal of 
developing a user-led organisation, based on existing CILs, in every locality by 2010 
(Cabinet Office - Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, 2005). However, several participants 
voiced fears that DPOs were not currently receiving adequate support. In particular, 
these participants were concerned that DPOs faced challenges from so-called ‘User led 
organisations’ (ULOs) who, some participants claimed, lack the clear cut control of 
disabled people in many cases, but can trade on an association with the values of 
DPOs. These organisations have grown while competitive procurement for provision of 
a range of services for disabled people has created opportunities for profitable 
enterprise. In this light, Andrew stated that both disability charities and private sector 
companies have displaced DPOs from the provision of services they would hope to 
deliver: 
“[T]here are a number of organisations which are bidding for work, 
which in our historical context have always been seen as best done 
by a disabled people’s organisation, like direct payment support, 
some of those will be ULOs which in my humble opinion might not be 
ULOs, but some of them will be big charities, some of them will even 
be commercial organisations who can see that they can make a little 
bit of money doing this” 
In this excerpt when Andrew refers to ULOs ‘which in my humble opinion might not be 
ULOs’ he suggests a large degree of ambiguity is involved in the use of the term. Taken 
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together with other contributions on this matter, it was clear that the definition of 
‘ULO’ is not straightforward or the subject of consensus. Tellingly, Andrew brings up 
this issue in relation to the challenge of private sector and charity organisations, who, 
he suggests, may benefit from the ambiguity. 
The ambiguity of the term ‘user-led’ and the way in which these sorts of 
organisations have encroached on the territory of DPOs was referred to by nearly 
every participant directly involved with DPOs. The challenges to DPOs from 
increasingly competitive and ill-funded markets is added to when ambiguously named, 
inauthentic ULOs can displace them. The identification of what is an authentic and 
inauthentic DPO is not always black and white, and the uncertainty surrounding this 
issue forms the subject of an important debate. Rachel referred to an on-going intra-
movement debate: 
“There’s a distinction between ULO and DPO which is very contested 
and some people don’t think there should be a distinction between a 
user led organisation and a disabled people’s organisation, and 
others think you can be a disabled people’s organisation, be activists, 
and not be running services. So you can be a group that goes out on 
protests and campaigns around certain issues and definitely be a 
disabled people’s organisation, but if you’re not running that advice 
and advocacy and information kind of function, that are in the ULO 
design criteria, then you aren’t necessarily a ULO, but there’s 
disagreement about that.” 
Other participants were more forthright than Rachel in sharply differentiating DPOs 
and ULOs, raising this issue as one of the challenges to DPOs and questioning the value 
of ULOs. For instance Roger observed that: 
“Disabled people’s organisations have bid to set up these CILs, and 
they’ve been outbid by not what we would call user-led 
organisations. To be a user-led organisation, that’s not the same as 
being a disabled people’s organisation, all a user-led organisation 
needs to be is reflective and accountable to the people that use the 
services, so that could be parents, carers, disabled people 
themselves. So it could be a mixture that makes up a user-led 
organisation, whereas for a disabled people’s organisation, it’s quite 
clear that the control would be with disabled people.” 
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In the first sentence here Roger refers to ‘not what we would call user-led 
organisations’ suggesting an independent definition through which he and other 
activists gauge the extent to which organisations are controlled by disabled people. He 
goes on to contrast the degree of control of disabled people over DPOs with that in 
ULOs. Andrew makes a similar point, again insisting on the distinctiveness of DPO’s 
over ULO’s: 
“I try, in a constructive way, to differentiate between what I would 
call disabled people’s organisations and what other people might call 
user-led organisations. There is no doubt that some user-led 
organisations are really not user led organisations at all, so I 
differentiate between those two groups. I mean there are a number 
of organisations that have been set up which are kind of pretending 
to be something they’re not, and I say that in a very honest way, 
probably don’t employ very many disabled people, if any, and may 
have a slight majority of disabled people on the management 
committee. But I think my experience is that certainly doesn’t mean 
anything.” 
By stating some ULO’s are “pretending to be something they’re not” Andrew is clearly 
identifying inauthentic/false ULOs as a challenge to authentic voices of disabled 
people. What is at stake in the debate over terms is not merely a definitional confusion 
but competing views on the degree to which disabled people should determine their 
own support and exert an organised local voice. By using the term ULO without criteria 
in place that would meet with the agreement of disabled people, the danger is that the 
term is used to endow practices and organisations with a credibility they do not 
deserve, allowing valuable sites of solidarity and peer support to be supplanted and 
isolation to grow. Many participants felt strongly about this issue and included it within 
their discussion of the most prominent challenges facing disabled people. This is made 
clear in the following passage in which ‘Victor’ links the emergence of ULOs to other 
setbacks and positions the matter at the forefront of problems of the movement: 
“[W]e’ve got this generalised idea of user led organisations which can 
mean anything, you just have to set up a bid for something, and with 
that bid find three disabled people who are prepared to act as 
gophers as your chair, treasurer, secretary and hey you’ve got a user-
led organisation. Now how we’ve ended up in that situation from 
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twenty years ago with CILs being a core part of our demands, I just 
don’t know, it’s been more spectacular than the loss of disability 
rights.” 
Some participants noted that there was promising recognition of the importance of 
DPOs within the current Government from the Office for Disability Issues (ODI)
33
. 
However, within participant accounts of the challenges to disabled people, little 
mention was made of the capacity of the ODI to limit the malign influence of actors 
within government departments with far greater power such as the Treasury or other 
parts of the Department of Work and Pensions. In this respect, it would be a welcome 
development if those like the ODI who endorse distinguishing DPOs from ULOs could 
gain enough influence to legislate on the principles they support. For instance, Andrew 
would value an official distinction of this sort, both as a measure of the level of control 
and staffing by disabled people, and also the more subjective question of the values 
they embody: 
“What’s been done recently, which probably is constructive, is we 
have, and the office of disability issues has started to, understand the 
term DPULO: disabled people’s user-led organisation as a way of 
trying to make a differentiation between those organisations that are 
run and controlled by disabled people and those which are 
something else […] I think we should be clear about whether they 
really are run and controlled and staffed by disabled people or not, 
and if they are working to, if you like, a social model philosophy or 
not.” 
Arguably, to adequately support ‘DPULOs’ a transfer of funds would be necessary to 
overcome the funding pressures resulting from cuts to local government spending. In 
the current situation, funding pressures and the policy of government to support ULOs 
has led to local authorities accepting groups that differ from those that the DPM had 
envisaged. Referring to a national survey of ULOs, Vera expresses her unease at the 
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national growth of organisations unconnected to the values and needs of disabled 
people: 
“A lot of organisations claiming to be disabled people’s organisations 
actually weren’t. So they didn’t have a majority of disabled people on 
the board or even employ any disabled people, you know that kind of 
thing. So yeah it was quite disheartening in a way […] these 
organisations were being run by other people in the main and those 
that delivered independent living services, I mean this isn’t 
universally true, there are some very good, exemplary organisations 
that still run their services and still are run by disabled people and are 
run in disabled people’s interests, but there are quite a number 
where supporting people with independent living has become more 
of a business really.” 
This situation may have come about in part because of the possibly benignly intended 
support from central government for ULOs. In Andrew’s view, the consequence of this, 
combined with budgetary cuts, is that local authorities are insufficiently discriminating 
about the credentials of would-be ULOs: 
“[L]ocal authorities have duties and targets round ULOs and are 
therefore prepared to accept definitions that don’t have very much 
at all to do with what the department of health has characterised as 
being part of what they call design criteria.” 
Bringing this section to a close, it was notable that the challenge of ULOs was 
positioned by some participants within a wider account of frustration and 
disappointment with the procurement environment in which they compete. This may 
be because the break-down of monolithic state-controlled services was felt to have 
had created an opening in which DPOs could assert their unique suitability for the task 
of guiding disabled people in the landscape of direct payments and personal budgets. 
However, participants suggested that any dream they had of an open field, liberated 
from oppressive institutions in which DPOs could flourish, seemed increasingly 
unlikely. Instead it had given way to a landscape in which price seemed to be the 
primary barometer of merit, incentivising the presence of other organisations who are 
increasingly able to dominate the provision of support. These organisations may be led 
by business principles rather than the politically motivated values of the DPM, 
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meaning their commitment to disabled people’s wellbeing may be more readily 
compromised because of their need to generate profit. 
As we saw at the beginning of this section and in chapter one, DPOs were seen 
as a key element of the independent living approach. Overall, their strengths and 
characteristics were not thought to be accounted for within procurement frameworks 
that narrowly focused on short-term cost considerations. Participants suggested that 
such frameworks, combined with cuts to council budgets, and ambiguous use of the 
term ULO, were allowing charitable and private sector institutions to regain power 
over disabled people while gaining reputational advantage from association with the 
values of DPOs. This is a cause for concern because, through advocacy, advice and 
other services, DPOs can promote the principles of the DPM, allowing more to be 
gained from the innovation of personal budgets and direct payments (Harris and 
Roulstone, 2011; Dodd, 2013). Furthermore, they can challenge poorly functioning 
markets and inadequate providers, helping to mitigate the isolation highlighted in 
section one of this chapter. 
Linking to the next section concerning ideological challenges, the power of the 
language of ‘user-led’ was thought by Andrew to fit into a pattern of the colonisation 
of the language of the DPM: 
“Large organisations, traditional disability organisations, like Leonard 
Cheshire, Scope etc, started to use the language of disabled people’s 
organisations to say they were including disabled people, they were 
letting them take control, basically they were saying they were doing 
the same as disabled people’s organisations but that they could do it 
better and they could do it cheaper and that’s very difficult.” 
The importance of language, and the need to carefully distinguish subtly differing 
approaches that ostensibly promote empowerment, leads to the concern of the next 
section with ideology and competing meanings attached to the narratives of choice 
and personalisation. 
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The Ideological Challenge: The Ideology of Choice Informing 
Government Policy 
In this section, I will highlight the ways in which participants identified current ideology 
as a challenge to the DPM. As we have seen in the previous two sections, when 
developments have departed from those called for by activists, participants often 
related these developments to differences in underlying principles and ideas. 
Participants’ insights into the principles of ‘independent living’ or ‘choice and control’ 
reveal what they perceived as the differences between these ideas and the underlying 
ideology of choice underpinning current policy. 
To understand the differences between these two approaches, it is necessary 
to first define what participants understood as the DPM’s ideal of independent living 
or ‘choice and control’. These principles were seen as synonymous and both choice 
and control were seen as necessary means to bring about independent living. 
Consistent with the account given in chapter one, I define independent living as the 
demand that disabled people are extended the means to exercise the independence 
any other citizen would take for granted. In this approach, impairment is severed from 
any notion of dependency. Independent living is based on the assumption that 
disabled people should be seen as equal and active citizens, and that their 
impairments do not constitute a valid reason for them to have less independence. It 
insists that independence, autonomy, and self-determination are a right and should 
not be contingent upon fluctuations in resources. Service users must be able to control 
the services they use, make their own choice among service providers and be at the 
core of needs assessment. In order to achieve these objectives, direct payments and 
personal budgets are seen as preferable to traditional ‘provided’ services. 
in the UK the history of the independent living approach has a great deal of 
overlap with the social model of disability (Barnes, and Mercer, 2006), and there is 
arguably a greater recognition that disablism suffuses society, and that independent 
living therefore requires a political campaign for the removal of physical, institutional 
and attitudinal barriers to achieve its goals (ibid). In the following interview excerpts 
‘choice and control’ and ‘independent living’ tended to be used interchangeably, and 
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therefore in essence, independent living meant choice and control and can be read as 
equivalent to it. 
Using data from interviews, I will now draw out participants’ understandings of 
the ideological underpinnings of the independent living approach, to differentiate it 
from their understanding (and critique) of government’s policies which focus primarily 
on choice. To provide some perspective on the origins of independent living, Kate 
explained how, to reverse the “control” historically held over disabled people by the 
state and charities, funding need to be directly transferred to disabled people, 
removing this degree of control from charities and the state. Thus the vehicle of direct 
payments was conceived in the British approach to independent living as a response to 
the power held over disabled people: 
“There were good reasons for those things [direct payments] when 
we brought them in, and I think they were to do with where we were 
at the time and how much disabled people’s lives were controlled by 
other people at the time, and we were trying to get to a situation 
where people would have absolute control and autonomy over their 
own lives.” 
This particular mechanism of independent living has now been endorsed (and even 
embraced) by successive governments. However, direct payments for some disabled 
people are a necessary but not sufficient condition to bring about what Kate describes 
as “absolute control and autonomy”. Vera made this clear as she showed how “choice 
and control” had a political meaning, challenging society to provide adequate 
adjustments and resources for disabled people to be able to exercise independence. 
As Vera noted, this differed from some other approaches and was a distinctive aspect 
of the British definition of independent living: 
“I suppose, in the US and in other European countries, the emphasis 
for independent living is on employing personal assistants, whether 
that’s through mostly cooperatives in Europe, or directly employed in 
the US, and that’s what people would think of as independent living. 
But in the UK, we’ve developed a rather different narrative to that, 
particularly in recent years, so it’s a narrative about where 
independent living is about choice and control and, you know, being 
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able to participate fully in society on the basis of equality, and we see 
that as applicable to all disabled people.” 
Describing a “narrative” of choice and control, Vera is suggesting the importance of the 
way practices are embedded within ideological frameworks (or “narratives”). If one 
accepts this, then ideologies may be an important dimension to be considered in the 
challenges facing disabled people. In the passage above, Vera distinguishes the British 
emphasis on choice and control through mention of “being able to participate in 
society on the basis of equality”. Considering the barriers that disabled people face 
and the challenges DPOs endure when competing against more commercially 
orientated organisations, coexistence on the basis of equality requires redistribution of 
power and resources to counterbalance these disadvantages. ‘Andrew’ made this 
point in relation to DPOs in striking and clear language: 
“If we want to create organisations that empower people, and I think 
DPOs are one of the best ways of doing that, we have to accept that a 
level playing field is automatically unfair because you’re dealing with 
groups of disempowered people, and forcing them to work in exactly 
the same way as people who aren’t disempowered.” 
This summarises the key aspect of independent living that “a level playing field is 
automatically unfair”. Another way of making this point would be to say that the 
‘playing field’ is automatically uneven if left unadjusted through redistribution. Later, 
Andrew elaborated on this point: 
“I think the central point is that you don’t treat everyone fairly by 
treating them the same, procurement forces everything to be treated 
the same, and inevitably it always comes down to prices and stuff like 
that, which is an issue if you want to provide quality and a good 
outcome as well, rather than just making a bit of money.” 
Arguing that fairness is not the same as treating people and organisations 
uniformly, Andrew is further explicating ‘choice and control’ to demonstrate that it 
does not assume a flat or uniform distribution of power, resources and capabilities. 
In addition to the necessity of prior redistribution, participants were keen to 
stress the necessity of collective user-involvement to add ‘control’ to individual 
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‘choice’. Rachel clarified this point, noting how personal budgets can work well with 
the active involvement of DPOs. In saying this, she shows how choice and control is as 
much collective as individual, not only involving individualised funding, but also control 
brought about through collective input: 
“Do I think it [personalisation] can be done well if there is a ULO and 
peer support at the heart of it and it’s a community approach? 
Definitely, so what’s been critiqued in the past is poor commissioning 
with commissioners who designed services and contracts without 
referring to disabled people. So when we talk about choice and 
control, for me, it’s about disabled people having a voice in how that 
service is designed, instead of some widget office manager going ‘oh 
today its office pens, tomorrow its personalisation’ and putting 
together a tender that bears no relationship to the values that we 
need to live.” 
By linking ULOs and peer support to the “values we need to live” she suggests that 
ULOs (or DPOs) can have the role of introducing the collective values of the DPM into 
markets for care and support and driving better outcomes for individual disabled 
people. Arguing that ULOs should be “at the heart” of the process she shows their 
centrality to achieving choice and control, and suggests markets characterised by 
personal budgets may not bring it about without their involvement. 
We saw in the previous section how redistribution and collective involvement 
through DPOs was seen as having practical value for disabled people. Within this 
section so far I have established their role within activist’s definition of independent 
living, showing how redistribution is seen as necessary to redress unequal power 
relations, and how collective user involvement is seen as a necessary supplement to 
the value and responsiveness of personal budgets. Noting how the government’s own 
ideology of choice can be seen to underpin policy development, participants perceived 
government policy to be departing from their principles of choice and control. 
Principles underpinning policy can be more implicit than those advocated by activists, 
lacking explicit definition and even appearing contradictory. Nevertheless, participants 
discerned the ideology of choice underpinning government policy as a challenge to the 
ideal of independent living. I identify this as an ideological challenge to the DPM, which 
I demonstrate below. 
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Participants saw particular welfare reforms as emblematic of a divergence from 
their notions of independent living. Certain policies were seen to express the essence 
of independent living by distributing resources to disabled people in such a way that 
would better enable them to live on the basis of equality with others. When payments 
such as the ILF or DLA are abolished or reformed, activists who base their work on the 
principles of independent living perceive them to be under threat. To illustrate this 
point, Vera pointed to the reform of DLA as an example of the unwillingness of 
government to accept the axiom that disabled people require extra resources to 
coexist upon a ‘level playing field’: 
“[D]isability living allowance really goes alongside all the thinking 
about independent living, because the disability living allowance 
recognised that there needs to be a level playing field and that if 
you’re a disabled person and you have an extra cost, and therefore it 
seemed sensible to have a benefit that contributed towards meeting 
those extra costs, which meant that then you could just get on with 
your life just like anyone else. But with the replacement of personal 
independence payment you know a lot of people are going to live 
now without those extra costs being met, and if you’re not going to 
have those costs met, then that undermines one of the fundamentals 
about independent living which is about participating in society on 
the basis of equality.” 
As we can see from this excerpt, many participants evaluated policy based on its lack 
of adherence to certain fundamental independent living values such as the ability to 
“participate on the basis of equality” and a “level playing field” through redistribution. 
As policy becomes increasingly decoupled from this ideal, the capacity of individual 
disabled people to exercise choice is diminished. In the following excerpt ‘David’ 
argues that the decreased level of available resources reduces the possibility of choice 
and control: 
“[B]ecause of budgetary constraints, local authorities are no longer 
funding services which were deemed part of somebody’s care 
package previously, for example funding provided for shopping or 
cleaning just aren’t provided for. So budgetary constraints and 
service providers and care companies charging from ten to twenty 
pounds per hour could limit the amount of freedom an individual 
may have. Obviously if you have less money but the care provider is 
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still charging fifteen pound per hour, there’s going to be limits to 
what you can do with your budget.” 
Without specifying the ideas underpinning policy, he is evaluating policy in light of the 
need for it to bring about the goal of “freedom”. This suggests a particular ideological 
construction of freedom which he detects to be missing from policy. He is linking the 
government’s failure to preserve existing levels of redistribution to the decline in the 
conditions required for disabled people’s freedom. In this way, like Vera, he is using 
the ideals of choice and control to gain a view of the implicit ideology of policy and 
establish its limitations. 
As with the principle of redistribution, the other key principle of collective user 
control was also found to be lacking in recent government policy. As Liz pointed out: 
“[B]rownie points don’t go to user-controlled, because at the end of 
the day, able-bodied people are still sceptical that we can have 
groups, and many areas can’t, but it’s up to us to support them to get 
them to feel confident enough to take control of their lives, and if 
there are disabled people’s organisations we can support them to 
take as much control as they possibly can.” 
Liz uses the ‘scepticism’ from policy makers regarding the general viability of DPOs to 
indicate another gap between the Independent living ideology and government policy. 
For Liz (and others), choice and control is impossible without the realisation of user 
control through the integral role of DPOs. To add data on this matter, Beverley also felt 
that the ideology informing policy failed to grasp the need for user-control: 
“Their [pioneers of disability activism] idea of a centre for 
independent living, was again to support disabled people in the 
process of living independently, so again it was about having 
somewhere where disabled people, well an agency if you like, where 
disabled people could get help and advice and support in using their 
direct payments and getting personal attendance, and I think that’s 
something which is not there today in the government’s 
interpretation of personal budgets, there’s not this kind of collective 
support which was there in the early days.” 
Arguing that collective user-control is not something which is apparent in the 
government’s “interpretation” of personal budgets, she is noting how practical 
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differences between government policy and the DPM can be seen through the way in 
which they are embedded in ideology. This suggests the importance of ideology as a 
distinct, but related, challenge to the others we have examined. This could mean that 
the struggles of DPOs to survive in markets in which their unique qualities are not 
recognised can be partly attributed to different background assumptions regarding the 
manner in which provision of care and support can best function. 
Nearly all participants shared the view that government had failed to grasp the 
necessity of collective user control and redistribution. In some participants’ accounts 
this lead on to a related concern with the challenge of the ambiguity and obscurity that 
inheres in government notions of choice. For some, this represented a complex 
challenge to unpick the differences in the idea of choice involved, while for others 
government rhetoric of choice simply cloaked or obscured the true intentions of 
policy. Notwithstanding these differences in interpretation, the elusiveness and 
ambiguity of the dominant government notion of choice formed another ideological 
challenge. 
As an example of this, ‘Malcom’ maintained that the use of language by 
governments could be deceptive and misrepresent their intentions: 
Q: “are they [the current government] using choice to mean 
something quite different to what you would then?” 
A: “yeah definitely, I mean that’s true down the current benefits 
agenda as well, welfare rights agenda, because it’s interesting that, in 
terms of the personal independence payment, rather than disability 
living allowance, they say it’s about bringing the best out of people 
and enabling them to reach their potential, really what they really 
mean is getting them off benefits. It’s not really about seeing the 
potential in people. But when you read the words and it’s ‘not about 
a person’s disabilities, but how they can fit in to society’ it all sounds 
wonderful, but they’ve definitely used the language of the 
independent living movement to do it their way.” 
Malcom is dismayed at the use of the term choice in conjunction with the removal of 
benefits that redistributed funds to disabled people. For Malcolm, this has been 
facilitated by the use of the language of independent living to confer credibility onto 
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policy. Rachel also feels that a conscious “cloaking” of undesirable policy in the 
language of rights and equality has taken place: 
“The move to individual budgets for the conservative party, the 
direction of travel has to be smaller and less support for fewer 
people, you know we’re not going to have under this government…I 
just think it’s that stealing of what’s been said in terms of rights and 
equality and cloaking a consumer and market economy in that 
language. And the reduction of levels of welfare for people and the 
reduction of welfare is what we’ve seen in the FACs criteria going to 
critical here, the use of private companies to assess people.” 
Unlike Rachel and Malcolm, others argued that rather than language ‘cloaking’ the 
true intentions of policy, government policy represented an uneven realisation of the 
principles of independent living. The government’s emphasis on personalisation was 
often seen to express the complications of this ideological challenge, arguably 
embodying a partial realisation of the DPM’s ideals in its focus on empowerment 
through personal budgets. The presence of these tensions can be read in the following 
contribution from Rachel where she explains that receiving a direct payment or being 
allocated a personal budget will not necessarily lead to choice and control, and should 
not therefore be seen as equivalent to personalisation: 
“I think what I’d like to see is a distinction between the choice and 
control and the personal budget, that personalisation doesn’t just 
mean a direct payment or personal budget, for us it means choice 
and control over how and what and at what time, and there is a 
direct payment element to it. For most people, politically and in the 
literature, personalisation has meant a direct payment, and that’s the 
wrong angle …the choice and menu of what people do with their 
lives, and the contact they have and the value they have in society, 
that’s the valuable bit about how that’s personalised, with a personal 
budget for me really, and the provision of advocacy for that, whether 
that’s mental capacity advocacy or peer support, advocacy is the key 
thing, not the direct payment.” 
Rachel does not want to completely discount personalisation but seeks to disassociate 
it from direct payments alone, instead stressing advocacy. By staking her own 
distinctive claim to the meaning of the term, it is suggested that she discerns some 
level of value remaining within the idea and does not consider it lost to negative 
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connotations. However, the version of “choice” underpinning policy was perceived as 
excessively individualistic without the application of corresponding collective values 
that would support user-control through the presence of DPOs. 
The danger of the implementation of personal budgets without corresponding 
application of the values of independent living is that empowerment is seen too one-
dimensionally as emerging automatically from the allocation of individualised funding. 
Trying to account for this ambiguity and the uneven realisation of choice and control 
within government ideology, David felt it could partly be accounted for by the 
government’s endorsement of a ‘free-market’ version of personalisation: 
“I believe the current form of personalisation that is trumpeted by 
government is a form of personalisation where the individual is 
responsible for every step of their lives. I think the form of 
personalisation that the government trumpets is a form of free 
market personalisation where the individual is an economic actor 
and, you know, everybody wants to be responsible for the 
administration of care packages, and you know, the current form of 
personalisation advocated by the government is free market and 
individuals are seen as isolated individuals and not within 
communities.” 
Like Rachel, David is arguing that the government’s version of personalisation involves 
an individualistic ideology. The way that David refers to a “form” of personalisation 
suggests that other forms may be possible, including a less individualistic form 
informed by the values of independent living. The feeling that ‘choice’ and 
personalisation were tainted by consumerism was not uncommon and David 
contributed more on this matter: 
“I kind of cringe at the word customers and this idea that if you give 
somebody a care package their service providers will offer a good 
service and an affordable service; it’s ridiculous because service 
provision is very often based on need. It’s not like buying a 
widescreen TV where you can do without, service provision, for 
myself say, I need to get out of bed in the morning, it’s not a choice 
it’s a need.” 
Here the common reference to the need for redistribution, in addition to the 
availability of individualised funding, is based on an important distinction between 
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human need and other commodities. Treating support and the requirement for 
relationships just like any other commodity means that the values of independent 
living embodied by DPOs can be ‘crowded out’ because they are not valued in a 
finance led procurement environment based on the logic of market exchange of 
commodities. This could be seen as ironic when government and its supporters often 
justifies austerity and savings made through strict procurement rules on the grounds 
that an over-wieldy state can ‘crowd out’ private sector initiative and innovation 
through excessive spending (Blyth, 2013). 
Referring back to the beginning of this section it will be recalled that 
independent living was conceived as a political challenge to society to provide 
adequate resources for disabled people’s independence and coexistence on the basis 
of equality. For Andrew, markets that can facilitate choice need to develop from an 
understanding of this challenge: 
“We’re still, despite the rhetoric, living in a world where disabled 
people are second or even third class citizens, who cannot expect the 
same opportunity that everyone else just takes for granted. And so 
we need a social debate which says “what do disabled people 
realistically need, support that other people might not need, what do 
we want those people to enjoy in life?” and until we’ve had that 
debate, we can’t really line up whatever funding might be necessary 
to make that happen.” 
Participants understood that demands for choice are made against a background of 
unequal power relations and the principles of independent living were consciously 
constructed to overcome such inequalities. Whilst participants tended to support the 
mechanism of individual choice, the version of choice and control supported by most 
of the participants was based less on consumerism and more on human rights and 
social participation. Markets were seen as a means to these ends and not an end in 
themselves. The ideological construction of choice through markets, in isolation from 
the principles of independent living, seemed to obscure what is required to bring 
about choice and control. 
Summarising this section, we started off by seeing how the DPM’s ideal of 
independent living was often articulated through the twin notions of ‘choice and 
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control’. This was seen as constituting a broader political challenge to society to 
provide adequate adjustments and resources for disabled people to coexist on the 
basis of equality. This was based on an account of power which understood the need 
to offset the inequalities that disabled people endure. In addition to redistribution, 
collective user-control was also seen as necessary. Demands for collective user 
involvement were based on a belief that accommodations to the preferences of 
personal budget holders alone would not bring about adequate choice and control. 
Having defined these aspects of choice and control, we saw how participants’ 
understood government policy to be departing from these principles. Examples such as 
the threat of abolition of the ILF and the reform of DLA were seen to demonstrate an 
unwillingness to accept the axiom that disabled people require extra resources to 
coexist upon a “level playing field”. The principle of collective user control was also 
found to be lacking in recent government policy, as was shown in section two 
concerning challenges to DPOs. Unlike independent living, the government’s version of 
choice was seen as viewing power as uniformly distributed, or flat. Where choice and 
control emphasised collective user-control, the current government’s version of choice 
was thought to assume that empowerment could come about automatically through 
the choices of personal budget holders. 
A further challenge concerned the ambiguity of the policy narratives of 
personalisation and choice. Generally, participants did not wish to entirely dispense 
with these terms, but were at pains to distinguish their definition of them from 
government policy. While these narratives embody the valuable principle of individual 
choice and the personalisation of services, they were currently seen as inadequate 
owing to the absence of redistribution or collective user-involvement within (or 
alongside) them. This complicates matters because an endorsement of these 
narratives could be mistaken for narrower and more individualistic notions of 
empowerment than is characteristic of the philosophy of independent living. 
Participants often framed both collective and individual empowerment as necessary as 
the route to independence, whereas the government’s choice and personalisation was 
seen as more one-dimensionally individualistic. 
140 
Much of the discourse informing policy formation construes choice in market 
terms based on a theory in which more exercise of choice is seen to punish poorer 
providers, meaning it is always favourable and leads to a better market in general. By 
contrast, the DPM’s ideal of independent living recognises that individual choice and 
personal budgets are necessary but not sufficient for empowerment. The rejection of a 
one-dimensional focus on individual empowerment should not therefore be mistaken 
for a rejection of the importance of individual choice. Without prior redistribution and 
support of DPOs, the exercise of individual choice intersects with power relations that 
disrupt the demand that all disabled people exercise choice and control. Thus it 
appears that for most activists, the relationship between individual and collective 
empowerment is not either/or, but that to have one you need both. 
Summary 
Within this chapter I have identified three key challenges facing disabled people. In the 
case of social isolation, themes emerged from interviews about the impacts on 
individual disabled people because of reductions in public funding on social support. 
The concern was that these reductions would limit the extent to which disabled people 
could participate as active citizens in their communities or share in life outside their 
own homes. The fear expressed by participants was that many disabled people would 
be constrained in the range of activities they could engage in, while their dignity was 
undermined by the absence of even basic supports. Regarding the second threat of 
deteriorating conditions facing DPOs, participants felt that the vital role DPOs play 
within markets of care and support could be undermined. It was believed by many that 
cuts and downward pressure on costs, combined with a competitive tendering 
framework, were disadvantaging DPOs. The conditions facing DPOs threaten their 
existence, in the process endangering an integral element of choice and control 
concerned with collective user-control. The third and final threat identified by 
participants’ concerned these very ideals of choice and control and how these were 
seen as diverging from the ambiguous ideological constructions of choice and 
personalisation that informs policy. 
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The overall extent to which the standard of living and level of support of 
disabled people has deteriorated under this government is an important aspect of 
analysing the challenges facing disabled people. Experienced participants were aware 
of past challenges under previous governments and seemed keen not to be perceived 
as naively romanticising the past, or downplaying the structural or ideological 
underpinnings of disablism that have persisted through different governments. In 
individual, organisational and ideological terms, disentangling whether participants 
were referring to immediate problems of the current government or to longer run 
structural problems was difficult, and interview data will need to be supplemented by 
analysis of further evidence to better understand this issue. 
Considering the challenges discussed in this chapter as a whole, there is a 
similarity to those faced by individual disabled and DPOs in that both may require 
additional resources to coexist on the basis of equality with non-disabled people and 
commercial organisations. We saw in the first section of this chapter how withdrawal 
of resources from individual disabled people is not experienced as equity but as a form 
of coerced isolation and a contradiction of the independent living approach. Equally, in 
the case of DPOs, treating them identically to other providers fails to recognise their 
unique strengths and the competitive disadvantages they face against larger more 
commercially orientated organisations. In the case of both DPOs and individual 
disabled people, a prior redistribution of resources is required to achieve coexistence 
based on a degree of equality. 
In this light it is important to note that the government’s ideological 
construction of choice assumes a flat distribution of power and resources and lacks a 
notion of redistribution. When disabled people are denied more than enough to 
‘survive’ (see section one above), the degree of resource redistribution is far removed 
from the demands for ‘choice and control’ based on a level of redistribution that 
would bring about participation ‘on the basis of equality’ and the opportunity to act as 
citizens with an active role in social and community life. Individual choice alone is not 
enough and must be augmented with a transfer of power and resources and the 
democratic control of disabled people. 
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While this continues to be the case, it appears that the overall situation of both 
many individual disabled people and DPOs may worsen, meaning fewer empowered 
disabled people can contribute to DPOs and help sustain them in this difficult climate. 
Meanwhile, the worry is that DPOs will be less able to reach out to, and contribute to 
better outcomes for local disabled people, or highlight the challenges many individual 
disabled people are facing, including when their budgets are reduced or “picked off” 
one by one. As these challenges to individuals and DPOs grow, it may become harder 
to challenge the limitations of a one-dimensional view of choice and empowerment 
that underpins government policy. This ideology is reinforced because the 
individualism of government notions of choice mean collective user involvement is not 
valorised and DPOs are not seen as intrinsically valuable. This construction of choice 
also ignores the preconditions which were seen as necessary by activists to enable the 
equitable exercise of choice through redistribution, offsetting disablism.  
These challenges are mutually reinforcing and intersect in complex ways. Taken 
together, they comprise novel forms of disablism that coexist with older and more 
familiar forms of disablism associated with paternalism and oppression within 
institutions. In the next chapter (six) I seek to reflect on these challenges in greater 




Chapter 6: The Challenges of Enforced 
Individualism and their Relation to Personalisation 
In this chapter I will further develop the data presented in the previous chapter, 
broadening my analysis by drawing on relevant literature to deepen the examination 
of participant contributions. I will do this by linking the challenges facing many 
disabled people to Roulstone and Morgan’s (2009) notion of ‘enforced individualism’. 
The idea of enforced individualism is useful in articulating the shifting challenges facing 
disabled people in the UK and the shortcomings of current disability policy. To 
strengthen the conceptual framework provided by the idea of enforced individualism I 
will explore the policy narrative of personalisation, analysing its relationship to 
enforced individualism. 
The goal in this chapter is to explore the logic of enforced individualism and 
how it relates to the personalisation narrative (Needham, 2011). This will develop the 
interpretation given of the challenges facing disabled people, before the resulting 
positions taken by participants in reaction to these challenges are analysed in 
subsequent chapters. The analysis presented in this chapter is predominantly 
concerned with the ideas at work in enforced individualism and personalisation. As we 
saw in the previous chapter, current challenges to disabled people have an ideological 
component but also have material dimensions concerning individual isolation and 
challenges to DPOs. Enforced individualism can relate to all three challenges outlined 
in the previous chapter and thus may be a good way of conceptualising them. In the 
case of personalisation, while I will focus on its narrative qualities, these qualities 
cannot be completely separated from material developments such as the promotion 
and increased availability of personal budgets. Although both enforced individualism 
and personalisation have definite material dimensions, the goal in this chapter will be 
to distinguish their ideological dimensions from the ideas of the DPM’s, in the process 
developing an understanding of how personalisation and enforced individualism relate 
to each other. In later chapters I balance this focus on ideas with a focus on the 
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political and economic conditions which have driven much of enforced individualism 
and formed the context in which personalisation has been promoted. 
Enforced Individualism 
Through my analysis of interview data and awareness of other relevant evidence, I 
have chosen to theorise the growing influence of a form of disablism that coexists with 
more familiar forms of disablism associated with paternalism and oppression within 
institutional settings. I argue that the challenges presented in the previous chapter 
collectively reconfigures the nature of the oppression many disabled people face. 
Borrowing from Roulstone and Morgan (2009), I refer to this reconfiguration as a 
movement toward the challenges of ‘enforced individualism’ away from one which had 
been chiefly characterised by ‘enforced collectivism’. To be more precise, I argue that 
these two types of challenges now coexist, with enforced individualism likely to 
continue to grow in influence in future. 
These terms originate in Roulstone and Morgan’s (2009) study of the impact of 
self-directed support on care provision in one local authority, in which they present 
data from interviews carried out in 2006 with users of day centres undergoing a 
process of modernisation. The authors found that the quality of life experienced by 
former users of day centres had often not improved. Their findings about lives outside 
of institutions anticipate many of those reached in the previous chapter. For example, 
the challenge of increased isolation for individual disabled people was anticipated, as 
the authors argue that those leaving institutions could be ‘prey to the rhetoric of self-
directed support without receiving the quantity of financial support required to engage 
with other disabled people and wider society in a safe and genuinely freely chosen 
way’ (ibid: 342). This concern was actualised in the previous chapter when participants 
warned of a situation in which support merely “kept people alive” rather than “giving 
them a life” characterised by citizenship, participation and recreation. Independent 
living requires disabled people have the choice required for active citizenship and that 
they not be isolated in their own homes or, as a participant in this study put it, 
“institutionalised in their own homes”. Roulstone and Morgan appeared to anticipate 
the risk of such problems, noting that as participants had begun to spend more time 
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away from day centres, ‘a great deal of former centre-based time was beginning to be 
spent at home’ (ibid: 342). This issue typified the concerns of many participants in this 
thesis with the growing risk of isolation and social disconnection in the lives of many 
disabled people. 
As well as the dangers of greater isolation and alienation in the lives of 
individual disabled people, Roulstone and Morgan also anticipated the compounding 
problem of the undermining of DPO’s capacity to mitigate isolation and support 
disabled people through the process of accessing and using individualised funding. The 
authors point to the value of collective contexts that are not enforced or paternalistic, 
and highlight the significance of CILs and DPOs as a means to decrease the likelihood of 
‘individual support solutions fostering enforced individualism and isolation’ (ibid: 343). 
They warn that ‘in the absence of adequate funding and exposure to organisations of 
disabled people, day service recipients risk moving from a position of enforced 
collectivism to an enforced individualism characteristic of neo-liberal constructions of 
economic life’ (ibid: 333). The reference here to enforced individualism clarifies the 
concept I draw upon to theorise my findings. In the same quote the reference to ‘neo-
liberal constructions of economic life’ is also of relevance, corresponding to the third 
challenge I identified in the previous chapter concerning obstructive ideas which 
undermine the conditions required for individual disabled people and DPOs to exist on 
the basis of equality with others. Taken as a whole, Roulstone and Morgan identify the 
isolation of individuals, challenges to DPOs, and the importance of ideological 
constructions as key aspects of enforced individualism, in each case foreshadowing my 
analysis of the challenges facing disabled people. 
This goes some way to explaining why enforced individualism is an appropriate 
vehicle for analysing my findings. In the rest of this chapter I will elaborate its 
importance through its relationship to personalisation, further conceptualising my 
analysis of the challenges to disabled people identified in the previous chapter. Before 
I can go further in this task it is first necessary to more carefully define enforced 
collectivism because of its inextricable relationship with enforced individualism. 
Roulstone and Morgan use the concept of enforced collectivism as they explore the 
individual and collective influences upon disabled people’s lives, noting that many 
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disabled people who have little experience of political forms of collective mobilisation 
will have experienced ‘enforced collectivities’ (ibid: 338) typified by ‘now reduced 
segregated long-stay, residential and day centre contexts’ (ibid). These collectivities 
characterise the concept of enforced collectivism which denotes the damaging 
influence of institutions upon the lives of many disabled people. 
Enforced collectivism, and the institutions which characterise it, arguably 
represents the most negative facet of an ambivalent inheritance of collectivist values 
from a time when the benevolent and caring function of institutions was more often 
assumed to outweigh their harmful practices. In such ‘one-size-fits-all’ institutions, 
disabled people were crudely grouped together with those with whom they may have 
shared little in common. This destructive process was a central part of the objections 
of the earlier DPM (Hunt, 1966). It is hard to overstate the role that segregation, 
underpinned by ideas of normality and sub-normality, has had in the experience of 
oppression of disabled people (Barnes, 1990). Experience of this segregation continues 
to colour analyses of disablism, particularly while it persists, albeit to a lesser degree. 
Attendees or residents of these institutions may be denied full autonomy through 
regimented institutional practices or even through coercion. Even in the best examples 
of day centres, the nature of the institution means that individuals will lose a degree of 
independence, choice and autonomy through the necessity that they compromise 
their priorities to fit with large numbers of fellow attendees and staff. 
In the climate in which these institutions grew, the individual empowerment 
that many disabled people demanded was suppressed by a climate of opinion which 
valued collective approaches to risk and solidarity over the unequal realisation of 
individual goals. These institutions decreased in influence in parallel with a process in 
which the fundamental values that underpinned their existence were questioned. This 
is to say that shifts in how services for disabled people are commissioned and 
delivered mirror a broader transition from a time of greater collectivism to the more 




 (Harvey, 2005) to neoliberalism
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, the inviolability of individual freedom 
from coercion arguably became better recognised. This provided a justification for the 
closure of many institutions as the goal of individual independence for all became 
more established. It is arguable that the greater acceptance of individual 
empowerment is in evidence today as more disabled people are able to gain a form of 
empowerment through an employer-employee relationship, increasing their power to 
realise their goals and desires through personal budgets or direct payments. Although 
the means to exercise greater choice are intended to be made widely available, the 
degree to which these choices can be realised continue to be uneven and influenced 
by cognitive and economic resources (Stevens et al, 2011). 
In the previous era, characterised by greater collectivism and paternalism, and 
the current environment, appreciative of autonomy but prey to atomism, differing 
forms of injustice are produced. Enforced collectivism was likely to breed institutional 
oppression, and enforced individualism the forms of isolation and alienation referred 
to in the previous chapter. This is not to say that deinstitutionalisation had to lead to 
isolation or alienation in a direct causal manner, but that when deinstitutionalisation is 
combined with drastic cuts in government expenditure the result is isolation for many 
disabled people, including those receiving personal budgets or direct payments. The 
shift to deinstitutionalisation and individualised funding mechanisms has of course 
been broadly welcomed by disabled people, but when combined with drastic steps to 
control government spending, it leads to different challenges from a situation in which 
this reduction in spending is combined with institutionalisation. While 
deinstitutionalisation is in no way a cause of austerity, it may be that aspects of the 
ideological forces which facilitated the process of deinstitutionalisation are also 
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 Harvey (2005: 11) uses the term ‘embedded liberalism’ to describe how in the post war period 
‘market processes and entrepreneurial and corporate activities were surrounded by a web of social and 
political constraints and a regulatory environment that sometimes restrained but in other instances led 
the way in economic and industrial strategy’. 
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 Harvey’s (2005: 2) definition of neoliberalism is elaborate but it’s beginning states that neoliberalism 
is ‘in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human wellbeing can 
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the 
state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. 
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supportive of falls in state expenditure on support for disabled people as pursued 
through austerity. 
The historical movement between enforced collectivism and enforced 
individualism, and the environment which gives rise to their development, begins to 
show why I arrived at enforced individualism/collectivism as an appropriate 
conceptualisation for my analysis. In interviews for this thesis some participants 
criticised the continuing paternalism of day centres and segregated institutions, but 
when asked to assess significant or emerging threats, their responses were typically 
more characteristic of enforced individualism. In this sense a perception of the 
movement from enforced collectivism toward enforced individualism appeared to be 
manifest in interview data. This movement also provokes a consideration of the forces 
which shape the opportunities for disempowerment/empowerment that are available, 
and helps in understanding how resistance can orientate itself to these opportunities. 
By itself, enforced individualism can illuminate the challenges I have identified, but it is 
also the dynamic relationship with enforced collectivism that is useful. In this sense 
enforced individualism-enforced collectivism is a relational framework which requires 
both concepts to be meaningful. 
The correspondence between the findings of the previous chapter and those of 
Roulstone and Morgan means that the dualism of enforced individualism and enforced 
collectivism is appropriate as an animating theme for this stage of my analysis. Given 
that the data presented by Roulstone and Morgan is from 2006, it reminds one that 
these trends are not entirely new or purely the outcome of the election of the coalition 
government and the introduction of their program of austerity. Arguably the 
challenges I have presented can be understood as an intensification of a previously 
existing trend. Overall my analysis of interviews adds fuel to the concern that ‘self-
direction can take on ‘distinctly neo-liberal characteristics’ (Roulstone, Morgan, 2009: 
343). In my view, enforced individualism is growing as personal budgets become 
widespread but are detached from their potential as the level of each budget is 
restricted by rationing, and many are denied any funding at all through heightened 
eligibility criteria. Meanwhile, the strength of DPOs has been undermined as they are 
made to compete with charitable and private sector providers, who mimic their 
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strengths in the race for competitively awarded local authority tenders. In this 
situation the personalisation of social care has often been spoken of as a way of 
increasing the empowerment of disabled people. I now go on to relate it to enforced 
individualism. 
The Personalisation Narrative and Enforced Individualism 
In this section I will scrutinise the policy narrative of personalisation in order to justify 
and explain in greater depth my argument that a shift has occurred toward more 
enforced individualism. In the previous chapter I explained the challenges of what I 
now theorise as enforced individualism, including the ideological challenge of 
obstructive and limiting ideas. It will be recalled that these limiting ideas included a 
failure to accept that disabled people require the resources necessary to coexist upon 
a “level playing field”. Another problem was the absence of the idea of collective user 
control in recent government policy. Unlike independent living, the government’s 
version of choice was seen as viewing power as uniformly distributed, or flat. Where 
choice and control emphasised collective user-control, the version of choice that is 
characteristic of enforced individualism assumes that empowerment could come 
about automatically through the choices of personal budget holders. To some extent 
each of these limiting ideas are present in the policy narrative of personalisation, 
mirroring its flat account of power, construal of empowerment in market terms and 
fetishisation of individual choice (see Dodd, 2013; Houston, 2010; Ferguson, 2007). 
This may be because both enforced individualism and personalisation are ultimately 
bound by the constraints of neoliberal policy orthodoxy. In concluding chapters I will 
return to this broader context, but for now will focus upon what the policy narrative 
personalisation can tell us about enforced individualism. 
The focus here on an intangible policy ‘narrative’ might seem questionable 
when ‘hard’ questions of funding are driving down the level of support and benefits 
experienced by many. As an abstract term, the potential of personalisation will mainly 
be driven by the forces which make use of it and the level of resources made available 
to actualise it. However, the narrative qualities of personalisation as a ‘policy story’ 
(Needham, 2011) are a key reason why many have been persuaded of the merits of 
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personal budgets and direct payments. Indeed the potency of personalisation as a 
policy story is such that it has spread throughout many areas of public service reform 
(ibid), suggesting that the narrative is potent whether it denotes personal budgets and 
direct payments or reforms in other public services. Part of the success of 
personalisation as a narrative is its mutability (ibid); however, its meaning is not 
completely mutable and is constrained by the web of associated terms that are 
connected to it. The uses and meanings of terms can shift, but at any one time, what 
they refer to is constrained by their web-like relation to one another
36
. Personalisation 
has a relatively stable meaning that refers to empowerment in anti-structural, 
individual terms. It is reasonable therefore to attend to the inner logic of the narrative 
and to its relation to enforced individualism. Because the two are closely related and 
overlap to some degree, it is important to unpick their relationship. 
The narrative of personalisation shares with enforced individualism some 
important characteristics, but is clearly not identical to it. I define personalisation as a 
policy narrative, associated with personal budgets and individualised funding. Enforced 
individualism, as I note above, refers to the totality of the three challenges identified in 
the previous chapter, as well as the movement away from enforced collectivism. 
Neither personalisation nor enforced individualism simply causes the other, rather 
they are causally interrelated. As a policy narrative, personalisation is a way of framing 
or talking about empowerment. It refers to empowerment in terms of personalising 
support to facilitate individual choice making. In common with the ideological 
challenges analysed in the previous chapter, it is inattentive to structural dimensions 
of disempowerment or disablism, viewing individual empowerment through personal 
budgets as sufficient for individuals to thrive. This means it does not refer to the full 
range of factors which can counteract individual empowerment and play a role in 
upholding conditions of isolation. Unlike the DPM’s notions of choice and control or 
independent living, it lacks a notion of collective user involvement, meaning it does not 
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 Sayer, drawing on Giddens (1979; 1987), comments that ‘Once objects have been "arbitrarily" given 
names, the conventions governing how terms are combined to make meaningful discourse which can 
inform successful action are far from arbitrary’ (1993: 328). 
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give a prominent role to DPOs. As we shall see in greater depth below, in these 
respects, personalisation seems to act to reinforce aspects of enforced individualism. 
Enforced individualism can also affect the personalisation narrative. As the 
isolation that characterises enforced individualism grows, the prospect of greater 
empowerment through personalisation recedes. Personalisation, sold through 
powerful stories of empowerment (Needham, 2011) could then be seen to be failing 
by the standards it has set for itself. If isolation grows, and personalisation is seen to 
fail to deliver on its resonant stories, it may mutate into a story primarily about 
‘freedom from’ paternalistic institutions. Another way in which enforced individualism 
could affect personalisation is that challenges to DPOs could mean they are less able to 
remind personalisation proponents of the multifaceted nature of disablement and the 
collective effort needed to challenge it. This could reinforce within personalisation an 
increasingly one-dimensional view of power that assumes empowerment will arise 
from personal budgets alone. 
Personalisation, its Relation to Power, and its Divergence from the 
Principles of the DPM 
Interview participants appeared to be suspicious of the one-dimensional notion of 
empowerment at work in personalisation that assumes the award of a personal budget 
will, by itself, lead to empowerment. Some explained this simplistic view of 
empowerment and the associated challenges of isolation and social alienation through 
reference to the disparity between the model of direct payments pioneered by the 
DPM and the version of personalisation being promoted by the government
37
. 
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 This distinction might be questioned given that, without personalisation, direct payments could be cut 
in conditions of austerity and themselves then be seen as a vehicle for regressive cuts. It may be that the 
investment of activists in developing direct payments meant they were disposed to viewing them more 
positively. On the other hand, participants may have been right to be critical of differences in process 
that are embedded within personalisation such as resource allocation systems and indicative budgets. 
Recent evidence suggests a worrying degree of opacity in this aspect of personal budgets and 
personalisation. Slasberg et al (2013) find that the average real allocation to recipients of personal 
budgets falls far below what they are initially awarded through the resource allocation system (RAS). An 
upfront and reliable indication of the level of budget through the RAS was conceived as a cornerstone of 
personalisation. The differences between upfront and real allocations are so great that Slasberg et al 
conclude ‘the actual budget was being decided without regard to the upfront allocation. This would 
mean that personal budgets, defined as they are by the upfront allocation with which to plan support, 
do not even exist’ (2013: 94). 
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Whether participants were correct to sharply distinguish personal budgets from direct 
payments or not, the idea that control had been lost over the direct payments agenda 
to another set of values, seemed quite a common way of explaining the challenges 
facing individual disabled people and DPOs. In this way, participants were linking 
personalisation to the challenges I have described as enforced individualism. As an 
example of the feeling that disabled people’s control of the direct payments agenda 
had been lost under personalisation, Robert argued that there was a tenuous link from 
the direct payments he and movement colleagues had campaigned for and what is 
now promoted as personalisation: 
“I’ve always been sceptical; you know we’ve always been fighting for 
direct payments and I was involved very closely with the campaign to 
legalise direct payments years ago, but we’ve never been 
campaigning for resource allocation systems or SEQs; not really in 
that form…I guess it made us feel, to be honest, a little bit like the 
direct payment thing ‘oh it wasn’t working’ and that was because ‘it 
was a bad idea’. It wasn’t because it was a bad idea, it wasn’t working 
because it wasn’t implemented properly, and actually if it had been 
implemented in the way that we’d been suggesting with a degree of 
flexibility and choice and control, and the right levels of investment in 
support structures and systems, it would have been accessible to a 
lot more people.” 
Similarly to Robert, Liz felt that personal budgets, embedded within the narrative of 
personalisation, had proven to be more susceptible to being used for reducing 
support, fuelling isolation: 
“I’m very suspicious of personalisation and personal budgets, 
because as far as I can see so far, everyone who’s been assessed as 
needing a personal budget, who was once on a direct payment, has 
had their support reduced, and I just think, maybe I’m being 
sceptical, but the way it’s been administered and delivered is far 
more to do with local authorities ability to be imaginative, creative 
and cost-effective than it is about taking direct payments to another 
level.” 
The divergence of personalisation from the principles of independent living 
disappointed some participants who argued that personal budgets, embedded within 
personalisation, rather than extending the empowerment of direct payments to more 
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people, are in danger of becoming a distortion or perversion of the original intentions 
of direct payments. For example, Liz explained that: 
“When disabled people began to control the cash that was supposed 
to be there for our benefit, that kick-started what was going to be a 
long process of emancipating disabled people through direct 
payments, and I think personalisation has taken our idea of the right 
to control and has manipulated it in a way that the control is steadily 
going back to central provision and to support for the professionals, 
cos they’re now going to determine what personalisation is and how 
much money we need to achieve.” 
Liz refers here to the way in which “they’re now going to determine what 
personalisation is and how much money we need to achieve”, suggesting a decline in 
the extent to which disabled people are in control of policies ostensibly designed to 
deliver empowerment. This drives a “suspicion” at the malign values at work in place 
of disabled people’s in personalisation today. If this suspicion is correct and 
personalisation is not based on the principle of redistribution and coexistence on the 
basis of equality, personalisation is compatible with the challenge of isolation to 
disabled people. This may be an example of how the ideas identified as a challenge in 
the previous chapter can obstruct the demands of disabled people. The DPM argued 
that the level of resources required for a “level playing field” were necessary. As 
personalisation takes hold it is arguable that the processes associated with it provide a 
means to subvert this logic, putting the level of resources deemed available above the 
need of the individual to achieve independence (Slasberg et al, 2013). 
This shortcoming in the logic of personalisation can be illuminated by contrast 
with the inversion of individual models of disability represented by the social model of 
disability. The social model sensitises one to the individualisation seen in 
personalisation as an over-arching framework for empowerment. Presented as a self-
evident good, the wide appeal of the personalisation narrative can obscure persistent 
inequalities and differences in disempowerment, promoting an ideal of independent 
market actor who realises meaning through market decisions (Houston, 2010). Barnes’ 
reasons for doubting the potential for personalisation as a framework for 
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empowerment are of interest here, as she notes the limits of such a one-dimensional 
approach to addressing disempowerment: 
Any strategy that claims ‘empowerment’ as an objective requires an 
understanding of the processes and circumstances that give rise to 
disempowerment. People’s experiences of the way in which public 
services are delivered is one factor in this, but it is not the only one. 
Claiming transformational effects from a strategy that focuses solely 
on this aspect of people’s lives simply will not do (2008: 156). 
Without the imposition of cuts, a focus on personalising public services could lead on 
to more participation in society. However, whilst personalisation may be seen as 
heightening positive freedom
38
 in this way, these gains will not necessarily be realised 
equitably as they interact with pre-existing inequalities that permit greater or less 
degrees of participation. Reinforcing this point, Stevens et al (2011), drawing on Clarke 
et al (2006; 2008), found that users of personal budgets required significant 
determination and high levels of cognitive and social resources to realise, as well as to 
make, choices. Overcoming the effect of these inequalities could begin with allocations 
of personal budgets that provide ‘enough money’ to enable independent living and full 
citizenship (Slasberg et al, 2013). This could also help to remove some of the 
bureaucracy and opacity from a process which according to Slasberg et al frequently 
does not provide the user with anything close to what is initially agreed for a 
‘indicative budget’ through the resource allocation system (ibid). A model of fairness 
as ‘enough money’ has never been part of personalisation, with the model of fairness 
at work closer to one of ‘a fair share’ of whatever budget the political process had 
made available (ibid: 95). With what is deemed affordable built into the logic of 
personalisation as a fundamental principle, it would seem the allocation of ‘enough 
money’ to achieve independent living and overcome inequality and disempowerment 
would always be very difficult to achieve. Personalisation is ‘power-blind’ by 
suggesting that ‘transformational‘ empowerment can occur through a shift in social 
care practice. 
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negative freedom is the ‘freedom from’ external restraints on individual freedom, while positive 
freedom is the ‘freedom to’ realise one’s potential (Berlin, 1969). 
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To achieve transformational levels of empowerment and overcome the 
challenges of enforced individualism, disablism and the basic relations of society must 
be changed, requiring that concentrations of power are challenged and made to cede 
power. The DPM has generally understood that ‘choice and control’ must be fought for 
against a background of concentrated power and wealth (Finkelstein, 1980; Oliver, 
1990). Power relations are not referred to within the logics of personalisation, 
mirroring my analysis of the ideological aspect of enforced individualism and its 
essentially flat account of power. The context determining enforced individualism is 
informed by existing power structures including disablism in the form of inadequate 
budgets, extremely demanding assessments for benefits and over-powerful private 
sector ‘care’ agencies. 
As an example of the need to challenge disablism, Andrew argued that the 
need to address power dynamics means that one must go beyond market discourse to 
explore other metrics and perspectives on quality and effectiveness in ‘care’. This point 
is used to inform an argument that distinguishes cost and effectiveness: 
“So disabled people, if they are one of the most disempowered 
groups, and I think they probably are, then they’re going to fare 
worst and lo and behold we obviously hear loads about benefit cuts 
and entitlement cuts and all sorts of things like that, and clearly 
without money, without resources, it’s pretty difficult to make much 
headway if you’re looking to live independently and to do something 
different. For some there needs to be an acceptance that cost and 
effectiveness are two different things. Something that is cheap may 
be cheap but it inevitably will not be as effective as something that 
might cost just a tiny bit more but will deliver three times as much 
benefit.” 
For Andrew, to place effectiveness above cost would entail a radical restructuring of 
procurement and a measurement of effectiveness by other means. One barrier to this 
occurring is that personalisation neglects any notion of structural disablism beyond 
individual acts of discrimination. To value DPOs on criteria other than cost would 
require greater recognition of disablism and the use of DPOs as a defence against it. 
This could help with the conditions facing DPOs that were recognised in the previous 
chapter, but the personalisation narrative has seldom focused upon this need. 
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The relation of personalisation to DPOs 
It is significant that policy associated with personalisation has had little to say on the 
issue of disempowerment or the vehicle of DPOs as a means to address it. In this light 
Barnes (2008) warns that the influential early proponent of personalisation, 
Leadbeater (2004), is dismissive of collective activity such as the challenge put forward 
by the social model of disability to the understanding of disability as an individual 
phenomenon. She warns that ‘without collective action neither the political analysis 
nor the interpersonal support necessary for such transformations would have been 
achieved’ (Barnes, 2008: 154). In this sense Barnes observes a difference between 
personalisation proponents and those activists who ‘understand very well that it is not 
just about ‘making it personal’ (ibid: 155). In tandem with changes to how services are 
delivered is a need for collective action that could ‘realise human rights in conditions 
of inequality and vulnerability’ (ibid: 155). This is a key point in that personalisation is 
blind to economic, health or social inequalities (Stevens et al, 2011; Ferguson, 2007), 
and contains little in the way of a vision of positive freedoms or support for 
organisations that would seek to bring it about and overcome enforced individualism 
(Dodd, 2013). 
There is a tight relationship between the negative conditions facing DPOs 
identified in the previous chapter and a lack in the personalisation narrative of an 
analysis of disempowerment and the need for practices of anti-disablement. DPOs 
have a crucial role to play as sites for opposition to disablism led by disabled people 
and embodying their right to self-determination. Given the challenges of isolation of 
individual disabled people and of a crudely individualistic discourse, DPOs have a vital 
role to play as ‘collective bridges’ between disabled people, ensuring that they can 
collectively articulate a vision of a changed society necessary for the achievement of 
positive freedoms, and collectively challenge disabling social relations (Dodd, 2013). 
Roulstone and Morgan (2009) share an appreciation of the value of DPOs in a climate 
of enforced individualism, noting the important issue of how such organisations, 
rooted in ideas of collective organisation, can fit into the landscape created by 
personalisation. An aspect of the potential of DPOs is that they could potentially link 
individual control with collective identity ‘advancing new ways of viewing disability, 
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and one could argue new sites of solidarity’ (ibid: 338). Boxall et al (2009) also argue 
for collective user-involvement, identifying the role that CILs can have in increasing the 
accountability of providers and improving the protection of users of individualised 
funding mechanisms. They suggest that funding and service brokerage should be 
removed from local councils and placed with local organisations, including ‘existing 
centres of independent living and disabled people’s organisations instrumental in the 
original development of DP schemes’ (ibid: 511). 
As we have seen in chapters 2 and 5, DPOs, as agents of social change, are seen 
as receiving too little support in a competitive procurement environment. For Andrew, 
the advantages of DPOs and the lack of recognition of their contribution meant that 
the procurement framework should be adapted to take account of disabled people’s 
disempowerment within society: 
“[Y]ou don’t treat everyone fairly by treating them the same, 
procurement forces everything to be treated the same, and 
inevitably it always comes down to prices and stuff like that, which is 
an issue which wants to provide quality and a good outcome as well, 
rather than just making a bit of money. But there’s no doubt, and I 
think this is accepted outside of our movement as well, that the 
procurement environment we have favours big organisations and 
effectively discriminates against smaller organisations, simply 
because bigger organisations have got a commercial advantage in 
being able to bid, and having the human resources to put together 
nice sounding tenders, and we don’t have that resource… if we’re 
talking about agents of social change, which I think we are, then we 
should be creating environments where good ideas, innovative ideas 
come from small groups of people who want to change the world.” 
Failure to support the role of DPOs as “agents of social change” reflects an inability to 
account for differentials in power, or in other words to “treat them the same”. Unable 
to account of structural disempowerment and inequality or the need to articulate a 
positive vision of an alternative social configuration, personalisation is arguably 
consistent with what Andrew complains of. Without an understanding of 
disempowerment, or of the value of DPOs to fight against it, the individualism of 
personalisation means it endorses a narrow measure of quality based on cost and 
cannot adequately endorse the role of DPOs as agents of anti-disablement. Without 
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the articulation of a position against structural disablement and accepting the 
necessity of cost constraints on individual’s autonomy, the focus of personalisation 
may drift toward the surer ground of anti-paternalist negative freedoms from 
institutions and the threat of enforced collectivism. This could further threaten DPOs 
as their role in challenging structural disablement and projecting a positive vision of 
freedom is further undermined. 
Implemented in a neoliberal context that is likely to amplify rather than 
ameliorate its excesses, the danger is of personalisation supporting a situation 
characterised for many by isolation and loss of participation. Participants often 
seemed to invoke collectivism as a quality missing in current policy. An identification of 
an absence of collectivism implies a perception of excessive individualism. An excess of 
individualism is connected to the challenge of isolation in that isolation can be seen as 
representing the worst aspects of individualism, and the absence of the means to 
realise the positive aspects of individualism such as self-actualisation. An excess of 
individualism is also arguably connected to the challenge facing DPOs, in that an 
absence of collectivism means the function of DPOs as ‘collective bridges’ is not 
valued. 
DPOs could be a force that corrects the enforced individualism within which 
personalisation is implicated. DPOs would be crucial to a counter-narrative that would 
take account of social oppression and the poverty of solely individual views of 
empowerment. Collective spaces such as DPOs enable individual grievances to be 
transformed by the knowledge that individual experiences are part of a broader 
experience of disablement. Such spaces allow the diverse tendencies within disability 
politics to converge and debate (Barnes and Mercer, 2006). 
Summary of arguments regarding personalisation 
We have seen how the personalisation narrative lacks a notion of structural 
disablement, and the need for DPOs as vehicles of anti-disablement. It has also been 
suggested that personalisation is excessively individualistic, lacking sufficient reference 
to the collective forces that can cause isolation or the need for DPOs to act as 
159 
collectivising bridges to connect holders of individual funding for support. To put these 
shortcomings of personalisation and its relation to enforced individualism into a wider 
context, it is interesting that before the introduction of the term ‘personalisation’, 
Priestley argued that ‘the disabled people’s movement has been partially successfully 
in securing negative rights, it has as yet, made rather less progress in obtaining the 
positive rights necessary to exercise active and inclusive citizenship’ (1999: 213). There 
has been some progress on positive rights since Priestley wrote as personalisation is, in 
abstract terms, concerned with the creation of conditions which would allow 
individuals to personalise their care in order to achieve what they require. Progress has 
also continued to be made on the matter of negative freedom because personalisation 
and increased take-up of personal budgets is seen as a further blow to institutions 
which frequently compromised individual autonomy. 
Delving deeper into the issue of positive freedom, beyond a purely abstract 
view of personalisation, it is evident that the cuts currently affecting personal budgets 
derail the realisation of positive freedom because the range of choices available to the 
individual are so limited. At a higher degree of abstraction another problem is that 
wider positive freedoms entail a vision for a way in which society could be changed for 
the better to enable individuals or groups to better realise their potential. 
Personalisation contains little in terms of a positive vision of an alternative society that 
could address, at a structural level, the inequalities that disrupt realisation of choices. 
Although personalisation is often depicted as a utopian, positive vision of users freed 
and empowered, expressed in emotionally resonant, utopian language (Boxall et al, 
2009; Needham 2011), it actually lacks a vision of a collective political project to bring 
about a shift that would allow positive freedoms to be realised. In this sense, 
personalisation stands for nothing other than removing unnecessary restraints on 
individual freedom and allowing individuals to better exercise their choices. 
 It will be recalled that interview participants focused upon challenges such as 
isolation related to cuts to personal budgets, cuts to benefits, and cuts to services they 
depend upon. These cuts are likely to decrease personalisation by restricting choice. To 
a limited extent this means that the narrative of personalisation could provide a 
position from which to critique the cuts. On the other hand, personalisation is not a 
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framework for empowerment which can allow one to understand and mobilise against 
aspects of enforced individualism such as the conditions facing DPOs, the structural 
nature of disablement, or the obstructive ideas which prevent understanding of 
disempowerment and the requirements for coexistence on the basis of equality. For 
these reasons and because of the absence of a vision for a changed society, it can be 
argued that personalisation is unlikely to adequately address positive freedoms, 
despite its rhetorical commitment to doing so. As a result, negative freedoms from 
institutional power may perhaps serve as a fall-back justification for the changes 
promoted as personalisation. In such a case the movement from enforced collectivism 
to enforced individualism would neatly conceptualise the drift of personalisation from 
its original goals, as it becomes a narrative that is primarily against ‘enforced 
collectivism’ but tacitly justifies enforced individualism. It can therefore serve as a self-
limiting agenda for change that limits the imagining of any collective vision beyond the 
good of increased individual autonomy and choice. 
In summary, personalisation is implicated in enforced individualism because by 
concentrating solely on personalising services to individual needs, it holds the danger 
of taking the focus away from the social process of disablement and the policies 
required to overcome it. There are continuities here with earlier developments in 
disability policy, such as the community care reforms of the 1990s. Priestley observed 
of these reforms that the formulation of policy almost exclusively around individual 
needs functions ideologically by ‘masking the collective oppression of disabled people’ 
in such a way that ‘prevents us from discussing the removal of disabling barriers in the 
wider social world’ (1999: 49). Priestley’s point applies well to the present day. Again 
empowerment is claimed through the telling of stories of empowerment through 
individually tailored solutions, while many experience drastically worsening levels of 
isolation and participation. To overturn enforced individualism, it seems that action 
informed by structural and social analyses of disablism is required. 
We saw in the previous chapter how cuts to, and reforms of, support and care 
along with threats to DPOs formed the dominant and overriding theme in many 
interviews. The challenge of enforced individualism is multiple but is driven in great 
part by the removal of funding for support and redistributive benefits. I will turn to this 
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aspect of the overall conjuncture in concluding chapters. In this chapter and the 
previous chapter I hope to have laid bare the inadequacy of the ideas driving disability 
policy and documented some of their effects. In this chapter I have found the 
ideological limitations of enforced individualism at work in the policy narrative of 
personalisation. A one-dimensional and impoverished view of empowerment is 
arguably apparent in the government’s focus on the personalisation of social services. 
By focusing attention on personalising services to individual needs, a divide can be 
created between improvements in the dynamics of individual support relationships 
and other forms of empowerment, redistribution and social justice. Disabling barriers 
are far from exhausted by those tractable through personalisation, and yet this is the 
language through which government almost exclusively chooses to express the 
possibilities of empowerment for disabled people. West (2013) offers some empirical 
evidence in support of this interpretation of personalisation. Her analysis of the 
practice of social workers within a local authority highlights the ideological potency of 
personalisation as social workers continue to deploy the narrative to endow their 
practice with meaning, while they are forced to implement cuts to services and restrict 
service user’s quality of life. In my view this adds weight to my argument that 
personalisation is implicated in challenges of enforced individualism, and is ill 
equipped to foster opposition to growing isolation or challenges to DPOs. 
The Scope of Enforced Individualism 
A possible criticism of the arguments made against personalisation above is that no 
narrative of reform could by itself exhaust the multifaceted challenges of 
disempowerment and empowerment. There is truth to this and personalisation has 
the virtue, as one of many imperfect narratives, of stressing individual empowerment. 
However, I believe I have shown its congruity with the challenges of enforced 
individualism. In the politics of disablement, individual support and politics are 
interpenetrated and an ostensibly empowering narrative such as personalisation has 
to be considered for how fit it is for the task of overturning enforced individualism. 
Before moving on in subsequent chapters to analysis of the positions taken by 
participants in relation to the challenges of enforced individualism, I will first introduce 
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some caveats in acknowledgment of the limits of the arguments presented above. In 
the first instance, it should be noted that, when offering a coherent interpretation of 
trends on a large scale over a long period, it is of necessity that only the most general 
tendencies can be drawn out, meaning details that don’t correspond to the 
interpretation can be obscured. Analytically separating enforced individualism from 
enforced collectivism illuminates shifts in the challenges facing many disabled people, 
but continuities in sources of oppression can be underplayed in a story that 
emphasises discontinuity and rupture from one form of oppression to another. Indeed, 
the risks posed by the desire to control costs and to increase bureaucratic control are 
older than neoliberalism, let alone enforced individualism. 
A related danger is of believing that, if the threat of enforced individualism 
grows, the threat of enforced collectivism will necessarily become more distant. 
However, institutionalisation in large scale residential ‘care’ ‘homes, typical of 
enforced collectivism, remains a reality or a threatened reality for many, and if cost 
constraints become even greater, re-institutionalisation may be considered as the only 
‘realistic’ option within tight spending limits. Therefore, even negative freedoms from 
‘enforced collectivism’ can be threatened when cost considerations and austerity are 
allowed to trump all other arguments. The danger of enforced collectivism should not 
be forgotten even when contemplating the emergence of new challenges. I have tried 
to avoid any downplaying of this form of oppression by arguing that the threat of 
enforced collectivism persists and coexists with enforced individualism rather than 
being replaced by it. Indeed, I have aimed to ground my criticisms in the value base of 
my participants and their commitment to measures which increase the autonomy and 
independence of disabled people and erode enforced collectivism. It is important to 
avoid undermining the very real benefits that can be derived from personal budgets or 
direct payments. Yet it is questionable if personalisation is the way forward through 
this difficult territory, because framing empowerment without due attention to 
structural and collective concerns can undermine the understanding of disablism 
which is necessary as a complement to the focus on individual needs. 
In closing, it can be seen that a shift has occurred from a situation in which 
enforced collectivism was the dominant form of disablism, in which individual rights 
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were overlooked, to one of hegemonic neoliberalism in which enforced collectivism 
coexists with increasingly influential enforced individualism, meaning a limited range 
of individual rights are the only terms in which the empowerment of disabled people is 
understood. In the following chapters we will explore the capacity of differing 




Chapter 7: Participants’ Strategic Positioning 
In the previous chapter I explicated the combination of challenges currently facing 
disabled people, theorising them as enforced individualism and relating them to 
personalisation. I now turn to data concerning how participants strategically 
positioned themselves. In my analysis of participants’ contributions regarding political 
strategy, I analysed the interviews in relation to their views about three key themes. 
Firstly, almost all participants made reference to the influential social model of 
disability. Here participants interpreted events in light of the model or offered varying 
appraisals of the model’s use, in the process offering hints at a range of other positions 
as the model served as a point of differentiation within disability activism. Secondly, 
participants’ contributions tended to fall within more radical or gradualist tendencies. 
These tendencies were related, but not equivalent to, the third theme concerning the 
degree to which participants endorsed protest or professional service provision as the 
appropriate vehicle for opposing disablism. I now turn to the first theme of the social 
model of disability. 
The Social Model of Disability 
Since its formulation in the work of UPIAS (Union of Physical Impaired Against 
Segregation) (1976) and following its subsequent elaboration and extension in the 
work of Oliver (1990), the social model of disability has exerted great influence within 
the British DPM, forming its ‘big idea’ (Hasler, 1993). Even in the view of one of the 
most well-known and vocal critics of the model, Tom Shakespeare, it has the virtues 
that it is ‘simple and direct and effective’ and ‘understandable, memorable and 
relevant’ (2004: 11). Given the prominence of the model within interviews and the 
movement as a whole, it seemed important to gauge the extent to which participants 
endorsed it, not least when the challenges of disablism are significant and resources of 
strategy and critique must be appraised for how well adapted they are for the task at 
hand. The significance of the model in this sense is double, functioning as a tool 
through which activists can analyse the barriers to the inclusion of disabled people and 
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identify disabling social relations, and as a guide to the evaluation of priorities in light 
of this. 
In this section I examine the strategic significance of the social model in 
participants’ accounts. I explore how participants positioned its value as a tool of 
radicalisation; its use to invert individual models of disability; its role as a point of entry 
to the movement; the extent of its influence; and the risk of dogmatism in the way in 
which it can be used. Most activists will not have the time or inclination to read 
academic texts concerning the social model and will primarily be aware of it as the 
means by which a powerful inversion in perspective occurs. This was evident as 
participants described experiences of the shift from viewing intrinsic personal factors 
as the cause of their problems to viewing social forces as their primary cause and how, 
in turn, this helped to challenge their understanding of disablement. 
Using Roger’s account as an example because he exemplifies this view, we can 
see the politicisation and shift in political consciousness that occurred through 
exposure to the model: 
“I suppose it was the introduction to the social model of disability, 
turning the whole traditional notion of disability about the individual 
being broken and how they can be fixed, into a notion that society 
was set up in a way that didn’t include disabled people. So what we 
needed to do was change society, not change ourselves. I suppose 
that was a huge thing to get my head around, that it wasn’t me as an 
individual that was wrong, it was society that was wrong, and 
disabled people coming together; we wanted to change society.” 
Roger neatly encapsulated the core of the model’s power when he said “what we 
needed to do was change society, not change ourselves”. In this phrase he shows how 
the model can be politicising as individuals turn their attention outward from inner 
‘deficiencies’ toward confrontation of the social forces that exclude them. This implies 
a commonality of interests with others facing the same forces, meaning it can be 
politically potent, both as a force for individual politicisation and as a source of 
collective mobilisation. Of further interest is Roger’s comment that “it was a huge 
thing to get my head around”. It can be seen in this remark that, even as a disabled 
person who would later become a prominent activist, Roger did not easily take to the 
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inversion in perspective involved in taking on a social approach to disability. This 
suggests that individual understandings of disability benefit from a deep and ingrained 
hegemonic domination in which they are viewed as the ‘common-sense’ approach to 
disability. As a disabled person, Roger is likely to have been at the intersection of a 
series of individualised discourses of disability that would have been repeatedly 
reinforced as the means by which to understand his situation. The “huge thing” to get 
his “head around” expresses the radical break with, and inversion of, these discourses. 
In many cases this perceptual shift had led to participants undergoing an 
experience of politicisation or consciousness raising. As an example, Rachel described 
the shift in her views that occurred upon exposure to the model at university: 
“One of these guys said to me “stop bleating on, stop worrying about 
things, there’s this thing called the social model” and there’s where I 
learnt that actually it was the barriers that were the problem and 
that there was a whole new identity and culture I guess.” 
In the first sentence of this excerpt reference is made to the need to “stop worrying” 
and the psychological impact of the model is hinted at, as a process by which one turns 
away from inward looking worries to challenging the macro scale social forces of 
disablism that may underpin these worries. Of further note is the second sentence in 
which the model is linked to nothing less than “a whole new identity and culture”. 
Linked in this way to “identity and culture”, we see how the model is an entry point to 
the movement. In analysis of the interview data below I show how the significance of 
the model endures beyond introduction to the model and the initial politicisation that 
follows as seasoned campaigners use it as the departure point for differentiation 
around a number of other key issues. 
To further explore the social model in relation to strategic positions taken, we 
can look at the uses to which the model is put by activists, both as a practical tool and 
as a theoretical construct for understanding the nature of disablism. As noted in 
relation to Roger above, the social model is of use as a tool to expose hegemonic and 
damaging individual understandings of disability that locate the cause of disablism 
within individuals, with regressive consequences for efforts at tackling disablism at a 
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structural level. In this context, it may be that the social model continues to have value 
in exposing the tendency of government policy and rhetoric to frame disability policy 
in individual models of disability. Arguably this tendency is detectable in the trend, 
highlighted by Beverley, for highly personal intrusions during assessments for benefit 
eligibility. In making this criticism, Beverley looked back to the earlier days of the 
movement, showing how unnecessarily intrusive assessments can be critiqued from a 
social model perspective: 
“One of the things that Vic [Finkelstein] said was that with the social 
model of disability, by focusing on society, they wanted to move 
away from this highly intrusive investigation of your own life and 
your own impairment, and today we’re seeing a lot of that, even with 
a computer choosing about someone[…] so to switch the focus and 
to say rather than “lets assess you in small detail to see how much 
you can work” its ”let’s look in all the workplaces and see if they have 
all the provision for people with whatever impairment”. So the social 
model is saying let’s look at the businesses and seeing if anyone with 
an impairment can work there, we’re not looking at each individual 
and the minute details of their lives. So Vic Finkelstein in this 
discussion really struck me with this point, because all of this now, 
there is so much of this hugely intrusive questioning.” 
Here Beverley is suggesting the social model and its earliest proponents continue to 
have relevance for understanding and challenging present day forms of disablism. 
Using the example of adapting workplaces to make them accessible, she deploys the 
social model to highlight the possibilities for change at a more general level than the 
“minute detail” of individual people’s lives. By making this comparison with individual 
models, Beverley’s use of the social model shows the impoverishment of addressing 
the exclusion of disabled people through intrusive evaluations of their capabilities. This 
use of the social model may be important in light of the narrow individualism and even 
potentially victim-blaming tendencies that characterise the ideological component of 
enforced individualism, and arguably underpin the isolation and denial of autonomy 
facing many disabled people. 
A complementary point to Beverley’s was made by David who also uses the 
social model to critique current policy: 
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“I think over the last twenty years a lot the rhetoric is pretty good 
around personalisation, but the political classes have re-
individualised the problem of disability; it’s kind of our fault for being 
disabled, …no social model principles underpinning that…. And one 
other concern is the recent step by Lord Freud to advocate the bio-
psycho-social model when it comes to assessing disabled people and 
their eligibility for benefits.” 
Although David did not specify the means by which disability had been ‘re-
individualised’, this contribution is nevertheless revealing in showing the scope of the 
social model as a frame to interpret the development of policy over the last twenty 
years. It continues to assert an immediate significance in this account as the support of 
an alternative model such as the ‘bio-psycho-social’ model is seen as a concern, 
presumably because it would represent a departure from social approaches to 
disability and a return to an individual approach. Of further note in the excerpt is the 
contrast he draws between the praiseworthy rhetoric of personalisation and a 
negative process of re-individualisation. One might think personalisation is itself a 
process of individualisation, but in David’s account they are opposed to one another.  
Another example of the uses to which the social model was put by participants 
came from Mary, who, as a disabled activist and retired social worker, felt that the 
social model was still largely alien to social workers who exercise power over disabled 
people and are tasked with delivering some of the changes I describe as enforced 
individualism: 
“I was never as convinced that the others [social workers] were as 
committed to the principles of the social model. I don’t think this is 
being unfair, but realistically for most social workers, in those 
working in this field, it’s a job, whereas for myself and the other 
colleague I mentioned had a bit more of a personal, fundamental 
motivation here. Those who didn’t work in this field, other social 
workers, had no idea. And I think even now, some will have heard of, 
and some will understand, to some extent, the principles of the social 
model, but I’m not convinced that they’re committed to it. I think it’s 
quite difficult, unless you’re living it when it becomes an instinctive 
way of viewing the world, as a social worker, most social workers will 
say they have clients who need services, and however empowering 
they want to be, they know that they can’t provide the services their 
client needs and will therefore retreat into a traditional way of 
service provision.” 
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Firstly, we see again an indication of the depth of the shift involved in viewing disability 
from a social model perspective as Mary comments that it is difficult to fully grasp the 
inversion involved without the experience of “living it” as a disabled person. Again the 
social model can be viewed here as an entry point to the movement, ironically forming 
a barrier to entry to those non-disabled people who, it is said, would struggle to grasp 
it. This point also arguably reinforces the case that ingrained individual understanding 
of disability are hard to displace, and confers expertise onto the ‘ordinary’ views of 
disabled people who are able to view events through the prism of the social model. 
This position raises serious questions about the role of (non-disabled) social workers in 
the fight against disablism. If it is accepted that the social model continues to have 
value in opposition to enforced individualism and disablism in general, and that social 
workers tend not to fully grasp or practice the model, the task becomes either to work 
with them to inculcate knowledge of the model, or to consider acting without social 
workers in any opposition to enforced individualism (Sapey and Pearson, 2004). 
From the above examples one gets a sense of the scope and breadth of issues 
to which activists apply the social model. For instance, Rachel argues that it was the 
gateway to a “whole new identity and culture”, while David criticises the last twenty 
years of disability policy as insufficiently informed by “social model principles”. Given 
this extensive application and the extent of continuing disablism, participants wished 
to evaluate the use of the model and its apparent dominance. One possible drawback 
to its dominance is the potential occlusion of other approaches that could be 
complementary. On this topic, David was atypical in suggesting that there is diversity 
of approaches that could be considered in the category of ‘the social model’: 
“It’s maybe important to talk of social models, because, while we all 
agree that society is a social construct, you can have lots of different 
perspectives around that. For example, the work of Ayeesha 
Vernon
39
, and her work around identity – different cultural and 
religious experiences. Or the different ways we view the social 
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model, for example the Swedish social model which argues from 
principles and the British social model which is based on a kind of 
Marxist materialist social struggle approach to viewing society. I think 
it’s important to talk of social models and understand that it’s not a 
fixed entity and different organisations and activists have different 
views on that”. 
In this excerpt David groups a number of eclectic approaches under the category of 
“social models”. This could be valuable in that use of the social model in the UK has 
been criticised for exclusion of experiences of disabled people from minority ethnic 
backgrounds or of women (Vernon, 1998). The assumption of a singular meaning of 
the model could exclude the voices of these groups, many of whom are more likely to 
experience aspects of the threats I have summarised as enforced individualism. 
Furthermore, a more heterogeneous and pluralist social model could have the 
advantage of being less likely to be adopted as a dogma, owing to its multiple 
meanings. On the other hand, much of the potency of the inversion in perspective and 
challenge to individual models described above could be attributable to the intuitive 
and singular meaning usually understood as the ‘social model’. This tension between 
unity and diversity in the movement and in the theorisation of disability is a theme I 
return to in concluding chapters. 
More typical than David’s eclectic view of “social models” is the unitary and 
singular meaning of the term. For example, in Roger’s account, the scope of the model 
is almost seen as complete or exhaustive: 
“We say that all of our work is influenced by and reflective of the 
social model of disability which says that the problem is society is not 
with the individual.” 
Speaking of a DPO, he says that “all” of their work is influenced by the social model. 
Given the complexity and variety of work involved in such an organisation, this says a 
great deal about the variety of ways in which such an apparently simple idea can be 
applied. 
However, if it is applied pervasively and consistently there could be a risk that 
the social model is used inflexibly or even dogmatically. It may be applied beyond its 
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reach as it assumed to be applicable to every aspect of the experience of disability, 
leading to the exclusion of other potentially revealing ideas (this may, of course, be a 
risk with the application of any idea). Indeed, where participants expressed critical 
views regarding the social model, it was never to disagree with its central insight, but 
often to find fault in the ways in which the model was sometimes over-used or applied 
too dogmatically. It was unclear at times if this was thought to be because the model 
lent itself too easily to misguided applications, or was merely the fault of rare and 
over-zealous individuals. When ‘Kate’ noted the dangers of dogmatic applications of 
the social model, she linked it to the psychological process that disabled people 
experience when becoming aware of the model: 
“[T]hese days I worry there are people who have adopted the social 
model as a religion, rather than a tool for understanding stuff, that 
slightly bothers me…so because when you first come across it and 
you relate your impairment to it, including myself, there is that thing 
about a light bulb going off and you re-evaluate your past experience 
and your experience of discrimination and so on and disadvantage, 
and it’s really liberating and I can see why people think ‘god this is 
really important stuff, I’ve got to share it with people.” 
This suggests that the potency and radical break in perspective described above can 
itself develop into a flaw if it is translated into the ‘zeal of the converted’. It is revealing 
that Kate herself is clearly aware of the political utility of the model, explaining her 
own introduction to the model as a “light bulb going off”, but also balances this with a 
worry that it can be adopted as a “religion”. This phrase suggested that awareness and 
adherence to the social model can be used as criteria for inclusion in the movement, 
while ignorance or disavowal of the model could lead to exclusion. If the social model 
is “adopted as a religion” in this way it could drive political unity, but at the expense of 
the inclusion of a wider constituency. 
Following this, Kate invokes Oliver’s (2004) point that the social model is a tool 
and not an all-encompassing theory: 
“[I]t was only ever designed to be a model, I don’t know if you’ve 
read Mike Oliver’s work, but Mike was very clear this was a way of 
describing things in a way that social work students could 
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understand, that’s was all it was, and it’s a way of putting across an 
insight that was developed by the Union of the Physically Impaired 
against Segregation, that what is most keeping people from 
participating in society is social structures that don’t take account of 
your impairment. Because there was a whole industry built up 
around disability equality training and explaining the model to 
people, because some people were very slow to cotton on to it, 
people got a bit kind of religious about it and there are still people in 
the movement who say that if you don’t say that you uphold the 
social model and you agree with the social model, somehow you 
can’t be in our team or our gang.” 
As well as making her point that the model is a tool and that it should not lead to 
sectarianism within the movement, she also linked this to the institutionalisation of 
the movement in “disability equality training”. To illustrate her view that zealous 
attachment to the social model could be counter-productive, Kate gave the example of 
“purists” who insisted upon social model terminology at the expense of political 
alliance: 
“I’m talking about the people who were social model purists. In [X] 
they had a really good CIL, but the local People First group withdrew 
from the local CIL because People First talks about ‘people with 
disabilities’, that’s what they say because they’re People First. The 
Social Model purist would say you talk about disabled people 
because it’s a political category, and the chair of this CIL told off the 
People First
40
 representative for talking about people with 
disabilities, and you think ‘how stupid can you be?’, here’s someone 
who’s self-defining, who’s got a learning disability, who doesn’t 
understand your very nice distinction between the two things you’re 
talking about anyway, and you’re telling them off for speaking up in 
your meeting, you know, how crass can you get, but not surprisingly, 
the local People First withdrew from the CIL” 
Taken in combination with accounts of the radicalising impact of the model, the 
danger of purism implies a tension between the political utility of the model, and the 
possibility that some will become overly attached to the model, resulting in division, 
when alliance is likely needed to effectively oppose disablism. This may particularly be 
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the case with groups who do not as readily identify with a social model analysis such as 
people with mental health needs (Anderson et al, 2012). 
Notwithstanding this criticism, I found that whilst there was generally strong 
support for the value of the social model, there was little sign of dogmatism. However, 
in one case a degree of the inflexibility that Kate complains of may have been evident. 
‘Peter’ seemed to assume that he had ‘correctly’ interpreted the social model, 
meaning that he could advise on the ‘right way’ to represent oneself or point out that 
some long-standing activists do not grasp the implications of the social model fully: 
“Every time I raise the social model, people that aren’t aware of it 
can find things offensive, there are organisations we’ve worked with 
through the coalition, and if you point out that despite their ethos, 
they’re probably using the wrong terms, or representing themselves 
the wrong way and not getting the most out of their community, 
people tend to think you have a personal agenda against them. I’m a 
bit pedantic when it comes to language anyway, so I do have to be a 
bit careful. But then again as someone once said to me, if you’re not 
offending those individuals and they don’t know the difference then 
what’s the point, because what amazes me is some of these people, 
disabled people themselves, who have been in the industry longer 
than I have, they have less of an understanding of what the social 
model is or what it tends to advocate.” 
Peter realises that he may cause offence by correcting people’s use of terminology, but 
had clearly weighed this up against the value of spreading what he considers to be 
valuable principles of the social model. This type of approach could conflict with Kate’s 
concerns regarding “sterile debates about meanings of meanings” that can alienate 
potential allies. 
Of those to raise doubts about the social model, Kate was unusual in endorsing 
a ‘Fabian’ belief in the value of incremental, gradual social progress. It was intriguing 
that the other main voices to criticise the social model came from those participants 
affiliated to DPAC, who differed from a Fabian approach in supporting a form of 
disability rights activism that overlapped with anti-capitalist or socialist politics. In the 
case of an affiliate of DPAC, ‘Victor’, his revolutionary politics is clear and gives him 
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reason to question why the social model has not been more closely linked to ‘social 
transformation’: 
“[O]ne of the problems for me with what seems to have happened 
with the social approach or social model is that, although it feels like 
it’s always been placed in a Marxist context, and understanding of 
capitalism and its role in creating disability oppression and 
discrimination, what’s never been a part of the social model is an 
explicit linkage to a rejection of a gradualist, reformist change of 
society, to being absolutely associated with a socialist transformation 
of society and a revolutionary perspective.” 
For Victor, the drawbacks of the model are almost the opposite of Kate’s view. Where 
Kate worried it could become dogmatic, Victor was concerned that it had become 
untethered to its historical-materialist roots, proving too flexible and adaptable to a 
variety of political ends. Later in the interview, however, Victor sought to moderate his 
opinion, noting that the social model had to be acceptable to a wide enough variety of 
people to take hold in their consciousness, albeit again ultimately linking it to the need 
for a revolutionary transformation of society. 
“[Y]ou have to be careful about how you put ideas forward because 
you want them to become generalised and supported by as broad a 
layer as possible, but it becomes a problem when the social model 
becomes accepted by government departments like the DOH, when 
its accepted Life Chances
41
, when at the same time that department 
it’s part of is involved in deconstructing disability rights, and I think 
that that is fundamentally a problem and a weakness of that 
approach in the sense of how it can be used in that way, and I think 
the problem is that because it has evolved in that way as essentially a 
reformist idea and not linked to socialist transformation, in effect an 
idea that could be a revolutionary idea, that points to a truth of 
discrimination, oppression and social barriers, what it hasn’t pointed 
to and in some ways has become a barrier to, is that you can only 
remove those barriers by changing society along socialist lines.” 
Although he argues that it needs to become as “generalised” as possible, its mutability 
had proven to be a weakness as it had evolved into a “reformist” idea that could not 
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ultimately overcome the most stubborn disabling barriers. It seems at times that he 
goes further than other participants in criticism of the idea of the social model itself, 
rather than those who distort it, when he comments that it is “fundamentally a 
problem and a weakness of that approach” that it can be co-opted by other agendas. 
On the other hand, he describes it as what “could be a revolutionary idea, that points 
to a truth of discrimination” suggesting that he may think the blame lies with the 
reformist political forces for misusing or distorting the model, rather than the nature 
of the model itself. 
Members of DPAC such as Victor are prominent within current protests against 
the damaging impacts of austerity on disabled people, and in the face of new threats 
to disabled people, there was some sense among these participants that the social 
model had been found wanting, perhaps accounting for Victor’s criticisms. In the case 
of ‘James’ this was clearer as he balanced his experience of the social model’s 
importance with his view of its limitations: 
“It’s been the cornerstone of everything I believe in, and the social 
model I don’t believe actually goes far enough; it should be a starting 
point not an end point; it was a model that was created forty years 
ago now and the disabled movement and the disabled community 
has moved forward and I don’t believe that we’re still using a model 
now that is adequate. It could become as inadequate as the medical 
model is, we need to develop that and move forward as a group and 
a society […] There aren’t inadequacies but I just think that it needs 
to be developed a bit more around the community that we’re living 
in now, and it’s okay to just say ‘remove the barriers’ but we do need 
some more work on how to do that as a community really.” 
Going as far as to say it had been the “cornerstone” of his beliefs, James found reason 
to doubt that the model continued to be adequate to the task of undoing disablism. 
The extent to which the model continues to be adequate to the task of identifying and 
facilitating mobilisation against disablism is a key question and one I return to in later 
chapters. Saying that the social model should be a “starting point” and that it needed 
to be developed suggests he felt it had become static and in need of updating. He was 
less clear about how this might happen, but stressed that “removing the barriers” was 
necessary, only questioning how this could occur. 
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Summarising participant views regarding the social model, we can see that they 
concerned its value as a tool of radicalisation; its use to invert individual models of 
disability; its role as a point of entry to the movement; and the extent of its influence 
and the risk of dogmatism in the way in which it can be used. In the following section 
of analysis, I develop this analysis further by exploring broader radical and gradualist 
tendencies within participants’ accounts. Concluding this section and referring to 
discussion in later chapters, it is important to see that the merits of the social model 
should be weighed against available alternative perspectives. When activists dispense 
with the social model or supplement it with additional analytical resources, it cannot 
be assumed that the alternative perspectives used will be more useful or cogent. It 
was noteworthy that participants did not mention other models or theories or 
revisions to the social model in gaining insight into disability. Although disability 
studies has developed a variety of other theoretical approaches to disability in the last 
twenty years, participants did not draw on them in their accounts. This will be 
important to recall in concluding chapters when a closer look will be taken at the 
merits and drawbacks of the social model and those of available alternatives from 
disability studies. 
Radical and Gradual Tendencies in the Movement 
In this section I describe and explain the positions taken by participants in relation to 
activism. In doing so I will explore participant views concerning the relationship of 
disablism to capitalism, the value of single issue political engagement, the need for 
compromise, and the value of alliances. During my analysis it initially seemed that 
participants could be grouped into two broad positions, reflecting a bifurcation 
between what I have called ‘radical’ and ‘gradual’ tendencies. These approximated to 
the classic ‘reform or revolution?’ division within political movements (Luxemburg, 
1999). By this I mean, in the case of the ‘radical’ tendency, to advocate revolutionary 
or socialist politics, understanding disablism as a consequence of shortcomings of 
capitalism, and a belief in the need to work with broader groups in society to create 
change. By ‘gradual’ I mean the tendency to advocate incremental progress through 
compromise, accommodating a degree of undesirable change, and prizing what is 
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perceived to be possible over what is seen as ideal or naïve. I will further discuss the 
adequacy of descriptions of ‘radical’ and ‘gradual’ positions in chapter eight. 
The positions of participants might be seen as existing along a continuum of 
radicalism-gradualism, rather than requiring that one belong exclusively to one camp 
or the other. At one end of the spectrum, factors particular to disability could be 
subordinated to a wider critique of the economic model which guides current 
government policy in general. At the other end of the spectrum, participants expressed 
critiques of disablism in terms of absolute rights or morality, and economics was 
attributed little casual power or, alternatively, discussed as if it were a natural or pre-
given force, divorced from the wider field of social relations. To substantiate these 
positions I give some indicative examples of each. 
Radical perspectives were typified by affiliates of DPAC. For example, in the 
following excerpt, Victor makes an economically informed critique of austerity and 
argues that the DPM has failed to adequately understand and reject the austerity 
agenda: 
“The thing about austerity though is that there’s criticism of the 
European approach to austerity from people like Krugman
42
 who 
agree with the reduction in the welfare state but they don’t agree 
with the contraction of the economies, and they argue for more 
stimulus. Now in the disabled people’s movement we’ve not even 
argued for more stimulus or put forward the argument that if you 
meet people’s rights and give low paid people jobs, they’re going to 
spend all their money and encourage growth, they’re not just going 
to sit on it like rich people who don’t need to spend it and can put it 
offshore. So we haven’t’ even got involved in debates like that.” 
Here Victor is linking the fate of disabled people under austerity to that of the 
economy in general, arguing that higher spending on disabled people’s needs would 
inject demand into the economy and boost growth. The relevance to a dichotomy of 
radical-gradualism is that disablism is placed within an economic framework, and as 
we see below, in Victor’s case a critique of capitalism itself. Interviewees such as Victor 
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linked the failure to grasp the economic issues and their relation to disablism to the 
limitation of parts of the movement that view the problem of disablism as single issue: 
“[T]he problem then is that you have a whole generation of disabled 
people in Britain who….come to a radical idea through a single issue; 
they obviously argue for the removal of discrimination, the removal 
of social barriers, right to independent living, and to be part of 
mainstream society, but ultimately what prevents that absolute 
ability to take part in mainstream society is the way that society is 
structured. In a capitalist society that is structured along class lines, 
along inequality, so in effect whilst there have been improvements to 
disabled people’s access to public buildings and to education for the 
more intellectual of us, the social position of disabled people has not 
fundamentally altered in the last twenty five years, and you could 
argue has even got worse.” 
Victor’s position here is that disablism cannot be overcome without reference to the 
bigger picture of a society structured “along class lines”. He is convinced that the 
“social position” of disabled people has not improved owing to a failure to address the 
class based nature of our society. 
Without necessarily sharing a support of anti-capitalist politics, there was some 
support among other participants for a critique of single issue engagement. For 
example, Roger also regretted the tendency for more superficial engagement, 
although for him ‘single issue’ had an even more restricted definition as engagement 
with one aspect of the disability movement‘s struggle at a time: 
“Well I suppose the whole political scene has changed a lot in the last 
twenty years, not just in the disabled people’s movement…. I think 
people now tend not to get involved in political organisations, they 
tend to get involved in individual campaigns, and that’s what we find 
now, whereas people in the past would be involved in an 
organisation and go from campaign to campaign and support that 
organisation in their work. People tend to cherry pick now and when 
we recruit, or try and tell people that this is an issue that’s going to 
affect you. Whether its ILF being cut or whether its changes to 
incapacity benefit or DLA, or the medical assessment that’s being 
carried out by ATOS, it’s very much an individual basis now and I 
suppose it’s a very individualist society. I still believe sort of in that 
collective identity and collective voice, but that’s less recognised now 
I think.” 
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In this excerpt, Roger links engagement that is limited to issues that directly affect the 
individual disabled person to wider shifts in society toward a more individualistic 
culture in which common interests are asserted less often. For those of a similar 
‘radical’ view to Victor, the relation of disablism to class dynamics suggest a 
commonality of interests with others to suffer from class division. From this 
perspective, the particular struggle of disabled people must be joined with the struggle 
of others, which is difficult if disabled people cannot coalesce into a unified movement 
of their own. In the case of participants involved with DPAC, a belief in alliance 
resulted in an endorsement of participation within broad, socialist coalitions with the 
objective of reversing austerity to the collective benefit of a constituency wider than 
disabled people alone. Following from this, ‘James’, also a member of DPAC described 
coordination with trade unions as becoming more “aware”, implying this was a sign of 
growing maturity and potential as an organisation: 
“It’s something that DPAC is managing, is becoming a lot more 
politically aware again getting the public on our side, because it’s the 
old adage ‘united we stand, divided we fall’ and the more people and 
organisations we can get supporting us, and us supporting them, 
that’s why I believe the TUC thing is so important, the attitude that 
we as disabled people must become part of the bigger picture, rather 
than isolating ourselves and our individual problems” 
For James, the need for broad-based coalitions and working with the labour movement 
followed from the need to gain mass support for the cause of disabled people and 
against a range of other forms of oppression. He argues that failing to take such an 
approach can lead to parochial and limiting politics or, in his terms, “isolating ourselves 
and our individual problems”. This latter phrase could be seen as mirroring the 
isolation that I identified as an aspect of enforced individualism. 
Another aspect of radical tendencies was evident in James’ account of the 
importance of cooperation with trade unions: 
“[I]t’s very important, not just for the disabled movement but more 
so for the trade union movement to identify the issues around 
disability and I think that a lot of unions are realising that disabled 
groups are not segregated, they no longer see us as us and them, I 
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mean you can become disabled at any time, after all the highest 
percentage of disabled people are the elderly and if you’re lucky 
we’re all going to become old, so we’re all going to become less 
physically able to do things or have less mental capacity to 
understand that. So we are all basically, it’s no longer us and them, 
its society as a whole that has to take up the issues around the 
disabled community.” 
Arguing for the importance of trade unions understanding disability issues, he is 
arguing for a unity or even identity of purpose with trade unions. For James, this 
follows from the ubiquity of potential impairment and the need for “society as a 
whole” to come to grips with the threat of disablism. 
At the gradualist end of the spectrum, it was not that cooperation was rejected; 
more that disability issues were not seen as inextricably linked to class politics or wider 
constituencies and thus different forms of cooperation were seen as legitimate. In 
contrast to more radically inclined participants, those involved in professional work 
within DPOs, tended to be concerned with the immediate problems of those the 
organisation represented and worked with, rather than political struggles shared with 
other groups. Therefore, those working in DPOs tended more often to be disposed 
towards the gradualist tendency. The radical and gradual tendencies are related, but 
not equivalent to, the degree to which campaigning and protest are valued over the 
value of service provision. This is hard to demonstrate explicitly through excerpts of 
interview data, but it was discernible through the omission of topics of protest or 
campaigning by those invested in service providing organisations. As an illustrative 
example, when ‘Andrew’ was asked to comment upon his priorities, he responded in 
terms of the further development of DPOs and empowerment of individual disabled 
people: 
“[O]ur priorities at the moment apart from keeping going is to work 
and put in everything we can into creating more DPULOS [Disabled 
People’s User-Led Organisations] and helping more disabled people 
to become empowered so much that they can see the point of 
forming user-led organisations or other vehicles that can enable 
them to live an independent lifestyle of their choice, be that a social 
enterprise, be that a non-profit making CIC, whatever it might be, so 
we’re putting this much energy into creating more that are like us 
basically and we think that will be good for the marketplace.” 
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This shows a difference with the ‘radical’ tendency which considers the highest priority 
to be involvement in coalitions and in protest. A key difference is the extent to which 
the roots or origins of disablism are seen to be addressed or if greater stress is put 
onto immediate gains that can be made for DPOs and disabled people within the terms 
of the current “marketplace” of care and support. The notion of the “marketplace” or 
‘market’ is itself of significance in that it can signify political allegiance through the 
extent to which one endorses, rejects or acquiesces to a capitalist market as the 
framework in which provision of support occurs. This is a crucial point of 
differentiation between radical and gradualist tendencies. 
This is again arguably evident in the case of Liz, who, rather than focusing on 
addressing the inequities or assumptions built into the economy, accepts it to a 
degree, commenting: 
“You know, whether we like it or not, disability support has to be 
paid for, and it’s a pot of money that can be cut.” 
On one level this statement is completely uncontroversial, but underlying it appears to 
be an assumption that expenditure on disabled people is an unrecoverable cost rather 
than an investment. Within this framework, the task becomes one of appealing on the 
grounds of a cost-benefit analysis, rather than working through protest to change the 
terms of the debate. 
A similar attitude was expressed by Mary, who again assumed relatively narrow 
parameters within which the struggle against disablism must unfold: 
“We’re talking about a country in billions of pounds of deficit and a 
fairly strong Tory government which says ‘we’re going to cut 
welfare’”. 
Framing the terms of the struggle within the terms of deficit, she seems to accept the 
importance of this metric, implicitly accepting the necessity of deficit reduction above 
other objectives. This perspective still allows for a variety of means of achieving deficit 
reduction such as increasing taxation rather than reducing expenditure on disabled 
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people, but a ‘radical’ perspective might differ on the importance of even addressing 
the deficit in the short to medium term. 
Even if radical perspectives might differ from these in their way of viewing 
these situations, it is notable that even these gradualist views relate the struggles of 
disabled people to economic fluctuations. In this respect the differences between 
gradual and radical positions could be quite nuanced, referring to the response to a 
commonly understood problem. Those from either perspective could not fail to see 
how the fate of disabled people was linked to the economy. Roger who worked full-
time in a DPO and was primarily concerned with how best to run his organisation, 
explained this point using the example of scapegoating that he sees as accompanying 
economic downturns: 
“Various campaign groups are aware of the scapegoating tendencies 
that any time we enter an economic crisis or a downturn in the 
economy, that politicians and the media are looking for someone to 
blame. You know, yesterday it might have been single parents, today 
it might be immigrants, and tomorrow it’ll be disabled people, and 
the politicians and the press are sometimes working in tandem and 
together on this” 
Although Roger and others shared with the radical tendency an analysis of the 
economic origins of current problems, they tended to part ways on the implications of 
this. For instance, when radicalism might demand no compromises during an attack on 
disabled people’s autonomy and wellbeing, gradualism might insist on the need to 
compromise on goals of the movement in order to succeed in having others accepted. 
Where the radical tendency would be less compromising and more oppositional, 
contributions such as Kate’s assumes the necessity of compromise: 
“[I]n order to get a broad enough coalition to get your ideas through, 
you have to compromise on a number of things … Now every time 
you do that, you do lose something, so you have to think 
pragmatically, if you’re a Fabian like me, about whether you’re losing 
stuff you’d die in a ditch for or not, and on the whole, it was worth 
getting what we got, and I think that’s partly the influence of a 
lobbyist is that you have to see which way the wind if shifting and see 
how far you can push people. You should always try and get a bit 
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further, but sometimes you have to accept that if you push too far 
you get people turning off.” 
As a self-identified activist, Kate is not pleased to compromise on anything the 
movement campaigns for, but she considers it important to gauge what is ‘realistic’ 
and ‘pragmatic’ and what can be compromised upon. This suggests a particular mind-
set that takes account of “which way the wind blows”, which can be opposed to a less 
accommodating and more oppositional approach that could be positioned by those 
like Kate as naïve and unrealistic. Tactically, for Kate, it was important not to be overly 
oppositional and to remain palatable to vested interests that had the power to block 
progress toward greater rights for disabled people. This is apparent in an account she 
gave of a previous campaign: 
“[T]here were some parts of the charitable sector that were just 
really unhelpful to us, and we had to sort of head them off at the 
pass as well and also overcome the resistance in local government to 
what they thought was an outrageous idea, you know ‘how can 
people with learning difficulties possibly take, how can older people 
with dementia possibly take charge’ and so we had a lot of work to 
do on lobbying. I also of course had to keep our own core support 
happy, because as you’re negotiating through a legislative process, 
inevitably there are compromises, and there were some people 
within the movement, who had a very clear idea of what they wanted 
and that any deviation from that was a betrayal and that we’d go 
backwards and never get what we wanted, like sort of purism. So 
there was a lot of stuff about how do you keep your core support on 
board.” 
Here it is suggested that those in the movement with power or influence need to 
balance the idealism of more radical elements with the ‘art of the possible’ in political 
lobbying. This endows those to make these judgments with a certain degree of power 
and leadership, and assumes expertise to judge what constitutes ‘realism’, ‘purism’, 
‘pragmatism’ and ‘idealism’. As with the notion of a market of service provision, these 
terms can serve as important signifiers around which radical and gradualist tendencies 
attribute differing rendering and value judgments. Use of these terms by participants 
suggests a conscious awareness of these tendencies and the need to locate themselves 
184 
in relation to them, perhaps hoping to distance themselves from accusations of ‘selling 
out’ or of political naivety. 
Having provided some examples of tendencies for radical or gradual 
approaches, a note of caution should be raised. By drawing out a contrast between 
radical and gradualist positions, it is important to consider the risk of positing polarised 
positions that are unreflective of the way in which activists really position their activity. 
In practice, participants seemed to recognise that different positions may be valuable 
in different situations. By using the term ‘tendency’ to describe radical and gradualist 
contributions within interviews, I try to avoid them being seen as fixed, absolute or 
mutually exclusive positions. They are positions people adopt rather than categories of 
people, although certain participants were more or less likely to adopt one or another. 
To view the tendencies as fixed in this way would be misleading as participants would 
move back and forth between more radical and gradual arguments. To use an 
example, Rachel described how she could combine what might be termed a gradualist 
approach with the more radical work of protestors to maximise each other’s impact: 
“[W]hat we did at that time was help with a policy voice, so we tried 
to take what the issues were for DAN [Direct Action Network], not in 
any formal way, but we used our spare time to when we weren’t 
doing formal work to try to improve things. So, for example, DAN 
would say the [……..] building is not accessible; they’d do a protest, 
and then we’d go in and try to do the development work and develop 
an access plan with them to try to make the building more 
accessible[…] It wasn’t anything formalised, and then in our spare 
time we’d go protest and stuff, but it was difficult when you’d have a 
vigil outside the council building for someone who had died of 
neglect and then you were in the council building a couple of days 
negotiating a contract, it was not an easy path to tread.” 
Through this example she warns against a simplistic opposition of these positions and 
suggests a rich strategic alliance that involves complementary use of skills and tactics. 
Applying these labels to individuals can be misleading because individuals can make 
surprising arguments, such as individuals in more ‘gradualist’ professional roles calling 
for greater protest. On the other hand, in her reference to the difficulty of protesting 
against and cooperating with her local council, Rachel says it was “not an easy path to 
tread”, suggesting some tensions between these roles and offering some validation of 
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the analytic distinction I have created. Arguably offering further validation of the 
distinction is the fact that Rachel was alone in offering an account like this of 
combining radicalism and gradualism within a short space of time. The movement 
between the tendencies and the tensions between them may reflect a deeper 
structural issue. This issue is one of the need to carry out incremental work required to 
facilitate independence and dismantle disablism, while balancing this with the risk of 
working within and endorsing structures of disablism. This leads into the next section 
concerning the degree to which protest or service provision are seen as the 
appropriate vehicle for opposing disablism. 
The Role of Protest and Service Provision within the Movement 
It is possible to see some of the tensions between radicalism and gradualism played 
out in participants’ views about the role of protest and provision of services for 
disabled people by DPOs. In making their points on this subject, participants referred 
to an apparent decline in campaigning, and the impact on the activities of the 
movement of entering into competitive procurement environments and relationships 
of dependency with local authorities. 
Among participants there was a degree of unanimity that there had been a 
decline in the influence of the campaigning vigour of the movement over recent years 
and since the high profile work of the Direct Action Network (DAN) in the nineteen 
nineties. Referring to this period, participants’ with a long history in the movement 
spoke of simultaneous work within campaigning and in CILs as parts of a larger whole 
of movement activity. In that time there appeared to be a greater unity of purpose 
between these twin functions within the movement, as greater reference was made to 
simultaneous work within both. Vera gave an example of her organisation: 
“[I]n our day we were one of the biggest disabled people’s 
organisations in the country because we, I mean, it was basically set 
up because we wanted to campaign, that was for sure, but also, 
services for disabled people were very very poor in [………..], so rather 
than wait around for other people to set up services, we thought well 
we’ll establish them ourselves.” 
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This shows a clear unity of campaigning and service provision. For reasons I explore 
below there is a lesser degree of unity now, and this is thought to have resulted in a 
decline in campaigning. The significance attributed to this did not necessarily 
correspond to the background and/or role of the participant. For example, those in full 
time positions within DPOs and not involved with current campaigning were quite 
likely to complain of the decline in campaigning activity. For example, ‘Robert’, who 
worked in a large DPO, said that he had no involvement in protesting on the streets in 
decades, but recalled that: 
”I’ve heard people say it’s [protest] lost its way a little bit, and in a 
sense I think what really gets things moving is when people are angry 
about something and it starts to motivate them to direct action. I 
gave a talk last week and showed a few slides from the nineties of 
different things that we were involved in that were getting us angry 
at the time… until the recent lot of welfare reforms came along, 
there’s almost been a bit of apathy around it, but I understand that’s 
really motivating people.” 
In this contribution, Robert offers a more positive note on the recent upturn in protest 
related to government policy. In contrast, Beverley was less convinced that an 
adequate challenge would be offered to the poor conditions faced by many disabled 
people: 
“To me there is an absence. You know who is saying that adults are 
having to go to bed at seven o’clock
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, who is saying that? And yet 
that will be all the disabled people in our estate who are using the 
agency. I don’t think there is enough exposure because there aren’t 
the organisations that were exposing these kind of things.” 
This view more closely typified those of other participants than the more hopeful view 
of Robert. For Beverley protest and campaigning is having little impact in her locality as 
those in her estate cope with a poor service from a private sector care agency. She 
links this to an absence of organisations that can raise the profile of such issues and 
finds this an unfortunate comparison to her more radical past in the movement. 
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 Beverley explained elsewhere that no care agencies serving her area would provide support any later 
than seven o’clock. 
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Beverley’s views on the level of campaigning seemed to characterise most 
interviewees who tended to feel that the response to shifting conditions of disablism 
had been inadequate. Referring directly to current threats, Victor argued that the 
implications of the decline in campaigning vigour of the movement were prominent 
and high profile elements of the movement had been found wanting in their response 
to current threats: 
“The shame with the UKDPC is that on the eleventh of May 2011, 
there’s about five thousand disabled people in its supporters… in 
about ‘88 in London, that demonstration because it was radical and 
rights based and it put forward a perspective that a lot of disabled 
people hadn’t heard before it won a lot of hearts and minds. Now in 
2011, the UKDPC had an opportunity to win hearts and minds again 
but in much bigger numbers, and it had an opportunity to call for 
organisations to join it and affiliate to it, but it didn’t do any of that, it 
had a rally at the beginning but not at the end. So there was an 
opportunity there for the movement to reinvigorate itself, to refresh 
itself, but it failed and in effect it largely went through the motions 
on the day; I think it knew along with the charities that it had to do 
something because there was a lot of anger with the austerity 
policies.” 
Victor’s views here correspond to many in regretting the level of opposition to 
austerity, but he goes further than other participants in specifically finding fault with 
the organisational capabilities of the United Kingdom Disabled People’s Council 
(UKDPC). He indicates an untapped potential in this national organisation, noting that 
it had five thousand supporters in 2011 and contrasts its lack of subsequent success 
with the ‘radical’ and ‘rights based approach’ of the movement in the nineteen 
eighties, suggesting these qualities are now lacking in the influential UKDPC. This he 
links to the need for the organisation to be refreshed and reinvigorated, implying that 
it is an ossified organisation that is incapable of responding to the “anger” of disabled 
people with “austerity policies”. 
This contribution falls towards the ‘radical’ end of the spectrum of 
contributions, seeming to profess the need for a rejection of the most prominent parts 
of the movement because they were perceived to have become too accommodating to 
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attacks on disabled people’s standard of living. However, as noted above, the decline 
in protest was noted widely in interviews and not just by those of radical views. 
A common account of the decline in protest centred on the entry of DPOs into 
a procurement environment in which they had to compete with other organisations, 
and even each other, for tenders awarded by councils who can leverage influence over 
them. In a general sense there was a feeling among some participants that adapting to 
this environment meant that values of solidarity and collective action could be 
compromised as organisations orientated themselves to the need to gain contracts to 
survive. For Mary this had been discernible in her own time working with DPOs since 
the nineteen eighties: 
“Again it’s competing. Certainly in the early nineteen nineties there 
was a feeling of collaboration, but it’s now all about competing and it 
sets organisations against each other.” 
This absence of collaboration could damage the possibility of concerted political action 
arising from the traditional sources of CILs or DPOs. Mary herself made this link, citing 
how collaboration had given rise to perceived successes of the movement such as 
direct payments and anti-discrimination legislation in the past: 
“Those sorts of organisations, they helped create a coming together 
of people with a variety of impairments, and the whole lobbying and 
achieving of anti-discrimination legislation and then direct payments, 
I think that in the working towards those achievements, there was 
more cooperation and participation together.” 
In these cases we see how the individual empowerment of disabled people had come 
out of collective mobilisation and collaboration. Elsewhere, James related a similar 
insight into the division that could grow from an exclusive focus on service provision: 
“My experience of disabled people and their organisations is they 
have become very protective of their patches and of what they’re 
doing.” 
For James this can be destructive to the pursuit of the goals of the movement, or in his 
terms: 
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“Basically getting lots of organisations working together and not to 
be worrying about the minutiae of detail rather than the overview of 
the situation.” 
The phrase “overview of the situation” implies an overview can be discerned that 
reveals the common strategic interests of disabled people in general. Taken as a 
whole, the contributions of Mary and James might suggest that “competing” and an 
absence of “collaboration” and defensiveness over one’s “patch” could prevent 
disabled activists involved in these organisations from addressing the broader 
situation. They were not attacking these people but suggesting that institutionally and 
structurally a bias had been built-in towards competition and against collaboration in 
political protest. 
A related issue that could serve to divide political protest from service provision 
is the possibility that local authorities can leverage influence over DPOs when they 
have financial power over them. As a former employee of such an organisation, James 
expressed this in the language of “control” being lost over the organisation: 
“[W]hen it stays political it’s much easier for disabled people to keep 
control of it, but once it becomes service led, because we’re then 
talking about service level agreements, we’re talking about where 
they’ll get their funding from, and I know that the one I worked with, 
disabled people lost control of the situation because the people who 
were giving the finance were setting down far too many stipulations 
around what they wanted, rather than disabled people, so therefore 
disabled people and the disabled community lost control of it, and 
once than happens it becomes a puppet of the local authority and 
able-bodied people….the local authority saw it as something they 
could control for their benefit rather than the benefit of the 
community, and the local social services wanted to have far too much 
control over it and its policies and they felt because they held the 
purse strings they could dictate the policies of the organisation, and 
once that happened I decided I could no longer be involved and had 
to leave the organisation.” 
Initially James describes organisations that stay ‘political’ as easier for disabled people 
to retain control over. This circumscribes a fairly narrow definition of ‘political’ as 
other than service provision, presumably referring to direct action, campaigning and 
protest. Other disabled people might argue that service provision by and for disabled 
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people and securing disable people’s rights in practice is a form of political practice, 
although it involves difficult relationships that have to be negotiated with local 
authorities. Contrasting being “political” with being “service-led” James clearly felt the 
price paid for gaining financial support were too great. Whether other activists accept 
this or not, there is clearly a difficult balancing act to be drawn between preserving 
autonomy and protest and having a presence in the provision of services to disabled 
people. 
This influence of local authorities over DPOs was referred to in other 
interviews. Rachel gave some insight into the power dynamics at work. In her 
contributions it seemed as if the relationship between DPOs and local authorities could 
lead to a strategic position of ‘forced gradualism’ as the functions of DPOs can be 
shaped by their relations with their funders: 
“I would say most of the ULOs and CILs throughout the country, more 
than fifty per cent of their income comes from one local authority or 
one health authority, and that’s a huge risk because the levels of 
pressure that the local authority can bear on you; to tell you not to 
campaign; to deliver a bit of a service that you really don’t want to 
deliver, because they need that met; or to not have a part of a 
service that you think is really important because they fund you, is 
really difficult.” 
Using her knowledge of the national scene, Rachel shows that this is a common issue, 
and is likely to be a consideration in the strategic positions taken by those in many 
DPOs. It seems likely that whilst local authorities may not directly interfere, the 
perceived preferences of the local authorities indirectly influence the behaviour of 
DPOs
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. Again this is a matter of institutional constraints and not a criticism of DPOs, 
who, as Rachel points out, may “need” the safety net of funding from a local authority 
to survive. 
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 For a more extensive discussion of the constraints on political activity of DPOs, and a discussion of the 
extent to which they engage in direct action and protest, see Barnes and Mercer (2006). In their 
research it was found that most DPOs ‘regarded political campaigning as central to their aims and 
objectives although this was interpreted in different ways’ (2006: 156), as some supported proactive 
campaigning and others a ‘behind the scenes’ approach. 
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This dynamic interacts with the effects of austerity as the requirements for 
funding become more tightly constrained and only the core functions of DPOs, if 
anything, are likely to be supported by local authorities. This was apparent in Mary’s 
contribution of when she explained how the scope of local lobbying by the CIL had 
been limited: 
“A: You have to be very careful when you’re lobbying, so for example 
the CIL locally will lobby but only on direct issues such as service 
provision issues. So there was an issue two or three years ago when 
the local council just messed up service provision in a huge way and 
the CIL were quite active in lobbying against that, and helped to 
achieve a positive outcome, 
Q: So that would now be prohibited? 
A: Yeah by terms and conditions, for example if funding is given to 
support an organisation like a CIL, which is tied usually to providing 
services, if any political activity is to happen then there needs to be a 
source of funding which is separate from local authority or 
government funding.” 
Being ‘careful’ in this account might be read uncharitably as being quietist or being 
silenced. She explains how recent changes mean that effective lobbying is less 
tolerated by governmental funders. Such functions could be viewed as entirely 
legitimate given that disabled people are disempowered in many ways. Mary would 
seem to support such a reading as she notes that a “positive outcome” of prior 
lobbying would no longer be possible, as protest is limited by the “terms and 
conditions” stipulated by funders. 
Among contributions at the gradualist end of the spectrum, shifts away from 
protest and toward a greater inclination to professional involvement in service 
provision and consultation was, in a small number of cases, framed in more positive 
terms. This approach assumed that if one ignored the need for efficient and effective 
service provision, the source of DPOs vitality could evaporate. Rachel put it thus: 
“[W]e’d had UK Disabled People’s Council, BCODP as it was then, but 
you’d never really got a chance to sit and look at business and look at 
what worked and what didn’t in terms of service delivery […] I saw 
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quite a lot of ULOs and CILs. At the time there were the DIALS, the 
disability information advice lines which have since folded, the CILS 
and the ULOS, and out of all of those the ULOs were the most flexible 
and the most locally based and fastest in responding to new things 
[…] they were generally smaller and more nimble on their feet and a 
bit more efficient.” 
In this contribution, Rachel is seen to prize ‘efficiency’, ‘flexibility’ and 
‘responsiveness’. These terms are synonymous with success in a competitive market. 
In the previous chapter, we encountered the controversial nature of ULOs, and in this 
passage they are seen as a progression from DIALs and CILs due to their capability to 
act flexibly and efficiently. Thus the more overtly political CILs are seen as more 
backward, inflexible and inefficient by implication. This did not seem to be consistent 
with everything that Rachel argued, and this variation in her account might hint at how 
individuals adopt differing positions in order for their organisation to survive, and in 
their capacity as activists, that they retain integrity and political conviction. 
In a contribution from David a similar point is made to Rachel’s in which 
changes from older organisations and a decline in overt protest might be seen as a 
growth in maturity and influence as DPOs gain a greater voice in policy formation: 
“Now, I’d say the difference between Derbyshire Centre for 
Independent Living
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 and the current centres of independent living is 
that in the seventies and eighties disabled people didn’t have a seat 
at their own policy making table. Now you could argue that the 
effectiveness of government’s engagement with disabled people over 
the last twenty or thirty years is that slowly but surely the disabled 
people’s movement has advocated taking notice of disabled people 
when creating policies that focus on disabled people. And I would 
argue a watershed moment was the previous government’s life 
chances report, the prime minister’s strategy unit Life Chances 
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 Derbyshire Centre for Integrated Living (DCIL) pioneered a distinctive version of ‘integrated living’ in 
which a ‘personal support scheme’ employed personal support workers on behalf of the end user, while 
the end user retained control over who supported them. DCIL worked on the basis that Independence 
required the fulfilment of seven needs and could be best achieved through a close level of cooperation 




 on disabled people. It sought to have a Centre for 
Independent Living in each local authority, I think by 2015.” 
Other participants might find reason to object to the suggestion that the influence of 
disabled people in policy formulation had grown, as the role of DPOs in policy 
formation appears more recently to have gone into decline. David may have been 
more aware of this than it first appears as he notes that a report published in 2005 
(the Life Chances report) may have been a “watershed” moment, perhaps suggesting a 
decline had set in more recently. If the price of apparent inclusion in policy formation 
was the decline of organisations with the political values of Derbyshire CIL, the 
question might be raised by others whether the influence of disabled people had really 
grown, or if co-option had occurred coupled with a loss of campaigning vigour. 
Elsewhere, David appeared more ambivalent on these issues, recognising that 
campaigning and protest would still be necessary in some circumstances, but arguing 
this needed to be married to ‘pragmatism’: 
“The reason that I got involved with [……..] is because it was idealistic 
in terms of advocating the social model but it has a pragmatic edge to 
it, so it campaigns for disabled people at a theoretical level and seeks 
to influence government policy…. the great thing about [………..] is 
that its idealistic; it does campaign for change and breaking down 
barriers and stuff. Buts it’s politically pragmatic as well, which I like 
about it, it’s not just a campaigning organisation, it has the 
wherewithal to do things like write policy documents to encourage 
government thinking. So it doesn’t just campaign, its constructive in 
its criticism.” 
Here David assumes that campaigning is “idealistic” or unconstructive and distances it 
from “influencing government policy”, but in contrast to his previous contribution 
appears to offer greater recognition of the need for protest as well. His argument is 
that the role of protest and provision cannot be resolved through an either/or 
solution. This more closely typified most participant thoughts regarding the role of 
protest and provision, in that answers would often be characterised by a call for a 
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balance between the two forms of activity. Another example of such as approach came 
from Vera who pointed out that it is precisely the threats I’ve described as enforced 
individualism that make the type of civic engagement involved in protest more 
difficult: 
“If you only protest on the streets and make so much bother, you 
know, I can see an argument for that, [inaudible] where you make 
government’s life really difficult and they’re forced to have a re-think. 
Or there’s the other kind of view where you need to do the two 
things, you know, cos I think, this is my view, that its quite hard for 
disabled people to protest on the streets anyway in large numbers, 
simply because of the stuff that we need to protest about, so people 
are living in poverty and not getting their support needs meet, you’re 
certainly not going to be able to get out there and protest on the 
streets, and that’s why I think we need to do the two things. Anyway, 
it’s the same as used to go on you know, cos when we were 
campaigning of the right to direct payments in the eighties and 
nineties, the Disability Action Network, DAN, always thought that the 
British Council of Disabled People was always too accommodating 
and cosying up to often to government, so they were the militants, 
but you get that with any movement, any change movement.” 
Here Vera recognises some of the trade-offs between protest and professional work 
and hints at the dilemma regarding the trade-offs between them. An example of such 
a dilemma came about in Roger’s account when he expressed his ambivalence 
regarding the need to take on work in order to secure the future of his organisation 
when it might not always correspond to the campaigning ideals that motivate him and 
his organisation: 
“I’m not sure what added value a disabled people’s organisation 
brings to running a payroll service for example, so in some ways 
that’s a distraction and that’s not why I got involved with the 
disabled people’s movement. So I think there’s more pressure on us 
…. to bid for contracts, and as our funding pots are shrinking, 
sometimes you find yourself applying for funding and you think to 
yourself ‘well does this meet the aims of our organisation just 
because it enables us to survive another year? Is it fulfilling our aims 
to enable disabled people to access mainstream services or does it 
change society to make it more inclusive to disabled people, does it 
meet our central goals?’ So sometimes you think to yourself ‘are we 
simply doing things to maintain ourselves in jobs’, and that’s not 
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what we’re here to do…It’s a difficult situation; do we say ‘no this is 
not what we’re about, we’re about campaigning for choice and 
control and change’, or do we say ‘if we don’t do it then the disability 
charities will’? It’s a difficult one and I’m not sure I’ve got the 
answer.” 
As part of a movement as a whole that has gained influence within service provision, 
this type of dilemma is likely to be common. It might be expressed as the need to 
balance securing sufficient funding to survive with not losing sight of overriding goals 
and political conviction in the process. 
We saw above that there was a degree of unanimity in the view that protest 
had declined. Even among those with little involvement in protest, it was notable that 
they generally felt this development was undesirable and that a balance or division of 
labour needed to be maintained between these functions. For instance, Robert, 
working full time job in a DPO, felt that more protest would be welcome, even 
considering a return to protest for himself: 
“Yeah I mean there have been some successes; there’s been more 
achieved through the kind of sit down and get involved and work and 
in partnership rather than manning the barricades stuff, but I think 
sometimes you need both. I’m getting to an age now where I’m more 
likely to be sitting down and working in partnership than manning the 
barricades, but you never know.” 
To again make use of a contribution from Andrew, who had previously offered a 
service-based and gradualist contribution, it was notable that he sensed that a radical 
paradigm shift was required in the way that disabled people were viewed. 
“The whole reason that CILs came into being in the first place is to 
challenge the place of disabled people in society, and that debate is 
still largely unaddressed. We’re still, despite the rhetoric, living in a 
world where disabled people are second or even third class citizens, 
who cannot expect the same opportunity that everyone else just 
takes for granted. And so we need a social debate which says ‘what 
do disabled people realistically need, support that other people 
might not need, what do we want those people to enjoy in life? 
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It is hard to see how such a radical shift in how disabled people are viewed would 
come about purely through patient dialogue and cooperation with the government. 
Pointing out that CILs came into being to “challenge the place of disabled people in 
society” he recalls the politicised origins of the movement and warns against becoming 
too gradualist or technocratic. Tellingly, he joins this to the fortunes of DPOs, stating 
that a fundamental debate is required to ensure adequate funding is provided to DPOs 
to address disabling barriers. Overall there was a level of consensus that protest was 
welcome even though not surprisingly, radical contributions tended to attribute 
relatively greater weight to it. 
Summary 
Within this chapter I have analysed participants’ strategic positioning in relation to 
three themes: the social model of disability; radical and gradual tendencies; and the 
priority given to work in service provision or protest. We saw how participants 
emphasised the potency of the social model, noting how it could serve as an entry 
point to the movement and could be deployed effectively to reverse individual 
understanding of disability. This potency may be part of why it was felt by some that 
the model could be employed dogmatically and applied to too wide a range of issues. 
In the case of the second theme, examples were given to show how participants 
moved in and out of radical and gradual positions. It was noted that it would be an 
error to over-stress the dichotomous nature of this split, and that impediments could 
serve to prevent those in professional positions from engaging in protest. These 
impediments were linked to the final theme of the tension between professional and 
protest. Here a dilemma presented itself concerning the degree to which participating 
within services could endorse structures of disablism. On the other hand, a position of 
pure protest could surrender important areas of disabled people’s lives to other 
actors. 
Participant contributions that I have grouped as pertaining to the social model 
of disability, gradual/radical tendencies and provision/protest priorities, exhibited 
careful differentiation of positions and the balancing of competing objectives. An 
important punctuation point in many varied accounts was a sense that things could 
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not and should not continue on present trends. In the case of the social model, some 
long-term advocates felt that it was beginning to be found wanting. In the case of 
radical tendencies there was a feeling among some that disabled people could not 
ignore social class and the bigger picture, as economics seemed to drive increasing 
disablism. Even in the more gradual tendency there was recognition that economic 
factors were tightly restricting disabled people’s life chances. In the case of service 
provision there was widespread agreement that greater protest would be welcome to 
stem the tide of unwelcome policy changes. In the previous chapter we saw how 
threats to disabled people and their organisation could be viewed in the context of 
unhelpful ideological preconceptions and the orthodoxy of neoliberalism. In 
concluding chapters I will explore in greater depth the relationship between the 
particular struggle of disabled people and the background political factors that I argue 
constrain the possibilities for change for the DPM. In the next chapter I further analyse 
the positions examined in this chapter by using Nancy Fraser’s theoretical framework. 
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Chapter 8: The Merit of Nancy Fraser’s Analysis to 
Theorising Anti-Disablism 
This chapter develops the analysis carried out in the previous chapter by building up a 
greater understanding of the positions taken in response to the challenges I have 
theorised as enforced individualism. I begin this process by restating the challenges of 
enforced individualism. I then go on to present Nancy Fraser’s (1995; Fraser and 
Honneth, 2003) analysis of injustice and resistance in order to apply it to my analysis of 
participant positions. First, I apply Fraser’s analysis to the categories of ‘radicalism’ and 
‘gradualism’ that I used in chapter seven to analyse the political positions adopted by 
participants. In the second application of Fraser’s analysis, I argue that her notion of 
‘bivalent’ political struggle is a fitting theorisation of participants struggle against 
economic and cultural disablism. Despite the relevance of Fraser’s analysis, I examine 
the limitations of applying her preferred political strategy to anti-disablism. Drawing on 
the work of Vehmas and Watson (2014), I highlight ways in which the requirements of 
anti-disablism defy Fraser’s preferred political strategy. This leads to an analysis that 
positions the independent living approach as an appropriate response to the bivalent 
nature of the cultural and economic struggle against disablism. 
Summary of the Challenges of Enforced Individualism 
Before I begin to further theorise the positions taken by participants, it is helpful to 
restate the conclusions from chapter six concerning the current challenges of 
disablism. It was argued that the current challenges to disabled people could be 
theorised through the notion of enforced individualism. This encapsulated the 
tripartite nature of challenges including: the isolation of individual disabled people; 
problematic conditions for DPOs; and obstructive ideology. The framework provided 
by the dynamic between enforced collectivism and enforced individualism was found 
to be of further use in data analysis. This is because the historical movement between 
enforced collectivism and enforced individualism provides a fruitful means of thinking 
about the prevalence of differing forms of disempowerment and the forces which 
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shape their emergence. This analysis informs the theorisation of resistance and 
activism that follows in this chapter. 
Within the theorisation of enforced individualism in chapter six I analysed the 
limiting ideology that underpinned the challenges of disablism. I claimed that the 
arguments of disabled people for the social model of disability and the independent 
living approach had been incompletely realised, in part because of the way they had 
been filtered through the prism of predominant ideology. This meant some principles 
of the movement had been formally accepted, such as arguments for autonomy, self-
determination and negative rights from coercion by the state. However, this had been 
easier than gaining the redistribution of power and resources required for positive 
freedoms. This uneven progress was illustrated through an analysis of the 
personalisation narrative. It was argued that personalisation, emblematic of dominant 
policy notions of empowerment, lacked an analysis of structural disablism and the 
impact of power and inequality on autonomy and participation. I went on to argue that 
focusing attention solely on personalising services to individual needs can divorce 
individual support relationships from other vitally important forms of empowerment, 
such as redistribution and social justice. 
The next section further theorises the positions taken by participants in relation 
to the challenges of disablism. By applying Fraser’s analytical framework, the 
challenges of disablism, and the range of responses to it, are further clarified. Before I 
apply Fraser’s analysis to the positions I referred to as radicalism and gradualism, or 
apply her notion of ‘bivalency’ to anti-disablism, I must first present the pertinent 
aspects of her analysis. 
Fraser’s Analysis of Injustice and Resistance 
Fraser’s (1995; Fraser and Honneth, 2003) analysis essentially involves two 
fundamental and irreducible forms of injustice and two modes of resistance. Of the 
two forms of injustice, one concerns cultural injustice or misrecognition, and the other 
economic injustice, or maldistribution. Of the two fundamental forms of resistance 
discussed by Fraser, one involves ‘affirmative’ strategies that tacitly endorse structures 
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and seek adjustments within them, and the other, ‘transformative’ strategies that seek 
to fundamentally alter underlying structures. 
Central to Fraser’s theory of justice and resistance is the principle of parity of 
participation. Parity of participation refers to ‘social arrangements that permit all 
(adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers’ (Fraser and Honneth, 
2003: 36). There are two principle preconditions required for parity of participation 
and failure to meet either of them creates injustice. One is the ‘intersubjective 
condition’ of participatory parity (ibid). Violations of this condition are ‘status 
injustices’, the paradigmatic example of which is misrecognition. Drawing on Honneth 
(1995; Fraser and Honneth, 2003), Fraser argues that recognition denotes 
‘intersubjective regard’ through which one’s status is increased or decreased in 
cultural value. Injustices of misrecognition are rooted in ‘social patterns of 
representation, interpretation and communication’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 13) 
operating through mass culture and inter-personal communication. Recognition 
‘corresponds to the status order of society’ (ibid: 50) in which some individuals are 
deemed worthy of greater esteem and respect than others. Institutionalised patterns 
of misrecognition deny individuals the cultural value that they should enjoy by 
perpetuating norms that depreciate some categories of people and undermine their 
treatment as full and equal participants in society. 
The other primary precondition for parity of participation is the ‘objective 
condition’, meaning the ‘distribution of material resources […] to ensure participants 
independence and voice’ (ibid: 36). Maldistributive injustice is driven by economic 
structures that systematically advantage some groups over others. As with injustices of 
cultural misrecognition, processes of maldistribution block parity of participation 
among society’s members. Socio-economic structures of disadvantage are rooted in 
the class basis of society. Examples of maldistribution include exploitation, meaning 
the extraction of surplus value as a worker’s labour is used for the profit of others. 
Another example is economic marginalisation, referring to the prevention of 
participation in certain forms of labour, or participation in any form of labour. Fraser 
also refers to the example of deprivation, meaning the denial of the basic means of 
subsistence required for a reasonable standard of living. 
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Fraser offers a way of distinguishing cultural and economic forms of injustice by 
noting the differing collective subjects who face each form of injustice. In the case of 
redistribution, the subject of injustice is ‘defined economically by a distinctive relation 
to the market or means of production’ (ibid: 14). Fraser is careful to explain that this 
form of injustice would not only involve the classic case of the working class, but also 
other groups that can be economically defined as a pool of labour for menial work or, 
or an underclass who are excluded from work entirely. This latter description could 
accurately describe the position of disabled people, who are typically excluded from 
employment (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007). By contrast to the economic classes who are 
the collective subjects of maldistribution, the collective subjects of misrecognition are 
conceived by Fraser as ‘status groups’, who face injustice as the result of ‘relations of 
recognition’. They are ‘distinguished by the lesser respect, esteem and prestige they 
enjoy relative to other groups in society’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 14). This could 
also accurately describe the situation of many disabled people (Tyler, 2013). 
When these subjects of injustice seek remedies for either maldistribution or 
misrecognition, Fraser identifies two principle routes available for social change: 
‘transformation’ and ‘affirmation’. Affirmative remedies for injustice ‘aim at correcting 
inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the underlying 
framework that generates them’ (1995: 82). Transformative remedies ‘aim at 
correcting inequitable outcomes by restructuring the underlying generative 
framework’ (ibid: 82). The distinction between affirmative and transformative 
remedies to injustice is combined with Fraser’s initial dichotomy between injustices of 
misrecognition and maldistribution. In the case of misrecognition, affirmative remedies 
to injustice would be typified by ‘mainstream multiculturalism’ in which unjustly 
devalued group identities are revalued and diversity of identity is celebrated. By 
contrast, transformational remedies to misrecognition would redress injustice not by 
revaluing existing identities but by changing the ‘underlying cultural-valuational 
structure’ (ibid: 83). By changing the underlying structure, transformative remedies of 
this sort have the effect of destabilising identities and differentiations and raising the 
status of disrespected groups. This would have broader affects, altering the sense of 
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affiliation and self of all members of society. Fraser calls this transformative politics of 
recognition ‘deconstruction’ (ibid). 
Affirmative remedies for economic injustice would leave the underlying 
political-economic order intact but seek to shift the allocation of resources to a more 
equal level. In Fraser’s terms, such approaches ‘raise the consumption share of 
economically disadvantaged groups without restructuring the system of production’ 
(1995: 84). In contrast, transformative remedies to economic injustice involve 
fundamentally shifting the relations of production, the social division of labour, or the 
structures of ownership of economic resources. Characterised by Fraser as ‘socialism’, 
this would not only shift the allocations of resources to particular individuals or groups, 
but also alter the economic conditions of existence for all of society. 
Fraser does not merely describe these differing permutations of injustice and 
strategies of resistance, but assesses their mutual compatibility and coherence. She 
concludes that the optimal strategy of resistance for groups subjected to economic 
and cultural injustice is one that combines a transformative politics of both recognition 
and redistribution. In Fraser’s terms, this amounts to an endorsement of 
deconstruction and socialism. 
Fraser’s endorsement of a transformative politics of deconstruction and 
socialism are a result of her view that affirmative remedies for injustice can be 
counter-productive, and that combining forms of resistance can be self-defeating. To 
illustrate this, Fraser uses the example of affirmative remedies for economic injustice 
typified by wealth transfers such as ‘social-insurance programmes’ for the employed, 
or means tested ‘public assistance programmes’ for the unemployed. Rather than 
diminishing or abolishing class differentiation, Fraser argues these affirmative 
remedies ‘shape and support’ class differentiation because ‘their general effect is to 
shift the attention from the class division between workers and capitalists to the 
divisions between employed and non-employed’ (1995: 85). This is problematic as 
deeper structures are left untouched necessitating surface transfers of wealth again 
and again, marking the ‘most disadvantaged class as inherently deficient and 
insatiable, as always needing more and more’ (ibid). Such a process has an unintended 
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effect as the groups in receipt of redistributive efforts are increasingly differentiated 
from the rest of the population, appearing, through repeated wealth transfers, as if 
they are ‘the recipient of special treatment and largesse’ (ibid). In this way, Fraser 
argues that an affirmative strategy of redistribution can also generate injustices of 
misrecognition through the differentiating effect they have upon those in receipt of 
benefits. Although the intentions of such an approach are underpinned by a 
universalist recognition of the equal worth of all, it can generate a stigmatising process 
which contradicts universalism in the sphere of recognition (ibid). 
Fraser argues that transformative remedies for maldistribution are preferable 
because they tend to reduce class differentiation and stigmatisation. As examples of 
transformative, socialist remedies for maldistribution, Fraser cites ‘universalist social-
welfare programmes, steeply progressive taxation, macroeconomic policies aimed at 
creating full employment, a large non—market public sector, significant public and/or 
collective ownership , and democratic decision making about basic socioeconomic 
priorities’ (Fraser, 1995: 85). Such measures tend to sever the link between 
employment and the share of consumption one benefits from, and therefore do not 
stigmatise the subjects of injustice in the same way as affirmative remedies. 
Fraser also applies this insight to the sphere of recognition arguing that 
transformative strategies tend to diminish or abolish the boundaries between groups 
by transforming the structures that create divisions. To illustrate her case Fraser draws 
on the example of the struggle against homophobia and heterosexism. She identifies 
‘gay-identity politics’ as an affirmative politics of recognition that seeks to revalue gay 
and lesbian identity. As an example of a transformative politics of recognition she 
identifies ‘queer theory’, which has as its goal ‘not to solidify gay identity, but to 
deconstruct the homo-hetero dichotomy so as to destabilize all fixed sexual identities’ 
(Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 83). Fraser argues that affirmative remedies to 
misrecognition have two main disadvantages. Firstly, they reify collective identities, in 
the process ‘drastically simplifying people’s self-understanding – denying the 
complexity of their lives, the multiplicity of their identifications, and the cross-pulls of 
their various affiliations’ (ibid: 76). This can even extend to conformity in the service of 
group loyalty, reducing experimentation and dissidence from group norms. This has 
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the important effect of leading to separatism through an excessive sense of loyalty to 
the group. The other disadvantage of an affirmative politics of misrecognition is that, 
for groups facing both cultural and economic subordination, the differentiating 
dynamic of affirmative remedies for maldistribution and misrecognition reinforce one 
another, both serving to separate the group from the rest of society and maintain the 
deep structures that create subordination and injustice. 
For Fraser, the tendency to stress differentiation in affirmative remedies of 
either sort means that they combine poorly with transformative remedies that tend to 
undermine group differentiation. Due to this contradictory relationship, Fraser argues 
that groups facing economic and cultural injustice should disregard strategies that 
combine affirmative and transformative remedies for injustice. To be clear, because 
transformative remedies diminish group differentiation, and affirmative remedies feed 
group differentiation, Fraser argues it would be inconsistent and self-defeating to 
attempt to combine affirmative and transformative forms of resistance because they 
work against each other. An example of such an unpromising combination of remedies 
might be an anti-racist politics which sought to deconstruct the binary of black/white 
‘racial’ identity while calling for resources to repair economic injustice in 
predominantly black communities. It could be found in such a case that the effort to 
deconstruct the constitution of black identity undermined the effort to secure 
resources for black communities because it brought into question the very notion of 
blackness. 
In order to be consistent and not counterproductive, this effectively means that 
strategies should either combine affirmative or transformative strategies, in the sphere 
of both recognition and redistribution. Fraser finds the affirmative combination 
unpromising because affirmative redistribution tends to undermine reciprocity and 
create antagonistic group differentiations, while an affirmative politics of recognition 
exacerbates this problem by calling attention to the cultural specificity that may have 
been stigmatised, deflecting attention from the structural origins of either form of 
injustice. Fraser finds more promise in the combination of a transformative politics of 
recognition and redistribution. Here, the modes of resistance would work in harmony 
as both serve to undermine structures through which individuals are differentiated. As 
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we saw above, Fraser argues that for the various collective subjects of injustice who 
face both economic and cultural injustice, a transformative politics of redistribution 
reduces economic injustice without creating class differentiation and stigmatisation. 
This is consistent with a transformative politics of recognition which deconstructs 
hierarchical dichotomies, blurring reified identities and promoting recognition of 
multiple identifications. 
To illustrate her endorsement of this strategic combination of remedies, Fraser 
uses the example of the cultural and economic injustice that are the subject of feminist 
politics. In this case she endorses the value of socialist feminist transformative 
redistribution combined with deconstructive feminism. Transformative socialist 
feminism would attend to the deep economic structures that generate economic 
gender disadvantage, avoiding the tendency of affirmative remedies to ‘mark women 
as deficient and insatiable, as always needing more and more’ (1995: 89). This is 
complemented for Fraser by a deconstructive feminism which ‘opposes the sort of 
sedimentation or congealing of gender difference that occurs in an unjustly gendered 
political economy’ (1995: 90). For deconstruction of this sort to be possible, the 
equality that can be achieved through transformative economic politics is required to 
allow the space for new constructions and deconstructions of identity and difference 
to be continually reinvented. 
To illustrate Fraser’s four-fold categorisation of injustice and resistance I 
reproduce the tabular representation of these categories from Fraser’s article of 1995: 
  
206 
 Affirmation Transformation 
Redistribution The liberal welfare state 
surface reallocations of 
existing goods to existing 
groups; supports group 
differentiation; can generate 
misrecognition 
Socialism 
deep restructuring of 
relations of production; blurs 
group differentiation; can 
also help remedy some forms 
of misrecognition 
 
Recognition Mainstream multiculturalism 
surface reallocations of 
respect to existing identities 
of existing groups; supports 
group differentiation 
Deconstruction 
deep restructuring of 
relations of recognition; blurs 
group differentiation 
Table 3. Fraser’s categorisation of forms of injustice and resistance (Fraser, 1995: 87). 
Having established Fraser’s framework for analysing injustice and resistance, and the 
reasons for her endorsement of transformative political strategies, I will add one final 
aspect of Fraser’s analysis which I will apply to my analysis. These are Fraser’s notions 
of ‘bivalency’ and ‘perspectival dualism’. Perspectival dualism means that struggles for 
recognition and redistribution demand the use of ‘an integrated approach that can 
encompass, and harmonize, both dimensions of social justice’ (Fraser and Honneth, 
2003: 26). Refusing to reduce either one of recognition and redistribution to the other, 
but never treating them entirely separately is, in Fraser’s terms, an approach 
characterised by perspectival dualism. Such an approach can ‘accommodate both the 
differentiation of class from [cultural] status in contemporary society and also their 
causal interaction’ (ibid: 93). From a perspectival dualist position, Fraser asserts that 
some injustices are primarily cultural in origin (such as heteronormativity) and rooted 
in the status order of society. In such cases, Fraser argues that economic injustice can 
result, even if it is ultimately the result of the ‘status order’. At the other extreme, 
Fraser identifies class struggles as originating in the economic structure of society, but 
again urges that they should not be seen as solely concerned with the redistribution of 
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wealth. Between struggles which are more clearly economic or cultural in origin, most 
struggles are closer to the middle of the conceptual spectrum, and face ‘two-
dimensional’ subordination, in which neither economic or cultural subordination can 
be identified as the ultimate origin of injustice. 
This is what Fraser refers to as ‘bivalent’ struggles in which neither a primary 
politics of redistribution or recognition alone can suffice. In ‘bivalent’ struggles, such as 
gender politics, the ‘subordinated group suffer both maldistribution and 
misrecognition in forms where neither of these injustices is an indirect effect of the 
other but where both are primary and co-original’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 19). 
Similarly, I will argue that the subjects of such injustice include many disabled people 
who face oppression that is irreducibly rooted in both the status order and economic 
structure of society. Attending to such injustice requires action at the level of both 
redistribution and recognition. 
Applying Fraser’s Analysis to Anti-Disablism: 
1. The Relevance of ‘Bivalency’ to Anti-Disablist Struggle 
I argue that disablism is a bivalent struggle in which injustice is both status and class 
determined, being irreducibly both cultural and economic in origin. Remedies to the 
injustices that disabled people face must, therefore, reflect the two-sided origins of 
disablism, but also pay attention to the particularities of prevailing contemporary 
forms of disablism such as those I have identified as enforced individualism. By 
applying the notion of bivalency to my analysis I can avoid underplaying the role of 
either redistribution or recognition in contemporary injustices of disablism. 
Fraser’s analysis of economic subordination, particularly in the form of 
economic deprivation and marginalisation, helps to make sense of my theorisation of 
enforced individualism. For example, in the analysis of enforced individualism I argued 
that both DPOs and individual disabled people had suffered from being denied the 
means to parity of participation. In discussing the barriers to achieving parity of 
participation both economic marginalisation and deprivation were referred to by 
208 
participants and informed my analysis of enforced individualism. Participants tended 
to focus upon the lack of material resources available for disabled people to leave 
home or for DPOs to compete on level terms with other providers of services. This 
included examples in which participants referred to the lack of material support that 
disabled people were experiencing, meaning they were marginalised from 
participation in social life in general, including the labour process. Participants also 
referred to disabled people facing deprivation such as in Andrew’s reference to the 
“existence and support that keeps people alive rather than support that gives people a 
life”. In another example, Roger discussed the marginalisation caused by “care cuts” 
lowering support to only cover “the very most basic things in life; getting yourself out 
of bed and getting fed, and that’s not independent living that’s about surviving”. 
Clearly a remedy to these challenges would require redistribution. 
Enforced individualism can also be seen as having cultural elements. It was 
noted above that the ‘status groups’, who face injustice as the result of ‘relations of 
recognition’ are ‘distinguished by the lesser respect, esteem and prestige they enjoy 
relative to other groups in society’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 14). This could be said 
of disabled people who, as a group, face cultural disablism through the media (Briant 
et al, 2013). This adds to the prima facie case for the relevance of the notion of 
bivalency to theorising disablism. In respect of my theorisation of enforced 
individualism, whilst the cultural aspect of disablism at work was a less remarked upon 
aspect of current challenges, there were important instances where participants noted 
how negative cultural representations combined with, and compounded, economic 
challenges. For example, participants noted how disabled people’s empowerment was 
culturally constructed in narrow terms in which the structural barriers to their parity of 
participation were underappreciated. The cultural under appreciation of structural 
disablism was also apparent in my analysis of the conditions facing DPOs as their 
unique role in combating structural disablism was ignored, as they were made to 
compete on price grounds with private and charitable providers of services. These 
cultural aspects of enforced individualism reinforce the argument that disablism is a 
bivalent form of injustice, involving maldistribution and misrecognition. 
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The more obvious aspects of enforced individualism might be economic but it 
would be wrong to let this obscure its cultural dimensions. For example, cultural 
representations of disabled people can affect the esteem in which disabled people are 
held as a group. This can play a role in the extent to which the public at large will 
accept cuts to benefits, support and public services for disabled people, and the extent 
to which disabled people experience discrimination and abuse (Briant et al, 2013). In 
addition, a feedback relationship can form between cultural subordination and 
economic disadvantage, as the absence of disabled people from community life can 
mean their presence is less able to combat negative cultural representation in the 
mass media. If negative cultural representations are less challenged by the prominence 
of disabled people, the esteem in which disabled people are held may fall, meaning 
they are put at a disadvantage in the pursuit of work, or considered unworthy of 
redistributive benefits or independent living payments. 
A perspectival dualist approach is useful in this context because wider cultural 
attitudes can reinforce the economic rationale for austerity, and serve to justify much 
of what I have described as the challenges of enforced individualism. The lower 
frequency with which cultural aspects of enforced individualism were invoked in 
interviews does not mean that cultural factors are unimportant, and could reflect a 
failure on my part to illicit answers of this kind. Indeed it could even be argued that 
enforced individualism is primarily cultural in that prevailing cultural norms determine 
the perceived importance of disabled people’s standard of living. However, on balance, 
it would be mistaken to view enforced individualism as primarily culturally driven 
because the cuts which are driving so much of enforced individualism, both within 
individual’s lives and DPOs, are most obviously caused by the commitment of the 
government to lowering state expenditure in general. Disentangling the relative role of 
cultural and economic factors is a difficult task. In this light, applying the notion of 
bivalency and perspectival dualism to enforced individualism will be an important tool 
in deciding how best to theorise and challenge disablism. 
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2. Applying Fraser’s Analysis to ‘Radicalism’ and ‘Gradualism’ 
By further applying Frasers’ analysis, we can now gain a different view on the 
categories I previously referred to as ‘radicalism’ and ‘gradualism’. In chapter six I was 
careful to state that these tendencies shouldn’t be seen as absolute positions but 
positions that exist along a continuum, along which participants would assume 
different positions at different times. In other words, they were positions people adopt 
rather than categories of people, although certain participants were more or less likely 
to adopt one or another. 
Referring back to Fraser’s distinction between the collective subjects of 
misrecognition and maldistribution, it is notable the position I referred to as ‘radical’ 
tended to advocate participation within broader social movements, emphasising a 
common subjectivity among diverse groups in opposition to the government’s 
economic program of austerity (Gleeson, 1999; Finkelstein, 1980). I argued that 
expressions of the radical position tended to advocate revolutionary or socialist 
politics, understanding disablism as a consequence of shortcomings of capitalism. In 
this sense, radicalism strongly tied disablism to economic subordination. From this 
followed a belief that disabled activists needed to cooperate with other groups in 
society who shared an interest in challenging austerity, or even capitalism itself. This 
was observable in James’ account when he praised the growing “awareness” apparent 
when disabled people worked in political coalition with others, and argued that the 
best response to austerity was one informed by the adage “united we stand, divided 
we fall”. In such cases, participants can be seen as closely aligned to Fraser’s collective 
subject of economic injustice defined ‘by relation to the market or means of 
production’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 14). This suggests the position I identified as 
‘radical’ involves understanding disablism as primarily driven by economic injustices of 
maldistribution. For example, Victor firmly located the struggles of disabled people 
within an economic framework, linking growing disablism to austerity and a failure of 
the DPM and others to offer convincing counter arguments to austerity. For Victor, this 
implied a shortcoming within the DPM because of its failure to engage in economic 
debates and its tendency to view the problem of disablism as a “single issue”. The 
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remedies for injustice that followed from this varied but were more likely to involve a 
transformation of economic/class structures than the gradual position. 
By contrast to ‘radicalism’ I argued that the gradualist position tended to 
phrase critique of disablism and endorsement of forms of protest within the terms of 
rights or morality. In this sense economics was attributed relatively little casual power 
in comparison to radicalism. In present circumstances, the gradual position could not 
fail to include recognition that economics had an impact on prevalent forms of 
disablism. However, in contrast to the radical position, economics was discussed as if it 
were a natural force, divorced from wider social relations. It was important but only as 
an external force disrupting the realisation of disability rights. Rather than seeking to 
change economic structures through a broad-based political movement, gradualism 
placed greater stress upon the immediate gains that can be made for DPOs and 
disabled people within the terms of the current ‘marketplace’ of care and support. 
Such a view presupposed that incremental progress could be made through 
compromise, requiring that one be accommodating to a degree of undesirable change 
and aware of what is possible and what is idealistic or naïve. 
Overall, the gradual position supported remedies which were more affirmative, 
assuming that broader political-economic conditions were held constant, and 
demanding that existing structures recognised disabled people’s rights. As an analysis 
of disablism, gradualism can be seen as construing injustice as primarily cultural, as a 
violation of disabled people rights and a failure of the status order to accord disabled 
people status. It is also, to a limited degree, economic in that it assumes the 
marketplace is the arena in which disabled rights will be won. It is therefore affirmative 
of economic structures. Gradualism was also economic in the limited extent to which 
those adopting this position were driven to accept the salience of economic factors by 
the apparent impact of cuts on disability rights. As we saw above, the radical position 
construes disablism as far more strongly tied to economic factors with little 
significance attributed to cultural factors. This could then lead to either transformative 
or affirmative remedies for economic injustice and did not have to lead to a 
commitment to transform cultural structures. 
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Below I adapt Fraser’s tabular representation of her analysis to demonstrate 
the composition of the radical and gradual positions I used in the previous chapter
 Affirmation Transformation 
Redistribution   
 






Table 4. Applying Fraser’s analysis of injustice and resistance to categories of ‘radicalism’ and 
‘gradualism’ 
The table illustrates the focus of radicalism upon economic factors, and how 
this can bifurcate into transformative/structural or affirmative economic remedies for 
injustice. Gradualism is affirmative in the cultural sphere in that it seeks greater 
recognition of disabled people’s status within the existing status order. It is also 
affirmative in the economic sphere and the extent of its economic analysis is more 
limited than radicalism. It tended to construe economic factors as external forces 
interrupting progress in the status order, rather than as part of the same social 
relations. To the extent that gradualism involved an analysis of both cultural and 
economic disablement, it might be argued that it more closely mirrors the bivalency of 
disablism. Radicalism tended to downplay the significance of the status order, doing 
less to reflect bivalent disablism. On the other hand, radicalism arguably better reflects 
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the prevalence of economic factors at work in contemporary disablism. Neither 
radicalism nor gradualism seemed to involve a transformative politics of recognition in 
which the notion of disablement itself was under question. This is interesting given 
that academic disability studies has often involved an endorsement of deconstruction, 
such as in the ‘critical disability studies’ approach (Shildrick, 2012; Goodley, 2013). 
Later in this chapter I explore some reasons why this might be the case, noting how 
the shortcomings of such an approach seem to repeat the problems of applying 
Fraser’s endorsement of deconstruction to anti-disablist struggle. 
The table shows that the distinction between radical and gradual would 
perhaps have been too simplistic if left untroubled and not returned to. At the earlier 
stage of analysis, radicalism and gradualism appeared as apt descriptors, but using 
Fraser’s categories shows that more was at work than a contrast between the two 
terms could convey. Fraser’s analysis shows that within the categories of radicalism 
and gradualism are dual concerns with the extent to which disablism is a matter of 
redistribution or recognition, and a strategic concern with the extent to which one 
endorses affirmative or transformative political activity. My analysis of radicalism and 
gradualism was not a mistake, but with the benefit of Fraser’s analytical framework, 
more can be seen about the positions that were taken. This can be seen in the case of 
radicalism. Although radicalism could be revolutionary or socialist, it could also 
demand redistribution within economic structures. What unified ‘radical’ perspectives 
was an analysis of disablism that saw it as rooted in economic structures. Radicalism 
was an economistic analysis but this could lead to affirmative as well as transformative 
prescriptions for political-economic change. Without Fraser’s analysis there could have 
been a tendency on my part to conflate economic analyses of injustice with 
transformative remedies for injustice. The structure of Fraser’s argument also 
highlights how gradualism is not only cultural but also, to a limited extent economic, in 
that it perceives economic factors as a disruptive influence upon the realisation of 
disabled people’s status and conceives of the existing marketplace as the domain in 
which to address disablism. Without the use of Fraser’s insights this may not have 
been as apparent. Further applying Fraser’s analysis to my interview analysis will help 
to understand why the movement has deployed differing arguments at varying times, 
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and why the arguments and strategies of the movement have developed in the way 
they have. 
3. Fraser’s Endorsement of Deconstruction and the Value of the 
Independent Living Approach 
Up to now I have argued that Fraser’s analysis is relevant to my theorisation of the 
challenges of contemporary disablism and political positions taken by participants. Her 
notion of bivalency illustrates the combined challenges of economic subordination, 
particularly in the form of deprivation and marginalisation, and cultural subordination 
and misrecognition. Both of these can be seen at work in enforced individualism. This 
led to a discussion of how cultural disablism was a less prominent theme in interviews, 
and in my analysis of enforced individualism, but could serve to highlight the important 
role that cultural constructions of disability have in underpinning and compounding 
the challenges of enforced individualism. Fraser’s analysis of recognition and 
redistribution was also useful in highlighting the differing ‘collective subjectivities’ that 
were implied by varying forms of injustice. For example, her identification of a 
collective subjectivity of economic, class injustice was paralleled by my category of 
‘radicalism’ which understood the struggle of disabled people as being one of a matrix 
of struggles commonly rooted in class injustice. Fraser’s argument that subjects of 
cultural injustices could be understood as subordinated status groups had its parallel in 
‘gradual’ positions which stressed the failure to recognise the equal status of disabled 
people and their rights. 
As I combined Fraser’s analysis of injustice with her analysis of affirmative and 
transformative remedies, we saw how what had previously been referred to as 
‘radical’ and ‘gradual’ positions incorporated differing analyses of the nature of 
disablism and the optimal form of resistance against it. ’Radicalism’ comprised an 
analysis of injustice as primarily economic, but this was not always followed by a call 
for structural economic transformation. The category of ‘gradualism’ comprised an 
analysis of injustice as primarily cultural and an endorsement of affirmative resistance. 
This is helpful because it serves to clarify with more precision what is at work within 
radical and gradual positions. Of further value was the way in which the four-fold 
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categorisation highlighted the absence of transformative remedies for misrecognition 
as participants did not appear to rely upon deconstruction. 
Beyond what I have argued so far, Fraser’s analysis chimes with the struggle of 
the DPM in a broader sense. Fraser’s key principle ‘parity of participation’ was 
foreshadowed in interviews by common use of phrases like Vera’s use of “coexistence 
on the basis of equality” or Andrew’s call for the creation of a “level playing field”. 
Both the demand for independent living, and an analysis informed by the social model 
of disability, share similarities with Fraser’s central principle of parity of participation. 
Indeed, demands for independent living can be seen as an assertion of disabled 
people’s right to parity of participation. Independent living is commonly associated 
with improvements in how support services are delivered and in overturning power 
relations with ‘carers’, but it is also a demand that cultural and economic conditions 
are created to deliver rights to disabled people (Shakespeare, 2000). Parity of 
participation is also relevant to the social model of disability (Danermark and 
Gellerstedt, 2004) in that a social model analysis identifies historically contingent, 
transformable relations which block the participation of disabled people on an equal 
footing with others (Thomas, 1999). 
As I have argued, Fraser’s analysis is useful for understanding disablement and 
anti-disablism. Fraser herself does not refer to the struggle against disablism in the 
examples she uses to illustrate her theoretical framework. With such close synergy 
with aspects of anti-disablism it is perhaps surprising that Fraser’s analysis is not more 
heavily drawn upon in disability studies
47
. One of the reasons why this is the case may 
be that while her analysis is very helpful to understanding disablement, her 
endorsement of a transformative politics of deconstruction seems less helpful as a 
remedy to disablement. This is not to dispute the overall value of Fraser’s framework 
to my analysis. Despite the limitations of her strategic endorsements, the manner in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
47
 There is a range of research combining a theorisation of disability and the politics of recognition. This 
is particularly the case with the work of Honneth (see Calder 2007, Ikaheimo, 2010) but reference to the 
work of Fraser in relation to disability is less well-developed. Ferguson (2005), Vehmas and Watson 
(2014) and Shakespeare (2014) have briefly discussed the relevance of her work to disability. Of the 
sources I have uncovered, the most developed applications of Fraser’s work to disability are Danermark 
and Gellerstedt’s (2004) and Gleeson’s (1999). 
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which they fall short when applied to disablement is revealing. Fraser’s analysis 
illustrates the bivalent nature of disablement, but in order to adequately respond to 
the challenges of bivalent disablism, one needs to look beyond Fraser’s endorsement 
of deconstruction and socialist transformation. The shortcomings of the strategic 
inferences Fraser draws from her analysis, when applied to disability, might help to 
explain why the conceptual tools of the movement have been developed in the 
distinctive way they have. 
To begin to analyse why Fraser’s strategic endorsements falter when applied to 
disability, it is first useful to recall that, in the exposition of Fraser’s analysis above, we 
saw that her theorisation of injustice and resistance led her to a consideration of the 
mutual compatibility of different forms of resistance. Within this discussion we saw 
how she endorsed transformative recognition and redistribution (deconstruction and 
socialism). Fraser makes this case in relation to other bivalent struggles, such as those 
around issues of gender or ‘race’ and I have argued that disability is similarly bivalent. 
To examine the shortcomings of Fraser’s analysis when applied to disablism, it 
is useful to draw upon Vehmas and Watson’s (2014) criticisms of another example of 
deconstruction, from ‘critical disability studies’. As critical disability studies is 
essentially an attempt to apply the concept of deconstruction to disability, Vehmas 
and Watson’s criticisms are relevant here as it gives reason to doubt the application of 
Fraser’s ideal of combining transformative action in the economic sphere with 
transformative deconstruction in the cultural sphere. Vehmas and Watson doubt the 
‘ethical and political applicability’ (ibid: 638) of ‘critical disability studies’ and probe its 
project to ‘deconstruct ideas about disability’ and explore ‘how they have come to 
dominate our approaches to the subject’ (ibid: 639). 
Vehmas and Watson question whether an account of the discursive 
construction of disability can ever lead to an adequate strategy for challenging 
disablement. Perhaps their most telling argument is that ‘in order to create fair social 
responses to disadvantage, we have to have a common understanding about 
disadvantage, and a reasonable (non-arbitrary) way of comparing disadvantages and 
correcting them’ (2014: 643). Deconstruction works against this by focusing on 
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dismantling the ways that people are categorized, rather than focusing on the 
relatively stable categories through which people can be identified as subjects of 
oppression and marginalisation. If a goal of the movement is to achieve a minimum 
level of well-being for disabled people, this presupposes a definition of ‘disabled 
people’ and an understanding of the ways in which disabled people are disadvantaged. 
Both independent living and the social model of disability presuppose a category of 
‘disabled people’ who face disabling social relations and require that their equal status 
be recognised. For Vehmas and Watson, in a context of scarcity, criteria to assess 
disadvantage and injustice are required, in order to allocate resources more fairly 
(ibid). Deconstruction is ill-suited to these requirements because, as Vehmas and 
Watson argue, paraphrasing Lister (1998) ‘if disability and impairment are simply to be 
deconstructed into a kaleidoscope of shifting identities and ableist discourse, there will 
be no disabled people left to fight for the right to be, or be a citizen’ (ibid: 646). 
As well as its inability to define categories of social disadvantage, applying 
deconstruction to disability is also problematic in its refusal to acknowledge or engage 
with difficult ethical debates surrounding the status of impairment. Vehmas and 
Watson argue that many people consider that some forms of embodiment are 
preferable to others because they believe that ‘some impairments may in and of 
themselves prevent people from acting and moving as they wish, from doing valued 
activities or faring well in general’ (2014: 641). The analysis provided by a 
deconstruction of disability and impairment implies that impairment is neutral and 
that freeing society from ableist assumptions is enough to overcome the challenges of 
disability (ibid). Vehmas and Watson insist that differences in impairment and social 
disadvantage are real and ‘produce tangible difference that cannot be challenged, let 
alone abolished, merely by pointing out the wanton nature of difference, and 
deconstructing the meanings attached to disability’ (ibid: 647). Contrary to Fraser’s 
view that deconstruction is complementary to transformation of economic structures; 
they go on to argue that redistribution demands recognition of the reality of social 
disadvantages among groups of people. They summarise their position by arguing that 
‘it is impossible to fight the oppression of a group of people that does not exist’ (ibid: 
648). 
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It is useful here to locate Vehmas and Watson’ position within the framework 
of Fraser’s analysis. Their critique of critical disability studies and deconstruction 
parallels participant contributions in that participants did not endorse, or even refer 
to, the value of a deconstructionist politics. Arguing that ‘[d]isability is rooted in the 
economic structures of society and demands redistribution of goods and wealth’ 
(2014: 647), Vehmas and Watson recognise the economic dimension of disablement. 
Although they extensively criticise deconstruction, they also praise the research critical 
disability studies has produced on the ‘cultural reproduction of disability’ (ibid: 643). It 
would therefore also be fair to say that they recognise the role misrecognition and 
cultural subordination play in disablement. As for the remedies for injustice that 
Vehmas and Watson appear to endorse; their focus upon the disadvantages of 
impairment mean they believe there are limits to the power of deconstruction in 
alleviating injustice. They therefore reject transformative remedies for misrecognition. 
Although they are less explicit on the matter, their emphasis on the need for 
redistribution within exiting economic structures appears to mean that they would 
also question the extent to which a transformative politics of redistribution could 
overcome disablement. By stressing the scarcity of resources and the intractable 
disadvantages associated with some impairments, it is implied there are limits to the 
potential of transformative redistribution to alleviate disadvantage. This does not 
mean that they reject the potential for addressing disabling economic structures, but it 
does suggest that they would reject the idea that disability is socially ‘created’ (Oliver, 
1990). Oliver uses this term to distance his account from social constructionism, 
arguing that disability is a bivalent creation of economic and cultural factors. Vehmas 
and Watson would not question the importance of either cultural or economic factors 
of disablement, but would reject the argument that disability is either social 
constructed or created. Their view is that there are limits to the reach of redistribution 
or recognition. Their approach could therefore be characterised as affirmative, in that 
they do not believe economic or cultural transformations could remove the 
disadvantages that many disabled people face. 
Vehmas and Watson’s argument about impairment may highlight a 
shortcoming of Fraser’s analysis, at least in its application to disability politics. As 
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Vehmas and Watson argue, deconstruction is clearly inadequate when applied to a 
struggle in which impairment is a factor because ‘disability is not the same as many 
other group identities [… ]There are no rational reasons to consider homosexuality or 
gender as undesirable characteristics whatever the social context, but there are many 
impairments that can reasonably be seen as undesirable’ (ibid: 649). The nature of 
impairment may be a factor that limits the potential of a transformative politics of 
recognition (deconstruction) in disability politics. This can be seen in the principle of 
independent living which relies on the argument that disabled people should 
experience the same rights to independence as the rest of the population. What 
disabled people require for independence is not a matter of charity but of a right 
(Shakespeare, 2000). Such an argument presupposes a definable group who demand 
their rights are met. Deconstruction would run against this by trying to dismantle the 
binary relations which allow a definition of ‘disabled people’ to be established. 
In the terms developed in this chapter, independent living could be read as an 
affirmative demand for redistribution of resources to satisfy the equal rights of 
disabled people to independence. This is because affirmative remedies leave the 
underlying political-economic order intact but demand a shift toward an equalisation 
of the allocation of resources. This affirmative remedy to injustice is present in the 
independent living approach, and its demands for redistribution to realise disabled 
people’s right to independence within the current social order. Equally, it could be 
read as an affirmative demand for recognition, in that it requires changes in 
relationships and the recognition of the equal status of disabled people’s self-
determination. It is also concerned with recognition insofar as demands for 
redistribution are premised on acceptance of disabled people’s equal status and right 
to independence. Again then, Fraser’s notion of bivalency speaks to this aspect of anti-
disablism, but in this case her recommendation of deconstruction (combined with 
socialism) is inadequate because independent living presupposes a defined category of 
disabled people who are demanding their rights are met. 
While independent living may be read as affirmative in the sphere of 
redistribution, its implications in the sphere of recognition are less clear. Cultural 




 requires a thoroughgoing ‘transformation of power relationships’. Articulated 
in this way, independent living is affirmative in demanding adequate resources for 
independence within existing political-economic structures, but could be read as 
transformative in demanding fundamental shifts in disabling relationships. However, 
within the terms of Fraser’s framework, independent living can only be read as an 
affirmative politics of recognition, calling for the rights of disabled people to be better 
recognised and for the category of disabled person to be revalued and raised within 
the status order. Within Fraser’s analysis, independent living cannot be understood as 
transformative because it does not involve deconstruction of the category of disabled 
person. The nature of impairment imposes limits on the extent to which such a 
transformative politics of recognition can be applied to disability. Within these limits, 
independent living is transformative in demanding a fundamental shift in the logic 
which underpins the support of disabled people, and is a far-reaching remedy to 
misrecognition. 
This critique of Fraser’s endorsement of deconstruction enables us to grasp 
why the independent living approach has developed in the way that it has. The issue of 
impairment and the right to independence must be premised on a relatively stable 
category of disabled people. An argument for independent living demands a 
fundamental shift in intersubjective relations of recognition, but it cannot got as far as 
an deconstructive politics which, when applied to disability, suggests ‘that impairments 
are ethically and politically merely neutral differences ‘ (Vehmas and Watson, 2014: 
647). Although disabled people are typical of the bivalent collectivities theorised by 
Fraser as facing cultural and economic injustices, they differ in that their impairments 
mean that the recognition of their rights to independence must be fundamental and 
never secondary to goals of deconstruction. The issue of impairment places limits on 
the applicability of deconstruction to disability politics. No amount of transformative 
deconstruction could remove the non-social dimension of impairment and this means 
the recognition of equal status and the right to independence is always likely to remain 
at the forefront of the movement’s demands. 




As we saw in the initial presentation of Fraser’s analysis, one of the reasons 
that Fraser supports deconstruction combined with socialism is that affirmative 
redistributive benefits can create stigmatising group differentiation. This is relevant to 
disabled people in that redistributive benefits could tend to create stigmatisation for 
disabled people, and that structural change could achieve changes beyond regular 
redistributive payments. On the other hand, this argument of Fraser’s could again be 
questioned in light of independent living and the arguments of Vehmas and Watson. 
The point of the right to independent living is that society as whole should come to 
terms with the need for redistribution to disabled people because of the physical and 
socially created disadvantages they face. Independent living refuses the logic of 
Fraser’s critique of affirmative remedies to maldistribution as potentially stigmatising. 
Rather than seeking to avoid the stigmatisation that may follow affirmative 
redistribution, independent living demands that those who stigmatize disabled people 
should be the subject of change. By combining an affirmative call for redistribution 
with an affirmative demand for recognition of disabled people’s rights, independent 
living attempts to shift the focus from the process of redistribution towards an 
acceptance of disabled people’s right to independence. 
Having developed this understanding of independent living, I can return to my 
initial application of Fraser’s analysis to my categories of radicalism and gradualism. In 
the first instance, I noted how radicalism and gradualism contained within them 
differing analyses of disablism. Radicalism saw disablism as primarily economic, 
requiring affirmative or transformative resistance to maldistribution. Gradualism was 
affirmative in the remedies it offered and saw disablism as primarily an issue of 
misrecognition and a failure to recognise disabled people’s rights. Independent living is 
affirmative in the economic sphere, demanding redistribution to fulfil rights, and is 
affirmative in demanding a shift in the way disabling relationships are configured. It is 
thus similar to what I had previously described as gradualism. It could be read as a 
subset of gradualism or its most clear example. The case of independent living and its 
link to the existence of impairment shows that an affirmative demand for recognition 
and redistribution, or in my terms ‘gradualism’, may always be necessary and cannot 
always be superseded by a transformative politics of redistribution. 
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Equally, the radical position seemed to capture an important aspect of anti-
disablist resistance. Through its materialist insistence on the economic determinants of 
disability it points to an important feature of contemporary disablism. The challenges I 
identify in chapter one and chronicle closely through my theorisation of enforced 
individualism are, at least superficially, driven by the political-economic goal of 
reducing the size and scope of the welfare state in Britain. I argued that such an 
economistic understanding of disablism could, in the radical position, bifurcate into 
transformative or affirmative remedies for maldistribution. As Vehmas and Watson 
argue, there may be a minority of disabled for whom no amount of transformative 
deconstruction or redistribution could remove the disadvantage they face due to their 
impairment. This does not negate an argument for transformative change to disabling 
economic structures. There are many disabled people for whom such a change may be 
able to yield massive benefits. This insistence that transformative social change could 
change disabled people’s lives is partly what is represented by the social model of 
disability. In this sense, Fraser’s endorsement of socialism may be less problematic 
than her endorsement of deconstruction. There may be limits to what either could 
achieve, but a transformative politics of redistribution need not suggest that 
‘impairments are ethically and politically merely neutral differences’ (Vehmas and 
Watson, 2014: 648) in the same way that deconstruction seems to. 
Summary 
To summarise this chapter, we have seen throughout that Fraser’s analysis is 
valuable in stressing the bivalency of cultural and economic injustice. In combination 
with her analysis of affirmative and a transformative politics, it was possible to see 
more clearly what was at work behind my depiction of radical and gradualist positions. 
Fraser’s analysis of bivalency problematised my initial categories of radicalism and 
gradualism and showed that they risked conflating the two distinct issues of forms of 
injustice (maldistribution and misrecognition) and forms of resistance (affirmative and 
transformative). Although Fraser’s analysis was useful on several counts, her strategic 
conclusions that followed from this analysis were found to be wanting. In particular, it 
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was argued that the independent living approach problematises Fraser’s privileging of 
transformative politics.  
In the remainder of this thesis I will further reflect on injustice and resistance. 
My focus will tend toward analysis of political economy rather than cultural disablism 
but this should not be seen to diminish the importance of cultural disablism. In part 
this decision is driven by a pragmatic need to restrict the range of factors covered in 
the remainder of the thesis. My decision to focus on political economy is partly driven 
by the way contemporary disablism seems to be driven in great part by factors of 
political economy (see chapter ten), and the lack of academic work to reflect this. 
Another reason I choose to focus on this aspect of disablism is that I believe the theory 
produced by some of those from the field of political-economy/political theory, such as 
Holloway (1991; 1993a; 1993b; 2005), can provide a novel means of conceptualising 
the relationship of disability studies and disability activism (see chapter ten). This focus 
on political-economy also informs the concern of the next chapter of the thesis with 
the extension of the social model of disability presented by Thomas (1999; 2007; 2010; 
2012). I will argue that Thomas’ extension of the social model is relevant to political-
economy because it has been generally been developed against a background of 
understanding of political-economy (Oliver, 1990) and as a way of conceptualising the 
structures and barriers than can obstruct the rights asserted by the independent living 
approach. Thomas’ social relational approach to disability opens the door to theorising 
multiple structures of disablism, including those of political economy. 
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Chapter 9: The Strengthening Of Social Model 
Politics in Carol Thomas’ Social Relational Theory 
of Disability 
In this chapter I turn from the concerns of the previous chapter toward the social 
model of disability. In the previous chapter one of the topics touched upon was the 
independent living approach and the way in which it attends to the bivalency of 
cultural and economic disablism. I argued that the independent living approach gives 
an affirmative argument in favour of redistribution within existing economic 
structures. Counter to Fraser’s argument that affirmative and transformative forms of 
resistance should not be combined, the independent living approach has been 
combined to useful effect with the social model of disability and a historical materialist 
analysis that offer greater insight into the potential for political-economic structures to 
shift and undermine progress toward independent living. 
In this chapter I will first present the ’social-relational’ contribution to 
theorising disability developed by Carol Thomas (1999; 2007; 2010; 2012). This 
elaboration on the ‘disability as oppression’ foundations of the social model provides a 
theoretical starting point for interrogating broader shifts in social relations, including 
economic and cultural disablism. It also focuses upon micro-cultural and interpersonal 
patterns of misrecognition. Drawing on Thomas’ development of the model, and 
making some methodological points regarding the appropriate scope of the social 
model, I argue that Thomas’ development of the social model need not involve the 
failings attributed to it by some participants and academic critics. In closing, I discuss 
how Thomas’ relational approach complements Fraser’s analysis and how it can serve 
as an important element in challenging enforced individualism. 
Why Examine The Social Model? 
An examination of the social model of disability is not only of theoretical interest but is 
valuable because of how central it is to activist understandings of disablism and 
resistance. We saw in chapter seven how important the social model was to 
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participants’ positioning in relation to the challenges of disablism. Participants 
explained the re-evaluation of experiences that followed their introduction to the 
social model and, in some cases, described the radicalising impact it had upon them. 
Introduction to the model had frequently been followed by a turn to activism in order 
to challenge the social causes of disablism. The participants who criticised the social 
model did not reject it out of hand but questioned if it had been adopted as a dogma 
and applied too widely, acquiring more significance than it should. 
There is merit to these worries, but I will argue that an analysis inspired by the 
view of disability as oppression remains vital to understanding disability. Scholars such 
as Thomas (2012) develop the political commitments underpinning the social model, 
without claiming that the simple social model can serve as a complete social theory 
(Thomas, 2004). Retaining the politics of the social model can, in a more elaborate 
theory, contribute much to challenge ‘individualist policy frameworks’ (Morris, 2011: 
3) and recent policy concerned only with individual aspects of disability (Yates and 
Roulstone, 2013). It is potent in its capacity to expose individualising views of disability, 
drawing upon antecedent historical materialist analyses (Oliver, 1990) that locate 
disablism in shifting social relations and the disabling tendencies of unfettered 
capitalism. The relevance of the social model will remain while it continues to be the 
case that social care in the UK is informed by a concern with individual rather than 
social determinants of disability (Morris, 2011). 
In my analysis of enforced individualism, I argued that its ideological challenges 
included a failure to address structural disablism, and a tendency to construe 
empowerment in individualistic terms that assumed individualised funding was 
sufficient for empowerment to occur, meaning collective user control was largely 
ignored. Factors such as these, and the general focus upon the individual disabled 
person, function ideologically to mask the collective oppression of disabled people, 
meaning that ‘speaking about disability and disadvantage as an individual problem 
prevents us from discussing the removal of barriers in the wider social world’ 
(Priestley, 1999: 48). The social model of disability, then, continues to have value as an 
ideological corrective that unmasks and challenges individualistic conceptions of 
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disability, revealing historically contingent, and potentially removable, relations of 
disablism. 
Thomas’ Social-Relational Development of the Social Model of 
Disability 
I will argue that what is most valuable about the social model is foregrounded in the 
social-relational theory of disability developed by Thomas (1999; 2004; 2007; 2010; 
2012). Before I do this, it is important to clarify that Thomas does not believe the social 
model itself can satisfy the demands of academic theory. For Thomas, the social model 
has served at times to simplify the social relational analysis contained within the UPIAS 
statement (1976) of the fundamental principles of disability. The enormous political 
value of the social model has come at the theoretical cost of encouraging ‘thinking in 
shorthand—to assert that, for example, that disability equates with ‘social barriers’’ 
(Thomas, 2004: 579). Following the need to find alternative means with which to 
theorise disability, Thomas’ contributes a social-relational theorisation of disability. 
This approach is consistent with the ‘disability as oppression’ (ibid: 577) foundations of 
the social model, but it goes beyond it to encompass other factors in disabled people’s 
lives such as the role of ‘impairment effects’ and ‘psycho-emotional disablism’. 
A continued focus on the politics of ‘disability as oppression’ is essential to 
Thomas’ project and is what she values about disability studies in general, 
distinguishing it from other approaches through its ‘explicit commitment to assist 
disabled people in their fight for full equality and social inclusion’ (2004: 571). The 
social model is insufficient for the requirements of the development of a social 
oppression paradigm, but it can serve as a symbol of the need to maintain a focus on 
politics and oppression. In this light, it is significant that many academics believe 
attacks on the social model open ‘the door to, and begins to hint at, an as yet ill-
defined rapprochement with “medical model” and “individual model” thinking’ 
(Thomas, 2008: 15). Thomas and academics sympathetic to the social model do not 
seek to wholly disown and reject it but develop a theory consistent with the political 
conviction symbolised by it. This is what seems to be at work when Thomas observes 
of the international journal Disability & Society that one can find in it a ‘rich mix of 
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sophisticated research and theory-based academic papers inspired by the social 
model’ (ibid: 16). The use of the word ‘inspired’ is significant in that the work Thomas 
refers to is ‘inspired by’ the political conviction most commonly represented by the 
social model. Thus while Thomas rejects the use of the simplified social model as an 
academic theory of disablism, her work can be read as a political intervention ‘on the 
same side’ as the social model against disablism, fulfilling Oliver’s (1992) requirement 
that EDR clearly takes the side of disabled people. 
Significantly, in light of participant concerns that the social model could be a 
vehicle for dogmatism, Thomas’ multifaceted approach is more open and harder to 
translate into a dogma. This is relevant because a minority of participants, echoing 
critics such as Shakespeare (2006) feared the dogmatism associated with the social 
model. For example, Kate argued it had been adopted by some “purists” as a “religion” 
and was being used as an exclusionary measure of whether someone could be “in our 
gang”. Thomas’ approach retains the political commitment symbolised by the model 
but is more carefully formulated, meaning it can address participant concerns 
regarding the possibility of it overreaching its relevant scope. 
Thomas subtly develops the original disability/impairment dichotomy as 
previously seen in the work of UPIAS (1976) and Oliver (1983). Here greater weight is 
placed on the ‘social relational’ character of disablism than the more familiar emphasis 
on disabling barriers in the social model. For Thomas, the social relational definition of 
disablism means it ‘constitutes a form of social oppression in contemporary society – 
alongside sexism, racism, ageism and homophobia’ (2010: 37). Enduring social 
relations equate to structures and this is complementary to the stress I placed in my 
analysis of enforced individualism on the failure to understand the structural nature of 
the disablement that individual disabled people face and that DPOs can challenge. As 
an example of the relevance of the social relational and structural view of disablism 
developed by Thomas, I have noted in my analysis of enforced individualism how the 
role of DPOs in combating entrenched structural disablism was not adequately 
recognised in the procurement environment. Furthermore, I noted how individualistic 
conceptions of empowerment cannot grasp structural impediments to individual 
empowerment, instead assuming changes in the way support is delivered would 
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deliver empowerment. Thomas’s social relational notion of disablism complements my 
analysis of enforced individualism because it involves a structural conception of 
disablism as a set of enduring patterns of social relations (structures) which constitute 
disablism. 
Arguably a structural analysis like this could also have been made within the 
original version of the social model. An advantage of Thomas’s social relational 
approach over the barriers reading of the model is that it better reflects the bivalent 
nature of disabled people’s struggle and the cultural disablism of misrecognition. 
Disablism involves misrecognition in the mass media (Briant et al, 2013) but also at the 
level of individual human relationships and how disablism can be internalised by 
disabled people (Reeve, 2002). This was shown by interview participants who voiced 
the “fears” that changes in policy had caused, or when Mary expressed the sense of 
“guilt” she felt for receiving more “substantial support” than her friends. In Thomas’ 
approach, viewing disablism as relational adds to the focus on barriers and structures 
an important additional emphasis on the inter-subjective misrecognition that co-
characterises disablism. This type of disablism, and the impact it has on disabled 
people, is referred to as ‘psycho-emotional’ disablism (Thomas, 1999). The social 
relational definition of disability requires that one pay attention to all restrictions 
socially imposed on disabled people. This includes psychological and emotional as well 
as political, economic and environmental restrictions. For Thomas, ‘psycho-emotional 
disablism’ shapes personal identity, including who we are and who we are prevented 
from being. Thus while restrictions on doing are of great significance, ‘that is not all 
there is to disablism; there are additional, often intangible, dimensions to the social 
exclusion of people with impairments, which may in turn have behavioural and 
practical consequences’ (ibid: 48). This extension of the social model may make its 
central political message more appealing to other people who might be considered 
‘disabled’ such as people with mental health needs for whom structural barriers may 
not be their main concern (see Anderson et al, 2012). The lack of this sort of analysis in 
a traditional reading of the social model may suggest its historical materialist origins 
were less equipped to reflect the misrecognition that co-characterises disablism along 
with economic subordination. A stress on relations and psycho-emotional disablism is 
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consistent with a stress upon structural disablism, but can also prevent this from 
excluding the individually experienced politics of misrecognition. This aspect of 
Thomas’ approach is complementary to the independent living movement’s stress on 
the politics of recognition and the changes required in relationships required to fulfil 
disabled people’s rights (Morris, 2014b). It also helps to counteract the lack of 
attention given in Fraser’s approach to ‘face-to-face’ interaction and its role in the 
development of the self and identity (Danermark and Gellerstedt, 2004).  
The advances made by Thomas on the social model flow from her definition of 
disability as a social relation, between people, or as ‘disablism’. Disablism is an unequal 
relation between impaired and non-impaired people, akin to the way in which 
‘patriarchy refers to the relationship of male ascendency over women’ (1999: 40). Thus 
disability is ‘a particular form of unequal social relationship which manifests itself 
through exclusionary and oppressive practices – disablism - at the interpersonal, 
organisational, cultural and social-structural levels in particular societal contexts’ (ibid: 
40). For Thomas, the social relational conceptualization of disability ‘changes the 
meaning of disability itself rather than simply switching attention to the social as 
opposed to biological causes of restrictions of activity’ (ibid: 44). By this she does not 
mean that all restrictions of activity experienced by disabled people are caused by 
social factors, or simply that disability is socially, rather than individually, caused. She 
fears such an argument could be read as an over-socialised understanding of disability 
that denies the role of ‘impairment effects’. Rather, by ‘changing the meaning’ of 
disability itself, she is redefining disability as ‘disablism’ or as a relationship between 
people. This does not refer to the social causes of restrictions of activity, but is 
redefined to refer to ‘the social imposition of avoidable restrictions on the life 
activities, aspirations and psycho-emotional well-being of people categorised as 
‘impaired’ by those deemed ‘normal’ (2010: 37). In this sense, one might describe the 
relational definition of disablism as the political redefinition of disability. 
Thomas could not have developed this conceptualisation of disablism without 
identifying the direct impact of impairments on the lives of disabled people. Her 
acceptance of a role for impairment is consistent with my argument in the last chapter 
that the non-social dimension of impairment limits the applicability of deconstruction 
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to disability politics. Thomas proposes the category of ‘impairment effects’ to denote 
‘the direct and unavoidable impacts that impairments (physical, sensory, intellectual) 
have on individuals’ embodied functioning in the social world’ (2010: 37). This is 
significant because the social model has been criticised in the past for serving to 
exclude experiences of pain and restriction not attributable to disablism (Morris, 
1991). This was apparent in interviews as participants expressed their concern at the 
tendency towards dogmatism associated with the social model. This, and concerns 
that the social model may subsume all disability experience into oppression 
(Shakespeare, 2006), can be resisted if one appreciates that disablism should always 
be understood in reference to a role for impairment effects. The category of 
impairment effects prevents Thomas’ approach from subsuming everything into a 
politically reductionist account of oppression, enabling one to acknowledge that there 
are restrictions of activity that ‘may be directly associated with, or ‘caused by’, having 
a physical, sensory or intellectual impairment’ (Thomas, 1999: 42). Placing limits on the 
scope of the social model and demarcating the boundaries of a social relational 
approach may therefore help to limit the dogmatism that concerned participants. 
The separation of impairment effects from disablism is an analytic distinction 
which cannot be neatly applied in practice. For example, impairment effects ‘may 
become the marker for other restrictions of activity that do constitute disability’ 
(Thomas, 1999: 43), meaning particular impairment effects may be associated with 
greater disablism. Thomas points out that ‘care must be taken, of course, not to 
mistake impairment effects for what are, in fact, disabilities’ (ibid: 43). Distinguishing 
impairment effects and disablism is useful in the context of the threat of enforced 
individualism where I stressed the structural forces of disablism at work. By analytically 
distinguishing impairment effects and disablism, Thomas’ approach can help to avoid 
the mistaken identification of the individual effects of structural disablism identified by 
interview participants, such as individual isolation, marginalisation and deprivation, for 
what is frequently attributed to the ‘tragedy’ of impairment. It is able to do this by 
separating out disabling social relations from impairment effects. 
As the basis for further studies, Thomas’ approach invites attempts to explain 
the ‘particular form of oppressive social relationship between those who are 
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designated impaired and those designated non-impaired, that is, the relationship 
which constitutes disability’ (1999: 40). Key questions then arise, such as are ‘how is 
the social relationship which constitutes disability generated and sustained within 
social systems and cultural formations, and why does it exist?’ and ‘how does this 
social relationship operate and manifest itself?’ (Ibid: 44). Through my theorisation of 
enforced individualism I hope to have contributed to this task by providing a means of 
theorising the tripartite nature of the challenges of isolation to individual disabled 
people, problematic conditions for DPOs, and obstructive ideology. Such a theorisation 
also provides historical insight by drawing upon the historical movement between 
enforced collectivism and enforced individualism as a means of thinking about the 
prevalence of differing forms of disempowerment and the forces which shape their 
emergence. 
In this way I believe my theorisation of enforced individualism has been 
consistent with Thomas’ analysis of disablism. I also believe that Thomas’ analysis 
complements my application of Fraser’s analysis of injustice and resistance and my 
analysis of independent living. In the following section I seek to clarify the scope of the 
social model by engaging with participants’ concerns that it could be adopted 
dogmatically. I also respond to some prominent academic criticisms of it. 
The Scope of Thomas’ Social-Relational Theory of Disability 
To gauge the value of Thomas’ approach it is important to neither overstate nor 
underplay its significance. It is helpful here to clarify what can be expected of theories 
in general. Consistent with the account given of open systems (Bhaskar, 1986) and 
critical realism in chapter four, theories can only illuminate a relatively small number 
of aspects of society, bracketing other social mechanisms, and creating logically 
coherent abstractions which isolate the relationship of a small number of social 
mechanisms in order to animate them. In doing so, theory provides an explanatory 
window onto society. Societies are open systems of multiple mechanisms exhibiting 
features that cannot ever be captured by one theory alone (ibid). 
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The lack of comprehensiveness of a model can be detrimental for particular 
groups, by excluding their experience. For example ethno-cultural minorities (Vernon, 
1998) or impairment specific groups (Scott-Hill, 2004) may feel that the social model 
imposes an alien meaning of disability onto them. On the other hand, theories such as 
Thomas’ are indispensable for explanation, and complete comprehensiveness is 
impossible for any particular theory. Application of any theory results in some social 
complexity inevitably being lost, but the question is whether the explanatory power 
gained from using a given theory outweighs the complexity lost in the process. In this 
light, the phrase “the map is not the territory” popularised by Korzybski (2010), 
expresses the insight that we unavoidably analyse the world through abstractions. 
Critics of the social model (such as Scott-Hill, 2004; Shakespeare, 2006; Watson, 2012) 
complain it is a simplification, but it is demanding too much even of a more 
sophisticated theory such as Thomas’ to hope it can capture the ‘true’ reality of all 
disability. Perhaps there can be no single comprehensive model of something as 
complex as disability. As Robinson remarked ’a model which took account of all the 
variegation of reality would be of no more use than a map at the scale of one to one’ 
(1962: 33). 
This description of the limited scope of individual theories can be used to 
further strengthen the case for the value of Thomas’ approach. The more simplistic 
social model has been commonly criticised for setting up problematic dualities or 
binaries (Shakespeare, 2006). Bearing the above in mind, this quality can actually be 
seen as a virtue of Thomas’ approach. By setting up different conceptual relations, it 
yields insightful ‘windows’ onto disability. This possibility is illuminated by Harvey’s 
analogous interpretation of Marx’s dialectical method: 
Marx sees each relation as a separate 'window' from which we can 
look in upon the inner structure of capitalism. The view from any one 
window is flat and lacks perspective. When we move to another 
window we can see things that were formerly hidden from view. 
Armed with that knowledge, we can reinterpret and reconstitute our 
understanding of what we saw through the first window, giving it 
greater depth and perspective (Harvey, 1982: 2). 
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In the case of Thomas’ approach we can see the perspective gained by setting up 
relations between social and individual models of disability, impairment effects and 
disability, and psycho-emotional disablism and structural disablism. Alone, these 
conceptual relations give a very partial view of disability but, by moving from one to 
the next, the possibility is created of developing a richer view. The windows analogy is 
apt because it demonstrates that Thomas' approach is less reductionist than the social 
model is said to be, and may be open to the addition of further windows through 
which additional perspectives on disability may be gained. Seen in this way, the 
conceptual elements of Thomas’ approach provides fertile ground for theorising the 
current challenges of disablism, providing windows through which anti-disablism can 
better grasp its task. The inclusion of these additional ‘windows‘ makes Thomas’ 
approach open to importing more general knowledge into consideration of disability, 
meaning it need not act as a static dogma as was feared of the social model by some 
participants. 
Looked at in this way, Thomas’ approach can elude the criticism made of the 
social model that it is adopted exclusively and tends to reduce all of disabled people’s 
lives to oppression, inevitably finding oppression in any research informed by it 
(Shakespeare, 2014). Thomas’ approach is not excessively reductionist, preserving a 
role for biology through the category of impairment effects. This is not to essentialise 
biology. Rather, through the disablism/impairment effects distinction, it names these 
two interacting strata. Biology is not reduced entirely to social factors, nor social 
factors reduced to biology. The separation here is analytic and in reality these 
dimensions will be blurred in numerous ways. As I argue in chapter four, the argument 
is that the analytic seperability of impairment and disability is a useful basis for 
analysing their interface. 
Participants such as Kate provided compelling examples of the way in which the 
social model could be adopted dogmatically, as she described how people with 
learning difficulties were excluded because they wished to be known as ‘people with 
disabilities’ rather than ‘disabled people’. Examples such as these show how the social 
model and its associated language can serve to exclude. On the other hand, the 
influence of the model has not prevented a vigorous debate from occurring about its 
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merits. For example, scholars such as Morris (1991) complained of the exclusion by 
proponents of the model of experiences of ‘private’ pain and distress. Subsequently, 
Thomas, without entirely dismissing the social model, developed the category of 
impairment effects. The social model is not without drawbacks, such as the examples 
described by Kate in which the model has been over-stretched. However, clarifying the 
scope of her approach and carefully analysing its meaning, as Thomas has done, can 
help to avoid these traps. 
I have argued that because Thomas’ multifaceted approach is open to further 
additions, it is harder for it to become closed and static. I have also argued that the 
analysis of disablism as a social relational phenomena helps in analysing the structural 
disablism that emerged in my identification of the threat of enforced individualism in 
current conditions of disablism. The structural nature of disablism was apparent in the 
frustration of participants with the failure of funders to accept the need to fund DPOs 
which could challenge and mitigate the existence of disablism. Social relational 
patterns of disablism were not accounted for in the obstructive ideas highlighted by 
participants which construe empowerment in strictly individualistic terms, lacking 
reference to enduring relations of disablism that limit the participation of individual 
disabled people and underpin their isolation. Much of this analysis of structural 
disablism would have been possible without Thomas’ particular reading of disablism 
but, positing the model in relational terms adds an emphasis on the bivalency and 
misrecognition that also characterises disablism. This is highlighted by her category of 
psycho-emotional disablism which identifies the individually experienced effects of 
misrecognition. Finally, Thomas’ category of impairment effects is another valuable 
addition to a traditional social model analysis, preventing the exclusion of ‘private’ 
experiences of impairment, and allowing one to unpick the relative role of impairment 
effects and disablism instead of them being conflated (and disablism blamed upon 
impairment). 
Having explained the relevance of Thomas’ approach to theorising and resisting 
enforced individualism, I will close by reflecting on how Thomas’ relational social 
model complements Fraser’s analysis of injustice and resistance. 
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Linking Thomas’ Social Relational Theory of Disability with 
Fraser’s Analysis 
In the previous chapter, we saw how arguments for independent living can be read, in 
Fraser’s terms, as a bivalent claim for affirmative redistribution and transformative 
recognition. In addition, Fraser’s analysis sheds light on Thomas’ approach because it 
also reflects the bivalency of disabled people’s struggle. One of the strengths of 
Thomas’ approach is that, in analysing structures of relational disablement, it refers to 
both redistribution and recognition. Such an approach is pitched at a high level of 
generality and refers to the full breadth of disabling relations which constitute 
disablism, ranging from economic exclusion, marginalization and deprivation through 
to misrecognition in the mass media and individual relationships. In a sense it is 
transformative in both cultural and economic terms, analysing disablism as a set of 
contingent social relations that can (and should) be changed, but in the sphere of 
recognition this does not go as far as deconstruction. Like the independent living 
approach, it is resistant to a thorough-going politics of deconstruction, again relying on 
a definable category of disabled people who are disabled by social relations. 
Thomas’ approach is consistent with Fraser’s analysis because both are 
concerned with the forces which restrict the participation of whole groups or, in 
Fraser’s terms, the ‘externally manifest and publicly verifiable impediments to some 
people’s standing as full members of society’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 31). The idea 
of barriers is close to Fraser’s emphasis upon cultural and economic injustices that 
block parity of participation. In this way, Fraser’s analysis may be similar to a 
traditional reading of the social model which stresses the social barriers that disable 
people. Applying Fraser’s analysis to disablism could suffer from some of the same 
problems as a social model concerned only with barriers. 
I argued in chapter eight that whilst Fraser’s analysis could help in 
understanding and resisting enforced individualism, it was limited by focusing solely on 
cultural and economic injustice which could lead to sociological overreach and 
reducing all disability into an account of oppression for which the social model has 
been criticised (Shakespeare, 2006). Critics have often complained in the past that the 
social model marginalises or ignores impairment and excludes its important role from 
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the study of disabled people’s lives. It would be a mistake to repeat this through the 
use of Fraser’s analysis. However, by combining it with Thomas’ approach, and the role 
reserved within it for impairment effects, this misapplication of Fraser’s analysis can be 
resisted. 
Thomas’ approach can also guard against another possible misunderstanding 
that could emerge from applying Fraser’s analysis. It will be recalled that Fraser’s core 
objective is parity of participation, of which status subordination is one key barrier. If 
one applies this approach to disablism it could easily lead one away from a 
consideration of the ‘internal’ costs of this subordination and to consider it only in light 
of the costs to one’s externally manifest status. Thomas’ category of psycho-emotional 
disablism is vital here as a reminder that disablism can be felt as much in one’s psycho-
emotional wellbeing and not simply externally in one’s status. The bivalent struggle 
against disablism extends into one’s individual existence. By adding Thomas’ relational 
approach to Fraser’s analysis, the application of Fraser’s analysis can evade a 
preoccupation with ‘externally manifest’ equality of status and avoid repeating the 
traditional social model’s mistake of excluding individual experience. 
Earlier, I argued that Thomas’ approach is consistent with combining it with 
other knowledge. An example of this is Vehmas and Watson’s (2014) critique of critical 
disability studies’ application of deconstruction. This is of note because of Fraser’s 
endorsement of transformative redistribution and deconstruction. Vehmas and 
Watson argue convincingly that deconstruction is unhelpful in the face of impairment 
and social disadvantage. Deconstruction cannot address the challenges of disablism 
merely by challenging the binary construction of disability identity. Vehmas and 
Watson concur with Thomas on the importance of impairment effects and argue that 
applying deconstruction to disability cannot address the non-discursive aspects of 
impairment. This is consistent with a social-relational analysis that includes a role for 
impairment effects and an independent living analysis which assumes a relatively 
coherent, definable group of disabled people who demand a redistribution of 
resources and transformation of culture to facilitate their independence. 
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I have emphasised throughout the bivalency of disablism. Thomas’ approach, 
combined with Fraser’s analysis can allow the struggle for anti-disablism to focus upon 
the structural basis of disablement, and discern its cultural and economic components. 
Thomas’ approach complements Fraser’s analysis by allowing a role for impairment 
effects and for the individual experience of psycho-emotional disablement. It is 
beneficial that the two are also combined with an independent living approach. 
Without a focus on demands for independent living, other forms of analysis could miss 
the shifts required in human relationships and patterns of distribution for the right to 
independence to be secured. Equally, without a social-relational analysis of disablism, 
calls for independent living could fail due to changes in political-economic structures, 
which could undermine progress toward independent living and which independent 
living can contribute little to understanding. This is arguably what personalisation has 
developed into in recent years. 
For all of the potential of Thomas’ approach when it is synthesized with Fraser’s 
analysis, fusing them together can only ever act as an invitation to probe the enduring 
relations that constitute disablism, what supports and sustains them, and how they 
can be overturned. In the following chapter I will further analyse the drivers of current 
forms of disablism. I will restrict my analysis to factors of political economy because I 
could not comprehensively theorise the totality of contemporary disablism. Political 
economy is an under-theorised aspect of disablism and a ‘window’ through which I will 
endeavour to offer fresh insights on current challenges. It is also important because of 
the situation reviewed in chapter two and because most participants - whether 
‘radical’ or ‘gradual’ - agreed on its importance.  
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Chapter 10: Orientating Disability Studies to 
Activism and Neoliberalism 
In this penultimate chapter I will build on my analysis by introducing some theoretical 
insights from contemporary thinking in feminism and Marxism to the current situation 
of disability activism. In contrast to earlier theoretical discussions, the following will be 
less directly relevant to the interview analysis, but will serve to develop the arguments 
made thus far and help to theorise the broader context in which my analysis is located. 
At a time when the independence and autonomy of many disabled people may be 
threatened, developing novel and revealing ways of viewing the situation can shed 
new light on aspects of current challenges and on possible responses. 
In the first section I will apply John Holloway’s political theory to disability 
studies, offering a means of conceptualising the uneasy relationship between 
academia and activism and their differing requirements (Holloway, 2005). In the 
second section, I draw again on Nancy Fraser’s work, offering a means of 
understanding the broader political context in which disability studies and disability 
activism is located. I argue that applying both these theories aids analysis of the role of 
activism in a time of resurgent disablism, and develops analysis of the way in which 
forces of neoliberal political-economy have exerted a powerful influence on prevailing 
contemporary forms of disablism and created the most urgent challenge facing 
disability studies today. 
Part One: Open Marxism 
In the first of two theoretical contributions in this chapter, I will draw on ‘Open’ 
Marxism (see Holloway, 1991; 1993a; 1993b; 2005; Bonefeld, 1987; 1994; Bonefeld, 
Gunn, and Psychopedis, 1992) and particularly the political theory of John Holloway. 
Before doing this, I first want to argue that many debates in disability studies can be 
understood in reference to two poles which pull theory in opposing directions. On one 
hand arguments are made against the social model and associated work because it is 
perceived to lead to excessive simplification and distortion of the complexity of 
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disability (e.g. Shakespeare, 2006). On the other hand, disability theory is criticised for 
its abstraction and abstruseness, as critics question how useful the resulting work is to 
disabled people and to political efforts to combat disablism (e.g. Oliver, 2009). Thus 
there is a divergence between those who perceive disability studies as the ‘academic 
wing’ (Thomas, 1999) of the DPM, with an obligation to contribute politically useful 
knowledge, and those who perceive it as their role to engage in the detached 
‘scientific’ (Vehmas, 2008) pursuit of knowledge, whether or not it directly benefits the 
DPM. In my view this tension tends to pervade much debate in disability studies, 
particularly in the seemingly never-ending debates on the value of the social model. 
To respond to this tension I will draw on Holloway’s endorsement of ‘negation’ 
as a key theme for political action and political theory. By stressing negation, Holloway 
is arguing that anti-capitalist theory (his chief area of concern) should express the 
constant effort that must be made to contain the subversive and destabilising 
movement of the oppressed to go ‘against-and-beyond’ (2005: 266) the existing social 
order. The constant presence of this ‘against and beyond’ or ‘negation’ within 
capitalism means that theory should capture the instability of the system and avoid 
descriptions of it as a static monolith. A theory based on ‘against and beyond’ is 
befitting because political theory attached to projects for social change begins from a 
standpoint of negativity to the status quo, not a detached comprehension of it. Here 
Holloway gives an apt description of the emergence of theoretical reflection: 
The starting point of theoretical reflection is opposition, negativity, 
struggle. It is from rage that thought is born, not from the pose of 
reason, not from the reasoned-sitting-back-and-reflecting-on-the-
mysteries-of-existence that is the conventional image of the thinker. 
We start from negation, from dissonance. (2005: 265). 
Social theory informed by this perspective should not be a detached or ‘scientific’ 
analysis of continuing domination, but should give a means of understanding the 
urgency of social change and the ever-present possibility of sudden shifts in social 
relations. This approach sits comfortably within autonomist or quasi-anarchist schools 
of Marxist theory, and in the past Holloway was known for espousing ‘Open’ Marxism. 
Open Marxism can be seen as a reaction against determinism and structuralist theory, 
240 
distinguishing itself by developing theoretical categories that are more befitting of the 
openness and unpredictability of societies characterised by constant instability and 
conflict that is often hidden. This stress on constant and sometimes hidden conflict 
reflects the conviction of Open Marxists that capitalism’s stable appearance belies a 
reality of constant resistance. This sensitizes them to the political nature of seemingly 
apolitical and unconnected acts, imbuing the disparate acts of individuals with a 
common force of political negation. 
The emergence of Open Marxism was partly a reaction against the application 
of critical realism to Marxism which was perceived by critics to fail to foreground the 
dynamic potential of the oppressed, losing their self-activity in accounts of ever 
greater structural complexity (Gunn, 1989). In response, an Open Marxist alternative 
was developed which stressed struggle and resistance and the dangers of reifying 
structures of exploitation and oppression. It is similar to Hardt and Negri (2000) who 
see resistance as having an autonomy which cannot be read off from, or accounted 
for, in the terms set by structures of oppression. This is because labour has its own 
force of ‘self-activity’ that capital depends on to reproduce its power, unlike labour 
which is potentially autonomous from capital (Hardt and Negri, 2000). Thus the 
emphasis in Open Marxism is on theory which reflects instability and fragility rather 
than one which portrays a timeless and stable structural prison of oppression. 
At present in disability studies, critical realists (Shakespeare 2006; Watson 
2012) call for accounts of greater complexity and the construction of a theoretical 
edifice that can express the complex interaction of different factors at different levels 
in the lives of disabled people. It might be, however, that support for this approach 
could lead to similar weaknesses to those identified in critical realism by Holloway and 
his contemporaries. That is, in building theorisations of disability that seek to reflect 
the rich complexity of interacting forces at work, critical realists risk reifying structures 
of oppression, omitting from their accounts the autonomy of resistance, as the 
possibility of change moves further away into the distance. 
This focus on negation heightens our appreciation that anti-disablism is 
occurring now in the form of millions of acts of resistance, and not in a far off time 
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when the structures of society have allowed an opportunity to challenge disablism. 
The path by which a convergence of these millions of negations can take place is 
unknown or open and therefore an effort must be made to ensure theoretical 
categories remain ‘open’ and reflective of the instability imposed by the 
unpredictability of struggle. 
This approach to social theory has not previously been applied to disability 
studies, but it is potentially a novel means of interpreting some of the tensions within 
disability studies. Concerned with developing theory of immediate political 
significance, Holloway’s approach is particularly valuable for the insights it can offer a 
thesis such as this, based on working with activists. Having briefly introduced Open 
Marxism, I now go on to apply some of the relevant ideas from this school of thought 
to disability. 
‘Open’ Categories 
It may be useful for proponents of a theory of negation or struggle such as that which 
is found within the social oppression paradigm in disability research to draw upon 
Holloway’s notion of open categories. An open social-relational view of disablism 
requires a coherent explanation of what constitutes disability in order to establish 
what it is that political actors share opposition against. The point of ‘open categories’ is 
to otherwise use a theoretical apparatus that is as open to new developments as 
possible. Another way of putting this is to say that we know that we want to end 
disablism, but we don’t necessarily know how to achieve this. Not knowing creates a 
politics of dialogue, listening and discussion and promotes consideration of the 
multiple dimensions of oppression and resistance (Holloway, 2005). 
The ‘openness’ of Open Marxism refers to theoretical categories themselves. 
This can be seen in contrast to a closed Marxism which:  
Accepts the horizons of a given world as its own theoretical horizons 
and/or it announces a determinism which is causalist or teleological 
[...] This being so, a central target for Marxism with an open 
character is fetishism. Fetishism is the construal (in theory) and the 
constitution (in practice) of social relations as ‘thinglike’, perverting 
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such relations into a commodified and sheerly structural form 
(Bonefeld et al, 1992: xii).  
Applying this to disability, accounts of disability which aim to introduce ever-greater 
structural complexity (Shakespeare 2014; Watson, 2012) risk demoting the importance 
of politics, freezing fluid social relations into elaborate theoretical edifices and 
accepting the givenness of the world. By contrast, theory that builds on the urgency of 
the social model, such as Thomas’ social relational approach to disability, emphasises 
the temporal and spatial specificity of disablism and the way in which it is continually 
re-inscribed onto disabled people in differing ways in specific contexts, serving as a 
warning against seeing fluid relations as static, immutable and ‘thinglike’. Construal of 
disability as ‘thinglike’ can prevent us seeing anti-disablement in everyday practices. 
The social oppression paradigm in disability research does not refer to disability 
as a closed, ahistorical and static category, but is open-ended, referring to how 
oppression is imposed, meaning it is dynamic and expressive of the antagonisms of 
disablism. If disablism is viewed from the perspective of struggle, there can be no 
permanence or certainty in our theories. This is to say that negation or struggle means 
openness of social development and the inadequacy of concepts and their 
incompleteness in the face of ever evolving conditions of struggle (Bonefeld, 1987). A 
focus here on struggle and an opposition to the errors of fetishism is valuable, again 
sensitising us to the ever-present possibility of resistance and the openness of a 
society characterised by this dynamic effort to control resistance. Applying these ideas 
to disability studies means theories that guide resistance must be reformulated as 
continuously as disablism is reformulated and re-inscribed. 
Holloway, Negation and the Self-Activity of Anti-Disablism 
I have noted in brief above that a key point for Open Marxism is the antagonistic 
presence of labour within capitalism and the need to contain the self-activity of an 
autonomous force at the heart of the system. I will go on to apply this insight to anti-
disablism, but will first need to briefly depart from it to explain further what this 
involves. 
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Drawing influences from autonomist Marxism and Adorno (1992), Holloway 
(2011) argues that it is important to break with most discourse on ‘the left’ which 
begins theory from a concern with domination. What is important about his approach, 
and others in the autonomist Marxist tradition, is that it inverts these approaches and 
begins with resistance. Holloway (2011) puts this in the following context: 
This is an inversion of fundamental importance, simply because to 
begin from domination means to enclose oneself within the 
categories of domination, so that the only possible way of breaking 
from domination is through the intervention of an external force
49
. 
In other autonomist accounts (such as Hardt and Negri, 2000) the self-activity of the 
working class replaces capital as the driving force of changes in capitalism. Due to the 
subversive and dynamic power of the working class ‘capital responds, trying to 
decompose the working class, which leads to a recomposition of the working class and 
a new wave of struggle, a new decomposition, and so on in a constant movement of 
composition – decomposition – recomposition’ (Holloway, 2011). Holloway values this 
way of analysing capitalist development, but for him it can too often lead to a static 
concern with characterising the present stage in the composition-recomposition and 
periodising previous discontinuities between different paradigms of labour and 
accumulation. This slippage can undermine the central achievement of autonomism 
and distract from its original intention to put struggle back to the forefront of analysis.  
To protect the status of struggle within analysis, Holloway argues that the 
insight of autonomism must be combined with a ‘conceptual revolution’. This means 
viewing capitalism from the point of view of its ‘negation’, not just replacing the power 
of domination with the power of the working class, but further changing our 
theoretical vocabulary to reflect the dynamism, instability and crisis-creating goals of 
the working class. Holloway puts this in the following way:  
The working class exists as negation of capital, that is, as crisis. The 
emphasis, then, is not on the restructuring of capital (as tends to be 
the case in positive autonomism), but on crisis […] Crisis is the centre 




of thought because what interests us is not the stability of capitalism 
but its instability, its fragility. Marxism is not a theory of the 
reproduction of capitalism, but of its crisis’ (ibid).  
I think a similar point of view can be applied to disablism and anti-disablist resistance. 
Clearly there are important differences between anti-capitalism and anti-disablism in 
many respects. Referring to Fraser’s (1995; Fraser and Honneth, 2003) analysis of 
injustice, the configuration and degree of economic and cultural injustice facing either 
group will differ. Furthermore, while the goals of disabled people and the working class 
may overlap, there may be important differences in their ultimate goals. For example, 
autonomous Marxists like Holloway would take an extremely suspicious view of the 
state as a vehicle for progressive social change, whereas most disabled people would 
see elements of the state as indispensable and as fundamental to their attempts to 
prevent marketization of the welfare state. 
Nonetheless, I think elements of Holloway’s analysis can be applied to anti-
disablism, shedding a different light on the struggle involved. In the first instance, the 
inversion from analysis that begins with domination to analysis that begins with 
resistance has parallels with the beginnings of the modern DPM in Britain, as anti-
disablist activists disrupted their oppression in institutions, through their struggle 
creating fissures in the fabric of disablism as it then stood. To further apply this 
inversion, it could be argued that the resistance of disabled people to institutional 
disablism forced disablism to reconfigure and take new forms, mutating into a more 
commodified and individualised form which I have expressed as enforced 
individualism. This highlights the fragility and instability of disablism as it struggles to 
respond to opposition.  
In this light the ideas of the movement can be seen as an expression of the 
negation of disablism. For example, the social model could be seen as emerging 
directly out of negation, expressing the opposition of activists to disabling barriers and 
structures. This is to say that the social model did not grow out of detached 
contemplation of oppression, but expresses a prior political process of opposition 
already at work. This speaks to the origins of disability studies in the theorisation of 
disabled activists. Their development of theory was not for its own sake but from a 
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position of dissonance with the disabling world. Just as Marxism may be understood as 
an articulation of what Holloway calls the ‘No’ or ‘Scream’ against capitalism (2002; 
2005) so too can the social model of disability be understood as an articulation of the 
negation, or ‘No’ against disablism. A reading of the social model as negation does not 
impose this view onto the social model, but recognises that the social model evolved 
from within political campaigns to overcome or ‘negate’ disablement. Therefore, the 
social model and work in the ‘social oppression paradigm’ (Thomas, 2012) can be seen 
as expressing negation, viewing disablement as an on-going process, analysing it from 
a point of view which assumes the possibility of non-disablism. 
The urgency of negation suggests that disability theory should not be an 
academic exercise in theorising the stability of disablism and domination of disabled 
people. As it becomes embedded in academia, there is a tendency for disability studies 
to become detached from activists and their organic knowledge of their struggle, 
contemplatively and uncritically accepting the givenness of disablism which many 
disabled people are actively resisting. In this context, theorists who offer a structural 
analysis of the reproduction of oppressive social structures can fail to adequately 
account for the central role of resistance, and risk slipping into prescribing what is 
necessary for the reproduction of oppression to continue (Holloway, 1991). Theory 
informed by the negativity of struggle runs against this, giving the social model the 
quality of ‘movement relevant theory’ (Bevington and Dixon, 2005).  
Unity in Diversity 
Of final relevance to applying Open Marxism to disability studies is the promise it holds 
for balancing unity and diversity in the politics of disablement. A persistent and telling 
criticism of the social oppression paradigm is that it excludes difference, assuming a 
common process of disablement and common identity in opposition (Vernon, 1996; 
1999; Dowse, 2001). Importantly in this context, thinking in terms of negation can help 
to reconcile unified resistance with diversity of experience and identity. In Holloways 
terms: 'No is unity, yes is multiplicity, one no, many yeses' (2005: 266). By starting with 
the 'No' against disablism and individual models of disability, the social oppression 
paradigm gives internal unity to the diverse expressions of positive identity contained 
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within disability politics. This can help to overcome barriers to unified political action 




Negation is more difficult to assimilate than the yeses of positive cultural 
identity as it is constantly preoccupied with movement beyond disablism in its 
manifold forms. According to Holloway, if you begin with the yeses of multiple positive 
identities, unity will quickly break down and the forces of anti-oppression is weakened. 
By beginning with negation, the question of a positive alternative is posed, as those 
united in negation consider what alternatives they endorse, leading to a process of 
dialogue (ibid). This is not to deny the importance of the yeses, but 'to understand that 
they must be understood within a negative logic' (ibid: 266). In order to illustrate this 
point, I use the following quote from Holloway, replacing his use of ‘capitalism’ with 
‘disablism’: 
Our no [to disablism] is something we share, something that invites 
us to connect with other expressions of the same no, a coming 
together that is not a question of building alliances but of extending 
our own no. The yeses invite us to focus on our own autonomous 
spaces or movements, to strengthen and deepen them, that is 
important, but we need more than that. The no leads us rather to 
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 Scholars such as Deal (2003) and Reeve (2004) discuss hierarchies of impairment. This term refers to 
the way in which both disabled and non-disabled people can draw distinctions between those in 
different impairment groups, ranking them on criteria such as functional limitation (Deal, 2003).  
Deal explains hierarchies of impairment through the human tendency to base one’s ego and 
self-concept on in-groups and out-groups. In other words, placing other people into an out-group can 
raise one’s esteem by locating oneself in a group that is ranked above the out-group. Thus when in a 
group made up only of disabled people, disabled people often identify with impairment specific groups 
(ibid). Of possible significance at a time of greater scarcity in disability benefits and social care 
payments, Deal notes that hierarchies of impairment can create suspicion of the use of resources by 
members of other impairment groups. It might be argued that this risks undermining the collective 
opposition of disabled people to shared challenges. Deal suggests that such problems can be overcome 
by disabled people choosing not to identify with an impairment-specific group, but as part of the 
broader category of disabled people. This, he asserts, can facilitate challenges to common problems and 
the identification of those groups which are treated worst in contemporary society. 
Reeve (2004) describes the damaging impact hierarchies of impairment can have in practice, 
highlighting the experience of a research participant who had been made to feel isolated and excluded 
because her impairment had been judged by other activist to not constitute a ‘real’ basis for her to be 
identified as a disabled person. In this way, Reeve shows how the functioning of such a hierarchy can 
mean the DPM excludes disabled people perceived to be different or less disabled. For Reeve (2004) this 
behaviour is an example of internalised oppression, as disabled people absorb the categories into which 
society has placed them, adopting them uncritically and using them to exclude others.  This, in turn, can 
be an important part of psycho-emotional disablism (see chapter nine). 
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think of our struggles as cracks or fissures in the texture of 
[disablism], cracks that derive their strength from spreading. Where 
the yeses invite us to build beyond [disablism], the no reminds us 
that the only beyond that makes sense is an against-and- beyond, 
and that although we may have different dreams of the beyond, we 
all share the same against (ibid: 266). 
In this reading, negation of disablism opens up a new world of possibilities and 
concepts, but in a world of disablism we must begin with negation. Practical examples 
of negation could potentially include DPOs. To think of anti-disablism territorially, it 
may be that these spaces, in which the negation of disablism finds practical expression, 
are places where the ideas of disablism do not apply to the same extent. Growing from 
this perspective, alternative practices may develop in spaces characterised by other 
values. Such practices may be asymmetrical to those in more disablist environments 
and may even prefigure those of non-disablist futures. However, when these spaces 
begin to break down and integration into the state-corporate nexus occurs, their 
independence is weakened, the asymmetry of practice disappears, and the refusal 
articulated by the social oppression paradigm becomes more affirmative of the status 
quo. This brings to mind concerns about the closeness of some DPOs to government 
(see chapter one) and the difficulties that DPOs must navigate in maintaining political 
independence while securing contracts through the process of competitive tendering 
that were raised by participants. 
Summary 
I have suggested that the application of an Open Marxist approach to the social 
oppression paradigm can highlight why negation and politically relevant theory 
continues to be important. Through an emphasis on negation and struggle against 
disablement, theories are rendered more flexible because they are subject to change 
at any moment through political struggle. This can also help to guard against theorists 
becoming overly enchanted with the elegance of their theories and the complexity of 
their constructions, constantly reminding them of the need to produce work that 
theorises the instability, and not just the reproduction, of disablement. Arguably, an 
anti-disablist social oppression paradigm, based on negation, can be valuable in 
reconciling both a degree of political unity and diversity. Because it is founded above 
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all on the conceptual importance of struggle and resistance, it may also be endowed 
with qualities of urgency and movement-relevance. It may then be appealing as an 
approach around which resistance can occur. 
In closing, I argue that although the idea of negation may seem pessimistic or 
depressing, its strength is that it invites unity between diverse groups who share an 
opposition to a force of oppression. Diverse positive alternatives are essential, and 
negation would be nonsensical if something else could not be done instead, but 
beginning with positive alternatives can lead to a focus on where actors differ rather 
than what they share. Celebration of positive alternative micro-cultures can do little to 
challenge more general patterns of oppression that constrain the wider creation of 
positive alternatives. In this context it’s important that negation breaks with disablism, 
informing prefigurative practices that could herald non-disablist futures. Even if 
alternative positive practices partially reverse widespread patterns of oppression 
within a limited territory or group of minds, wider patterns of oppression, such as 
those of isolation, enforced individualism, and economic or cultural disablism will 
persist unless they are challenged. Creating positive alternatives to a society 
characterised by disablism is the ultimate goal, but struggle and negation unlocks the 
potential latent in alternatives. Applying these ideas, the ‘social oppression paradigm’ 
in disability research could continue to embody this negation of disablism. 
Part Two: Fraser and Orientating to the Present Conjuncture 
In this section I will again draw on the social theory of Nancy Fraser for a quite 
different purpose than my use of Holloway and Open Marxism in the section above. I 
believe that Frasers’ analysis (2013) offers a powerful means of conceptualising the 
political situation in which current struggles against disablism are located, 
characterised by the significant challenges facing disabled people and disability 
activists. It is my contention that Fraser’s analysis of feminism holds relevant lessons 
for disability theory and that many of her conclusions can be read across into disability 
studies. 
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Within interviews for this study it was apparent that broader and more 
complex strategic dilemmas occupied participants’ attention, along with more 
immediate goals. In the following interview excerpt Nancy gives a good example of 
this, noting the difficulties of advocating individual rights in a neoliberal environment: 
“I think there is a problem […] with asserting individual rights and 
demanding autonomy, which is what choice and control is about, in 
the context of neoliberal economic policy and rising individualism. I 
think there’s an enormous contradiction between that one 
encounters and it’s too easy to fall into a position which would 
support privatisation and the market, because the market is 
supposed to deliver choice and it doesn’t. And that was the 
contradiction that was inherent in the demand for direct payments, 
which is based on the idea that if you give disabled people purchasing 
power, that’s how they achieve autonomy, but there’s problems with 
that. But that’s not to say choice and control are bad ideas or that 
direct payments are a bad idea, just that we shouldn’t be sucked into 
the neoliberal individualist framework.” 
The difficulty in avoiding support for greater privatisation and neoliberalism when 
demanding greater individual rights is arguably indicative of broader dilemmas 
concerning how to orientate to contemporary political-economy. It is Fraser’s (2013) 
belief that the current crisis of neoliberal capitalism is leading to changes in feminism 
as it attempts to grasp the changes driven by the current crisis. As a prolonged 
recession affects production and employment in many parts of the developed world, 
the human cost is paid for by many in the form of impoverishment and growing 
inequality. Fraser asserts that this crisis of capitalism serves as the ‘inescapable 
backdrop’ to feminist theorising which must take heed of the pressures it brings for 
many women. From the evidence in chapter two of this thesis and the contributions of 
participants, it is clear that the crisis and its affects are having a similar or even worse 
impact on many disabled people in Britain. Those who experience compound injustice 
such as disabled women may experience additional oppression, meaning intersectional 
analysis may be of relevance to understanding the combination of injustice they face. 
Fraser (2013) is not merely arguing that the capitalist crisis is an increasingly 
important backdrop to feminist theorising, but also that it has come as a shock to 
many feminist theorists who have avoided the ‘large-scale’ type of theorising needed 
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to address the global forces that have driven the economy to near collapse. Instead, 
Fraser argues, feminism has tended toward ever greater specialisation, as feminist 
theorists have eschewed the type of theorising associated with political–economy in 
favour of disciplinary niches. To some extent this has been driven by legitimate 
concerns that large-scale theorising of political-economy has tended to be reductive 
and/or deterministic, holding that other domains of inquiry should be understood as 
secondary to the theorisation of the ‘objective forces’ of the economy (ibid). This may 
have been a reasonable motivation for leaving behind large-scale theorising, but it has 
served to distance feminism from political-economy, meaning it is ill-equipped to deal 
with the ‘unavoidable questions’ of the nature of the crisis, ‘as well as the prospects 
for an emancipatory resolution’ (ibid: 277). 
I think many of these insights can be applied to disability studies. Just as 
feminism has grown away from political economy and large-scale social theorising, 
arguably, so has disability studies. In some ways this has been a sign of the maturation 
of the field, as theoretical diversity has grown and diverse methodologies have been 
brought to bear on disability issues. Combined with the roots of disability theorising in 
Marxism and historical materialism (Finkelstein, 1980; Oliver, 1990) the maturation of 
the field may have led some to conclude that theorising the relation of disability to 
political economy and capitalist crisis is outdated or necessarily reductionist. With little 
contemporary discussion of political-economy and disability remaining in disability 
studies, it has, like feminism, been poorly positioned to theorise the unavoidable 
importance of the economic forces which have driven public sector cuts, and in turn, 
driven multiple challenges for many disabled people. 
Again taking my cue from Fraser’s analysis of feminism, I argue that disability 
studies requires a means of responding to the significance of capitalist crisis without 
returning to economistic approaches that subsume non-economic factors within 
accounts built upon the assumed deterministic power of economic forces. To develop 
an understanding of the crisis of capitalism that conceptualises crisis as a social 
process, involving a wealth of non-economic factors, Fraser turns to the work of 
Polanyi (1944). Polanyi’s theory of crisis is ‘less about economic breakdown in the 
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narrow sense than about disintegrated communities, ruptured solidarities and 
despoiled nature’ (Fraser, 2013: 228). 
The Value of Polanyi’s Work 
Polanyi’s work (1944) is massive in scope, concerning the historical period in which 
capitalism grew throughout most of the world. Within this, he provides a compelling 
theory of crisis which does not locate the ultimate cause of crises within the economy, 
but in the relationship between the economy and society. For Polanyi, this can most 
productively be theorised by reference to the ‘double movement’ between two 
conflicting forces. On one hand, there is the force of marketization that seeks to 
disembed markets from the social institutions and ethical/cultural norms in which they 
have historically been embedded. This is the product of attempts by proponents of the 
self-regulating market to construct societies which are subordinate to market forces. 
Polanyi shows how these ideas came to prominence during the birth and subsequent 
growth of a distinctive nineteenth century set of economic beliefs, usually known as 
classical liberalism. As proponents of these ideas set to applying them in economic 
policy, Polanyi charts how the goal became to commodify more and more of what had 
previously been seen as beyond the scope of market forces. This runs counter to much 
of earlier history in which markets were embedded within social and ethical rules such 
as the idea of a ‘fair wage’. The political project instigated by proponents of the self-
regulating market to overturn the embedding of markets in social institutions in turn 
provokes a counter–movement for the protection of society. Polanyi views those in 
support of ‘social protection’ as engaged in a struggle to shelter and protect elements 
of society that are newly exposed to the ravages of the free market. The conflict 
between ‘marketisation’ and ‘social protection’ forms the ‘double movement’ of 
conflict at the centre of Polanyi’s theory.  
Polanyi’s analysis is clearly relevant to today’s crisis, and especially the 
challenges facing disabled people. In the present day neoliberalism is commonly 
understood as a renaissance in the ideas of classical liberalism that Polanyi describes. 
Again free-marketeers seek to commodify ever greater tracts of social life. For 
example, the marketisation of social life is arguably apparent in the development of 
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the work capability assessment (WCA) for recipients of PIP and its implementation by 
the private sector firm ATOS. The WCA has been the subject of significant criticism by 
disabled people, one reason for which has been the high number of people declared fit 
to work who have previously been classified as disabled (Guardian, 2014). The reaction 
to the WCA and related reforms could be read as the emergence of an oppositional 
force dedicated to ‘social protection’, as they mobilise to protest against the erosion of 
sensitivity and the welfare safety net that is manifest in the success of attempts to 
commodify previously publically provided services. This opposition, and contemporary 
marketization, appear to fit well with Polanyi’s double movement. 
Fraser finds much to recommend Polanyi’s analysis to feminism. In particular, 
the centrality of social reproduction to his account avoids economic determinism. For 
Polanyi, crisis is not just a question of the destruction of social values underpinning the 
market. Capitalist crisis is at one and the same time a social crisis as unconstrained 
market forces destroy social bonds. This aspect of Polanyi’s theory also has something 
to offer disability studies. Recalling data concerning the social impact of austerity 
policies from earlier in this thesis, it is apparent that the current economic crisis is as 
much a social crisis, breaking apart fragile provisions necessary to maintain 
independence for many disabled people. The existence of social crisis is also arguably 
apparent in the forms which opposition has taken, through the telling of individual 
stories, showing how the economic crisis is also a social crisis, as individual lives are 
devastated by the impact of austerity and marketisation on disabled people (e.g. 
Benstead et al, 2014). 
Another valuable element to Polanyi’s analysis is that it does not reject markets 
entirely but only criticises disembedded markets. He is against markets that are 
unconstrained by moral and social rules and form part of a wider political project to 
marketise ever greater elements of social life. This means his theory can align with the 
conviction of disabled activists that empowerment is possible through markets in ‘care’ 
and support, provided they are embedded in moral norms, which ensure disabled 
people have adequate guidance and resources with which to navigate markets and 
gain the most from them. Social care market conditions at present, characterised in 
part by the absence of sufficient resources to gain from purchasing services, could be 
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described as disembedded markets. The functioning of such markets is increasingly 
divorced from the norms which disabled activists have articulated, and are arguably 
part of the project to marketize ever greater tracts of social life. 
Having established some reasons for which Polanyi’s analysis can be applied to 
the current situation of disabled people, I now go on to explain the critique of it given 
by Fraser, and the resulting ‘quasi-Polanyian’ alternative she offers. 
The Shortcomings of Polanyi’s Analysis: Fraser’s Quasi-
Polanyian Framework 
For all of the initial value of Polanyi’s non-economistic analysis, there are definite 
shortcomings to his approach. His is a clearly evaluative framework in which 
embedded markets and social protection have a positive role, protecting society and 
individuals from the ravages of the market. Conversely, disembedded markets and 
marketisation have a clearly negative role, removing social protection and exposing 
society and its constituent members to the market. Although this captures an 
important dynamic, Fraser claims that it ‘tends to whitewash forms of social protection 
that are at the same time vehicles for domination’ (2013: 229). This is an important 
point for disability studies/disability activism. Some forms of ‘social protection’ have 
often been seen as functioning in the lives of disabled people as oppressive 
institutionalisation or paternalistic ‘care’ (Barnes, 1990). Contrary to Polanyi’s strictly 
evaluative framework, marketisation in such a situation can serve to undermine 
oppressive and entrenched arenas of public sector provision of ‘care’ in which power is 
held over disabled people. This is possible because society, as well as the economy, 
can be a vehicle for oppression. In line with this reasoning, Fraser criticises Polanyi for 
romanticising society and uncritically accepting it as the sanctuary from the ravages of 
the market 
For Fraser, this requires a revision of Polanyi’s theory, which can follow his lead 
in avoiding economism, but also avoid romanticizing society. Fraser’s revision of 
Polanyi’s framework introduces a third force into his double movement, adding 
‘emancipation’ to marketisation and social protection to form a triple movement. 
Emancipation can be reduced to neither marketisation nor social protection. As a third 
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force, emancipation opens up both the economy and society to critique, with both 
viewed as arenas in which domination can potentially operate. It can attend to the 
values in which markets are embedded, for example through a critical analysis of 
hierarchies of disabled and non-disabled identities, or it can attend to the disablist 
norms which underpin distribution or social protection. Equally, it could address more 
clearly economic questions such as access to the jobs market, to one’s own property, 
or to the elite professions (Fraser, 2013). 
In other words, whereas social protection is against the exposure of individual 
and society to market forces, emancipation is against domination in both market and 
society. This better describes the struggle against the forms of domination I described, 
using Fraser’s theory, in chapter eight. Here we saw how the challenges facing disabled 
people could neither be understood as purely economic in nature, nor only as cultural 
or status subordination. Responding to these challenges requires not only a response 
to economic subordination, as Polanyi might endorse through greater social 
protection, but also Fraser’s category of emancipation to address domination in both 
forms. 
Grasping the triple movement at work gives a richer perspective on capitalist 
crisis as a three-sided conflict. To understand what is at work within a crisis requires an 
appreciation that marketisation, social protection and emancipation are ‘conceptually 
irreducible, normatively ambivalent and inextricably entangled’ (Fraser, 2013: 235). 
They cannot be grasped alone and must always be seen as inter-related. To be more 
specific, the relation of any two must always be mediated by the third (ibid). Thus the 
movement between marketisation and social protection cannot be understood 
without reference to emancipation. Without reference to emancipation, domination 
could emerge with social protection that ‘shelters’ people from market forces. Equally, 
the movement between social protection and emancipation cannot be understood 
without reference to marketisation. For Fraser, feminism has failed to grasp that the 
struggle against domination in social protection is played out in a context in which the 
forces of marketisation also exist. Fraser’s point here is that attempts to dismantle 
domination in social protection can lead not just to the erosion of a specific form of 
social protection but can contribute to erosion of social protection in general. That is, 
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as domination through social protection is rightly attacked, forces of marketisation, 
which are far from benign, seize the opportunity to create new forms of marketised 
domination. This means that feminism needs to recall Polanyi’s original warning of the 
deleterious effects of marketisation and understand the background of marketisation 
against which campaigns against oppressive social protection are forged. 
Applying this to disabled people’s situation means that although the 
marketisation of social care could be questioned, this doesn’t have to undermine the 
autonomous involvement of disabled people as participants in markets for the support 
services they use. Marketisation in the case of disabled people’s support takes a form 
that disempowers many disabled people, but arguably doesn’t have to characterise the 
provision of all social care via market transactions. The process of marketisation in 
disabled people’s support services has taken the form of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ (Harvey, 2005), meaning the state has reduced benefits and provision of 
services while steadily increasing the funds awarded to a small number of private 
sector providers of services and assessments accessed by disabled people. The 
preferred contractors tend to monopolise the provision of benefit assessment and care 
provision. Their increasingly empowered position vis-a-vis the position of many 
disabled people characterises the marketisation of disabled people’s services. A 
consistent power imbalance and the relative enrichment of providers via accumulation 
by dispossession risks putting private sector monoliths in positions of undue influence 
over disabled people who lack the resources to interact with the providers of support 
services on an equal footing. 
It is important to consider whether the criticism Fraser makes of feminism 
opening the door to marketisation could also be applied to disabled activists and their 
attempt to dismantle institutional domination in favour of direct payments. It might be 
argued that by demanding the erosion of institutional domination disabled activists 
played a role in eroding social protection for disabled people in general. However, I 
think this would be a mistaken conclusion. The DPM was from an early stage informed 
by historical-materialism and Marxism, so it was already well-attuned to the 
background presence of market relations in the struggle against institutional 
domination. By consistently asserting the importance of the social interpretation of 
256 
disability, the presence of disablist social structures, and the requirement for resources 
adequate to deliver independent living, it could be argued the movement has always 
combined critique of institutional domination with demands that markets are 
embedded in non-economic values which demand disabled people have what is 
needed to successfully navigate markets. The DPM could therefore be seen as an 
exemplar of Fraser’s triple movement, criticising domination through social protection 
and marketisation, while displaying an awareness of the political-economy of 
marketisation against which these criticism were made. The predominant influence of 
neoliberal ideas in recent decades (Harvey, 2005) may have meant that political 
powerful proponents of marketisation were more receptive to the DPM’s criticism of 
domination through social protection than its criticism of domination through 
marketisation and its demand for greater social protection. 
Orientating to current challenges, disabled activists may be well placed if they 
are able to retain their historic commitment to theorising emancipation, social 
protection and marketisation, recalling early seminal texts in disability studies. In the 
present climate, this means taking account of the fact that Neoliberalism is a project of 
marketisation. This would mean that future critiques of disablism must avoid 
undermining social protection in general while they critique institutionalisation and 
professional control (Morris, 2011). 
Summary 
Navigating this territory can be difficult and complex. Criticism of neoliberal policy 
narratives, marketisation and enforced individualism must be expressed in a way that 
cannot be mistaken for a failure to assert individual rights/autonomy or be seen as a 
flawed endorsement of the excesses of paternalism. An analysis of disability within 
political economy is best placed if it can also sustain demands for autonomy and 
individual rights within an analysis of neoliberalism that prevents any 
misunderstanding that support for individual rights and autonomy could mean support 
for neoliberalism. 
257 
To better negotiate these tensions, it is useful to draw on Fraser’s (2013) 
argument that all of the three forces at work in her triple movement are ‘ambivalent’. 
Marketisation can work precisely as Polanyi described by undermining valuable social 
protection, but it can also be valuable on the occasions when it dislodges social 
‘protections’ that are oppressive. Social protection plays the role attributed to it by 
Polanyi by restraining and embedding market forces, sheltering society from the 
ravages of the market. At the same time, it can function to oppress and control in the 
name of protection. Even emancipation is ambivalent. It produces liberation but also 
‘strains in the fabric of existing solidarities. Even as it dismantles domination, it can 
dissolve the solidary ethical basis of social protection, clearing the way for 
marketisation’ (2013: 236). That is to say by challenging domination in economy and 
society, emancipation can fragment aspects of solidarity tied up in systems of social 
protection, thus creating opportunities for marketisation. Each of these ambivalent 
aspects of the triple movement provides an important means of theorising disablism 
and its context in neoliberal societies. Progress has been made against domination in 
social protection but perhaps less against marketisation. As I note above, proponents 
of the self-regulating market are ready to hear critiques of social protection in disabled 
people’s lives, but are largely deaf to criticism of marketisation and the progressive 
destruction of social protection. Orientating to contemporary disablism today may 
mean that the role of marketisation is attended to with renewed scrutiny. 
For Fraser, feminism needs to address marketisation, and the project to 
‘autonomise and extend markets’. In her terms, this requires a coalition between 
forces of emancipation and social protection against marketisation, at the same time 
remembering that social protection can also operate as an arena for domination. 
Arguing that feminism needs to do more to adequately theorise neoliberalism and 
marketisation, Fraser is not, of course, claiming that struggles against domination 
through social protection were mistaken. To argue against marketisation is not argue 
that emancipation from oppressions in the social sphere led causally to neoliberalism. 
Fraser’s case is that the critique of domination and oppression present in social 
‘protection’ operates on a terrain also populated by marketising forces. Increased 
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awareness of this, both in feminism and disability studies, can orientate these 
disciplines to prevalent contemporary forms of injustice wrought by marketisation. 
Coming to a close, we have seen that Fraser’s analysis help us understand why 
divisions and tension have emerged in the movement, as prevalent forms of activism 
struggle to adapt to changing challenges. We have also seen that Holloway’s ideas 
encapsulate the nature of responses to current challenges, and show how disability 
studies can struggle to adapt to the urgent form that activism takes. Holloway and 
Fraser’s ideas are therefore complementary. Fraser’s analysis helps analyse the 
challenges facing the DPM, and Holloway’s Open Marxism aids our understanding of 
strategies and positions taken by activists. In the next and final chapter I conclude by 





Summary of the thesis 
At the outset of this thesis I charted the rise of the DPM and summarised the mounting 
evidence of challenges to disabled people, describing some prominent responses and 
disagreements that have emerged in reaction to this situation. Building on this 
background, I set out to offer an original account of current challenges to disabled 
people and the DPM, while also theorising the positions taken by activists, and the 
political implications of this. As a result of engaging with these questions, I believe I 
have also contributed towards an understanding of the relationship of disability 
studies to the DPM. 
Central to my account of current challenges to disabled people and the DPM, 
was my use of Roulstone and Morgan’s (2009) notion of enforced individualism. I used 
this idea to describe shifts I identified at individual, collective and ideological levels. To 
be specific, this involved the challenge of the growing isolation of individuals, 
problematic conditions facing DPOs in the ‘care’ and support marketplace, and 
obstructive notions of empowerment. The notion of enforced individualism was of 
further use in expressing the dynamic movement in prevalent forms of disablism, as I 
suggested that disablism had changed from being characterised by enforced 
collectivism to a situation in which this coexists with enforced individualism. At the 
ideological level, enforced individualism also conveys the difference between the 
DPM’s grasp of power inequalities in its notion of ‘choice and control’, and ideas of 
‘choice’ underpinning policy, which lacked an analysis of power or inequality. I inferred 
from this analysis that popular narratives of empowerment such as personalisation 
lacked the necessary grasp of structural disablism and power inequalities that have in 
the past been articulated by the DPM and disability studies. Building on this analysis, I 
contextualised these changes by attempting to integrate and apply Thomas’ social 
relational approach and Fraser’s notion of bivalency, in both cases offering valuable 
ways of grasping the nature of contemporary disablism.  
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In my attempts to give an account of responses to these challenges, I noted 
apparent cleavages and points of differentiation at work within the movement. Among 
important points of contestation were views taken on the social model, the primacy of 
economics and the importance of cooperation with government. I brought out the 
implications of these positions and analysed how the movement could respond to 
current challenges, by drawing on Fraser’s account of the difficulty feminism has had in 
responding to resurgent neoliberalism. In this case I suggested that the DPM and 
disability studies might benefit from engagement with political economy, allowing a 
deeper interrogation of the causes of, and justifications for, austerity economics. In my 
view, Fraser’s analysis of feminism and her adaption of Polanyi’s work can offer much 
to those wishing to consider future political theory and strategy. I also argued that 
Open Marxism and particularly the work of Holloway offers a compelling means of 
articulating the requirements of movement-relevant theory. Research into disabled 
people’s lives does not have to be concerned with politics, but disability studies has 
historically been the one area of academia primarily concerned with the politics of 
disablement. Open Marxism reminds us of the birth of disability studies in dissonance 
and in the negation of disablism, and warns of the damage that can result from 
ignoring disablism. Of course, this is not to say that studies of a multitude of factors, 
including the study of discourse, are not legitimate areas of inquiry. Indeed the 
language and discursive construction of current challenges to disabled people is a vital 
and complementary area to what I have discussed in this thesis. 
Future possibilities for research 
When I described the development of my approach in chapter three, I explained the 
broadening of topic to encompass a wide range of disabling challenges that many 
disabled people currently face. Even within the broader approach I have taken, there 
have been important current threats and challenges which have been omitted. Among 
the more obviously significant topics that I have omitted are disabled people’s position 
in the labour market (Yates and Roulstone, 2012), and the growth of disablist hate 
crime (Roulstone and Mason-Bish, 2014). If I were to pursue further study of disabled 
people’s situation in a more holistic manner, I would try to integrate these topics 
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within my work. Their absence in this thesis was in part driven by the concerns of my 
participants, and in part by the need to limit the number of topics discussed to a 
manageable number. 
Theoretically, the greatest omission may be the lack of intersectional analysis 
of the impacts of austerity. Analysis of this sort could illuminate the way in which cuts 
and reforms are experienced differently by disabled people of varying characteristics, 
situations and identities. Deepening my own understanding of intersectionality might 
allow me to better grasp how the basic insight of intersectionality can be applied in 
analysis. By focusing on disabled people in this thesis, I do not mean to have 
diminished the importance of other political struggles or to imply that disabled people 
are not in many cases part of these struggles. Indeed, the impact of the challenges I 
have described will also interact with other forms of oppression and privilege. For 
example, it may be that working class unemployed disabled women may have been 
particularly affected by recent changes to government policy. The evidence collated in 
chapter two of this thesis and in interviews suggests profound and multiple challenges 
for some disabled people. This does not mean that I endorse a hierarchy of oppression 
in which disabled people are assumed to experience the greatest degree of 
oppression. A sensitive intersectional analysis is enriched by drawing upon more 
specific and detailed studies of the oppression experienced by particular groups.  
Another area in which I believe my work could be further developed is through 
additional insights from social movement studies and political theory. Surprisingly little 
is drawn from these disciplines in disability studies considering that the field has a 
close relationship to the DPM. Finally, I also believe that further work could be 
directed towards the empirical aspects of the current challenges to disabled people 
and the DPM. In this light, it is noteworthy that non-academic researchers have 
published the most systematic studies of this sort (see the work of Young, 2014 and 
Duffy, 2014 that I reviewed in chapter two). Disability studies would be well served to 
engage in this crucial area of research, and I would personally like to be involved in the 
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